Keep the Paper Trail

It is often remarked that Americans—hardheaded hegemons—never learn from their mistakes. Egregious lapses in foresight, ill-fated invasions and the illiberal use of diplomatic finesse are common fodder for this critique. But this coming November, voters can’t play the part of imprudent Americans. As the future of the country rests on the results of the upcoming presidential election, they must learn from the debacle last time around in 2000 and demand curbs to the troubling new trend of electronic voting. Without a tangible record of the votes—a “paper trail” of cast ballots—there remains the potential that Americans will once again witness a mockery of one of the most important events of the decade.

The market for electronic voting machines boomed following the circumstances of the 2000 election in Florida. After the debacle, state officials began searching for new methods to facilitate voting and thus prevent another contentious election. Following California’s lead, many states began the transition from traditional punch card ballots to touch screen systems; yet, since the start of the switchover, many critics have come forth claiming that current systems are insufficiently equipped to stave off the threat of malfunction or manipulation. Therefore, many are calling for a paper trail, or “ballot receipts,” to ensure that in the event of a close or contested election, officials will have evidence of the actual votes. We feel strongly that this is a necessary precaution.

Opponents of this proposal, however, argue that the paper trail is unnecessary and will prove cumbersome to the voting process. According to an article in The New York Times, critics of attaching a printer to current and future electronic voting machines—so voters can “confirm” their ballot—cite “paper jams, voter confusion and delays in the voting booth while voters read their receipts,” as potential disincentives to vote. But, at present, studies show that electronic voting systems are not currently designed to ensure we won’t witness another 2000 election, a concern that should trump added inconvenience.

In July 2003, Aviel D. Rubin, a professor from Johns Hopkins University, published an in-depth security analysis of the electronic voting machines manufactured by Diebold Inc.—one of the primary companies to benefit from the transition to touch screen voting. The report was full of criticisms of the company’s system and claimed that Diebold’s “voting system is far below even the most minimal security standards applicable in other contexts.” The report highlighted many of the potential dangers stemming from the nature of technology—essentially, that malfunctions are often unforeseeable—and the threat of “a wide range of attacks, including ballot stuffing by voters and incorrect tallying by insiders.” Until these considerable concerns are addressed, there is no legitimate reason to oppose a paper trail.

Ideally, we wouldn’t have to worry about tangible evidence to ensure the fair outcome of a presidential election. Other countries have gotten there—just look at the rather healthy system of electronic voting that exists in Australia. According to an article featured on Wired.com, “Australians designed a system [in 2001] that addressed and eased most of those concerns: They chose to make the software running their system completely open to public scrutiny.” That is, whereas Diebold chose to keep its software coding secret until it was finally leaked and posted on the web—and subsequently scrutinized by Avriel and his associates—the private Australian company had no qualms in providing their operating software in order to ensure voter confidence in the process.

But Diebold’s secrecy and public resistance of the proposed paper trails may not simply involve matters of marketing. After discovering that Diebold’s Chairman, Walden O’Dell, and other members of the company’s board are significant Bush benefactors, their intentions of opposing a ballot receipts remained appropriately suspect to many of the proposal’s proponents. As long as the company’s software security remains inept at guaranteeing a fair and clean election, electronic voting without paper evidence leaves Diebold’s intentions dubious. To ensure that voter confidence is at its utmost, and to make certain that we don’t fall prey to mistakes made in the 2000 election, we must make sure that there’s a paper trail this November.