Take It or Leave It

The new year has brought with it a clear message that the Bush-Rumsfeld misadventure of going solo into Iraq needs reexamination. As Saddam Hussein’s coffin, strapped to a U.S. Black Hawk helicopter, traveled across the desert, the Pentagon reported that U.S. deaths in Iraq have reached a new high of 3,000 since the conflict began in 2003. Although President Bush has held intensive strategic meetings with his new Secretary of Defense, Robert M. Gates, and other top security and army officials, his response to the report of the respected Iraq Study Group (ISG) has yet to materialize.

The ISG report, released on Dec. 6, boldly lays out a 79-point plan for Iraq, which, if adopted, claims to ensure the withdrawal of American troops from a stable Iraq by the first quarter of 2008. The report’s central recommendation is that America should pressure Iraq into making concessions to the Sunnis in the form of a list of reconciliation “milestones.” If the Iraqi government fails to make these concessions, then America should reduce or completely suspend its military and economic support. Unsurprisingly, the Iraqi government spat venom on the report, and Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, called the report an “insult” to Iraq’s people. He claimed that the report smacks of the 1980s and early 1990s American mindset, which favored order and a Sunni tyranny over the potential mayhem of a more democratic system.

While the ISG’s report has immediately resulted in a positive outcome by forcing the President to flirt with alternative strategies, this plan is strategically flawed in its imposition of an arbitrary deadline and in its general simplicity. The plan’s merits should not be ignored, but its central recommendations should not be implemented. Rather, it should be taken for what it is—a serious wake-up call to the president that the current strategy is not working. We are not losing in Iraq, but we are certainly not winning.

Almost four years since the invasion of Iraq, many Iraqis now call for a return to the days of the former Iraqi tyrant, Saddam Hussein. Given the bloodbath that has ensued since the invasion and the sectarian violence that has taken hold in the region, this reaction comes as no surprise. Just before his defenestration, former Secretary of Defense Donald R. Rumsfeld commented in a recently leaked memo that his current plan of action for Iraq cannot hope to stabilize the region. Another leak revealed a second memo written by Stephen J. Hadley, Bush’s national security advisor, which questions the competence of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Staying the course, the ISG report scathingly reveals, is no longer an option. America cannot hope to sustain a war that amounts to $2 billion a day, especially when scant progress is being made. Continued American presence in Iraq, the ISG notes, will only increase resentment in Iraq and lead Iraqis to suspect a permanent U.S. occupation. At home, “stay the course” only breeds frustrated citizens.

The report has, in the respect of discrediting the Bush mantra, so far proven successful: The Texas swaggerer has finally emerged from his stark state of denial and admitted during the first weeks of December that “stay the course” is no longer a viable option. The President is now (finally) open to new options as he seeks to craft “a new way forward.” Whether the White House will listen to the ISG report and other suggestions remains to be seen, but at least debate on the topic is unfolding.

Sadly, though, the report is saddled with shortcomings. Among the combination of three main policies recommended, the suggested dialogue with the United States, Syria, and Iran immediately stands out. To think that these countries would collaborate with America is almost laughable, given American’s intervention in preventing Syria from interfering in Lebanon and condemnation of Iran’s nuclear pursuits.

Indeed, diplomacy with these regimes would legitimize them—something that is certainly not in America’s interest. While some many contend that some dialogue is better than none at all, it seems highly unlikely that Iran or Syria would choose to bend to American interests.

Furthermore, the call for peacemaking in Palestine also needs revision. A Hamas-dominated government—which denies Israel’s right to exist—will certainly prove hostile to negotiations with Israel, and permanent peace will surely not materialize in the reported timeframe of a year. Moreover, the call for the transfer of the Golan Heights from Israel to Syria and the establishment of a stable Palestinian state could easily be construed as diminishing U.S. support for Israel.

Even more problematic is the report’s support for an arbitrary deadline of early 2008 for an American military withdrawal. In response, Senator John S. McCain (R-Ariz.), a revered Vietnam veteran and presidential candidate for 2008, called this deadline “a recipe that will lead to…our defeat.” Announcing a set deadline is tantamount to having a parent announce to their teenage child that they will leave the house for the weekend…party, anyone? It would only invigorate America’s enemies around the globe, since they would seize the opportunity to wreak more havoc in the area and worsen America’s exit. If sectarian violence were to reach a feverish pitch leading up to the set deadline and the presence of American troops became even more vital for regional stability, then exiting might further stir trouble at home and lead to a more disillusioned citizenry. Ultimately, a deadline would clearly paint a pathetic image of a frail America that would permeate the Middle East and the rest of the world, only leaving room for a Vietnam-like withdrawal and national disgrace.

So while the ISG’s report has its virtues—namely, highlighting the failures of the present strategy—it is nonetheless undermined by several critical flaws. The report deserves consideration, but ultimately Bush should not adopt its call for a set date for leaving Iraq. A “new way forward” must indeed be found in Iraq, but the ISG report doesn’t fit the bill.

Ana I. Mendy ’09 is a history concentrator in Adams House.