It'll Only Get Worse

The Middle East is hardly a model of stability. Civil wars, bloody suppressions, and international conflicts seem par for the course. However, the past few years have seen an increase in violent struggles in the region. And these recent upheavals are harbingers of future Mideast chaos, caused in part by the decreasing global importance of oil. An isolationist shift in American foreign policy, excepting only Israel, will exacerbate this trend toward regional destabilization.

The most lasting change may be the global shift of nonrenewable resources. Saudi Arabia is no longer the world’s largest producer of oil—Russia has surpassed it, and the US is a close third, expected to exceed even Russia’s production by the end of the decade. And this does not take into account the increasing role of natural gas, which is disproportionately produced by Russia and the United States. Iran, the world’s third-largest supplier of natural gas, produces less than a quarter of US output. With the gradual transition to alternative energy sources and the increased use of natural gas, oil revenue will not flow into the Middle East like it used to. Dictators from Saudi Arabia to Iran to Qatar will find themselves without the guaranteed flow of wealth that has for decades propped up their regimes.

Add the diminished role of the U.S. to dwindling oil revenues and mix thoroughly with the globalizing forces of this century, specifically the Internet and telecommunications. Now sprinkle the mixture on one of the most historically combustible regions of the globe, replete with autocracy, theocracy, and centuries-old religious feuds. Add yeast, let sit for a decade.

What we are likely to get is, put simply, chaos.

Chaos in the Middle East is hardly a novel thought. But it is almost certain to get worse over the coming decades, in an ongoing process that may have begun with the so-called Arab Spring. We saw demonstrations, protest suppressions, civil wars, and regime changes. As the dictators who cling to power lose their source of funding, the process will only accelerate. If American isolationism deepens, our pseudo-involvement in the Syrian conflict may be the swan song of an era defined by international concern regarding Middle Eastern geopolitics. Someday, perhaps someday soon, the West might simply not care about the Middle East. Protecting the Persian Gulf may not be in our strategic interests, propping up the Saud regime not our agenda.

Such a world hardly seems far off in a day and age when most of the West simply ignores the overt use of chemical weapons by a dictator against his own people. Yes, the situation is complicated. Yes, there is a civil war. But no nation seems to care to enforce international norms regarding warfare or morality. Obama drew a red line, and now declines to enforce it, instead hitching his presidency on the prayer that Vladimir Putin delivers on his plans and collects all of Syria’s chemical weapons, despite reports that the chemical arsenal is already scattered across the country.

Some insist that the diminished influence of foreign factors will allow residents of the Middle East to develop their own systems of government and finally promote peace in the region. They are wrong. True, America has not always been a stabilizing force. But Iraq and Iran needed no foreign instigation to go to war in the 1980s; Syria wasn’t exactly a halcyon nation before Putin and Obama began meddling in the conflict. Without the U.S. propping up Mubarak, Egypt would likely have fallen into civil war decades ago. The same goes for Saudi Arabia, where the Saud regime would be long out of power without petrodollars.

The more optimistic among us hope that the very factors which are destabilizing the region can ultimately foster democracy. After all, without American intervention and Western demand for foreign oil, perhaps grassroots movements will take advantage of interconnectivity and social media to foster a civil society. Egypt was an ideal test case for this optimistic spirit: A dictator was overthrown and elections were held. What ensued, though, was a blossoming theocracy nipped in the bud by a bloody military coup. And even Libya is rife with militias wreaking havoc. So sure, maybe democracy will follow the absence of foreign influences. But I certainly wouldn’t hold my breath.

How the region will look in 50 years is anyone’s guess. Sheikh Rashid bin Saeed Al Maktoum, a former Prime Minister of the United Arab Emirates, reportedly had his own timeline: “My grandfather rode a camel, my father rode a camel, I drive a Mercedes, my son drives a Land Rover, his son will drive a Land Rover, but his son will ride a camel.” And once the US can fuel its own fleet of Mercedes and Land Rovers, we will have no interest in camels. Like it or not, chaos will fill the power void.

Jacob R. Drucker ’15, a Crimson editorial writer, is an economics concentrator in Mather House.