Bush’s Democratic Success

On March 24, Askar Akaev, the then-president of Kyrgyzstan, fled the country on a nighttime flight to Russia. Democratic protesters, revolting against rigged elections, had seized government headquarters in the capital Bishkek and overwhelmed the government’s military forces and riot police. Last Monday, Akaev formally announced his resignation, ending his 15-year autocratic rule and concluding the democratic revolution in the Central Asian republic.

Kyrgyzstan’s “tulip revolution” now stands alongside Ukraine’s recent “orange revolution” and Georgia’s ”rose revolution” as the third democratic revolution in a former Soviet state in 18 months. This remarkable turn toward democracy has not been limited to the former USSR; in the last three months, post-Saddam Iraq has held its first democratic elections, Palestinians have freely elected the moderate Mahmoud Abbas, demonstrators have caused the downfall of the Syrian puppet-government in Lebanon and created fierce pressure for Syria to withdraw its troops, Hosni Mubarak, Egypt’s ruler for 24 years, has scheduled multiparty presidential elections for later this year, and even Saudi Arabia has held its first municipal elections. Around the world, people are casting off oppressive authoritarian regimes at an unprecedented rate. Could it be that the President Bush and the neoconservative cabal were, god forbid, right? Right about Iraq, right about the universal appeal of freedom and democracy, and right about the aggressive use of American might to pressure for democratic reforms?

Although there certainly have been lucky breaks, like the death of Arafat, it seems churlish not to give the Bush Administration some credit for the spread of democracy. Regime change in Iraq has changed the climate in the Middle East by enabling the Iraqi people to defy the insurgency and prove the plausibility of democracy. Even more importantly, Bush shifted away from the U.S.’s previous policy of “pragmatic tolerance” of brutal autocratic regimes, which calcified established political regimes and stillborn reformist efforts. As a foreign policy, cynicism masquerading under the self-congratulatory name of “realism” doesn’t have the potential of Bush’s Wilson-esqe vision of freedom and democracy.

Furthermore, once given a good push by the Bush administration, the spread of democracy has signs of being a virtuous cycle—it’s contagious, and the virus is spreading. No one claims a direct causal link between war in Iraq and Syrian pullout from Lebanon; however, the example of self-determination and democracy in Iraq has made people question autocratic rule at home. They have begun to believe that change is possible in their home country and know that the U.S. will support reformists’ efforts. The Iraqi elections have undoubtedly heartened the Lebanese demonstrators and increased pressure on the regions’ autocratic regimes. Mubarak’s sudden change of heart is not due to a case of violent mood swings. The Kyrgyzstan revolution has sent a clear message to the motley collection of anachronistic despots that rule Central Asia’s ’Stans. In Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbaev has reacted with fear-fueled anger and closed the border to Kyrgyzstan, but he will find it difficult to simply block out the example of Kyrgyz people-power. Perhaps we can even hope for the winds of revolution to spread the spark of democracy to the North Korea-like state of Turkmenistan, which is ruled by the demented Turkmenbashi (“Father of Turkmen”), who has deified himself (literally) and renamed months after his family members.

However, the spread of democracy is no panacea; by itself, democracy will not solve all of the problems in the third world. Poverty will not magically disappear, corruption will prove difficult to eradicate, ethnic tensions could increase, and democracy itself can backslide toward authoritarian personal rule (e.g., Russia). Nevertheless, democratic rule is almost always a step forward. The problems faced by a new democratic leadership—like secessionist regions in Georgia or control of Kirkuk in Iraq—will have to be faced eventually. Autocratic rule did not solve these problems, and continued repression will only make them fester. Even if a corrupt and autocratic ruler is replaced by another corrupt insider, as may happen in Kyrgyzstan, the successor will certainly find his behavior constrained by the example of what happened to his predecessor.

In each of the three former Soviet states, instead of meekly accepting the make-believe re-election of deeply corrupt leaders, average citizens courageously took to the streets, demanded honest government and honest elections, and led a democratic revolution. Neither this nor the first flowering of democracy in the Middle East has been foisted upon reluctant people by the barrel of a gun; rather, it reflects the action of individuals who demanded a say in their government. Before our faith in the common man, the ability of average people, succumbs to cultured intellectual cynicism or sophisticated anti-democratic snobbery, we should pause to appreciate the beauty and promise of these reforms. The unprecedented march of democracy, the echoes of which can be heard worldwide, validates and vindicates President Bush’s inaugural paean to liberty and democracy, the promise of “ending tyranny in our world.”

Piotr Brzezinski ’07 is an economics and Slavic Languages and Literature concentrator in Currier House.