Wag the Dog

Possibly the most prevalent source of political legitimacy in our age is the democratic principle, the idea that the most popular expression is necessarily the most desirable one. It has even come to be that the word democracy is now synonymous with what is good. We should know better.

Last Friday, the Dutch cabinet decided not to hold a referendum on the new Reform Treaty for the European Union (EU). European media outlets criticized the decision as an undemocratic move to push through a decision that would not pass in popular vote. They are probably right. And yet, the Cabinet is acting in the people(s) of Europe’s best interest.

The treaty effectively replaces the defunct EU Constitution, decidedly shot down by French and Dutch voters in 2005. After the rejection by two countries historically favorable to integration, Europe sank deep into institutional crisis. German Chancellor Angela D. Merkel has since pulled off an improbable and impressive political maneuver by drafting a reform treaty that effectively covers all the constitutional bases but is less than explicit about it.

In the first place, the “treaty” is no “constitution,” and this seemingly minor change in nomenclature has done wonders for its prospects of approval. Similarly, EU regulations will not be deemed “laws” in the future, as the Constitution had proposed; they will remain “regulations.” And although Europe’s flag and anthem are easily found on Google, they have been left out of the treaty’s text.

Such cosmetic changes may sound pointless, but that is precisely the point. Anders F. Rasmussen, the Danish prime minister, summed up the treaty’s benefits last June: “The good thing is that all the symbolic elements are gone, and that which really matters–the core–is left.” The core Rasmussen alludes to has several layers, all of them crucial to the project of European integration.

Firstly, the treaty includes a permanent presidency to cement the sense of unity among member-states and avoid the constant vertigo of the many different agendas resulting from rotating presidencies. Moreover, it proposes two other important structural changes that would curb bureaucratic issues within the EU. Once the treaty is passed, the EU will achieve legal personality as one entity and, at the same time, voting procedures will be modified to address what critics have baptized “a democratic deficit.” Such changes will increase the EU’s legitimacy both legally and practically.

Even more importantly, Merkel’s project addresses the need for a cohesive foreign policy. Although the name “Union Minister for Foreign Affairs” had to be dropped along with the flag and anthem, the post of “High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Affairs” would effectively carry all of its weight. The new position will effectively do much more than save Brussels a redundant salary, since today two bureaucrats share foreign policy responsibilities.

Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, one of Europe’s most important politicians, expressed in his personal blog that having one person with Europe’s foreign mandate would answer Henry Kissinger’s famous question: “Who do I call if I want to call Europe?” This relates closely with the true raison d’être for the EU in the first place: keeping the old continent relevant in the modern world.

This last March, member states invested heavily on marketing campaigns to remind citizens about the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, the genesis of the present Union. To the horror of Euro-skeptics around the world, the Union—which started in Rome with six countries in an economic alliance—has since grown relentlessly, adapting and surviving more than one failed referendum. In fact, the French and Dutch in 2005 were not the first to reject the EU; the Norwegians, for example, repeatedly voted against joining. The main problem with the 2005 vote was that many national constituencies confounded the EU constitution with a plebiscitary vote on their governments. For instance, most experts saw the failure of the French referendum not as a vote against integration, but rather as a vote against the Chirac administration. This should not even be a possibility.

But this is not about clever marketing. Rather, the treaty should be interpreted as the materialization of an instinct of survival for the continent as a whole. After single-handedly running the globe for centuries, Europe today faces the threat of sinking into oblivion. Through political, economic, and institutional progress, membership to the Union has brought benefits to many countries far beyond the original founders. Where totalitarianism had once consigned whole societies to poverty and underdevelopment, membership to the EU has made Spain and Poland, among others, thrive in the environment of globalization, furthering their relationships with older members like France and Germany.

Today, with the rise of undemocratic powers like Russia and China, Europe as a whole has little time for endlessly rotating presidencies, over-bureaucratized central institutions, or, even worse, a half-hearted foreign policy. It needs further coordination with which to augment its power, in order to guarantee the survival of the democratic values now coded in the requirements for membership. Europe needs a constitution, which today means voting for the reform treaty.

The Dutch parliament now has the power to force a popular vote by turning against the national cabinet’s decision, just like it did some years ago with the constitutional vote. The legislative body should learn from its past slip, bypassing needless popular consults and fast-tracking approval. Because, considering all implications, the outcome is paradoxically more democratic without popular consultation.



Pierpaolo Barbieri ’09, a Crimson associate editorial chair, is a history concentrator in Eliot House.