Avoiding Historical Repetition

On Oct. 12, Pakistan's military high command dismissed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, placing Sharif and his close associates under arrest. Army Chief Pervez Musharraf proclaimed himself chief executive, declaring a state of emergency, placing the constitution in abeyance and suspending parliament. Sharif's ouster is the fourth successive dismissal of an elected government before it completed its term of office, bringing to an abrupt end the democratic process Pakistan's powerful army had itself put into place in 1988 when it reluctantly transferred power to the political leadership following eleven years of military rule.

Faithfully following the blueprints of his military predecessors who have directly or indirectly controlled Pakistan for most of its existence, Musharraf claims the army reluctantly intervened to prevent an unscrupulous and corrupt political leadership from destabilizing the armed forces, the last remaining viable institution after Sharif had systematically eroded the autonomy and authority of the president, the parliament and the judiciary. Refusing to give a definite timetable for the restoration of a civilian, representative government, Musharraf claims that the military will withdraw to the barracks once it has prepared the grounds for a "true democracy," having eradicated all the ills of the Pakistani state, where violence is rampant as a result of political polarization and financial bankruptcy is only averted through external grants and loans.

To gain domestic acceptance and international legitimacy for continued military rule, Musharraf has announced an agenda for "good governance" which includes reviving the economy, ensuring financial and political accountability, depoliticizing state institutions, providing justice, rebuilding national cohesion and strengthening the federation through the devolution of power.

Repeated military interventions, however, are responsible for the very evils that Pakistan's newest military rulers claim to have taken upon themselves to obliterate. Financial and political accountability and the delivery of justice requires the rule of law, the first casualty of a military intervention. Musharraf himself is responsible for superimposing the military's dictates over the supreme law of the land, the constitution. Blatant abuse of state power and institutional corruption were rampant in past Pakistani military regimes, but no dictator held himself, or his regime, accountable before the superior courts. Every military withdrawal took place after the high command acquired constitutional protection for its actions. It is unlikely that the present regime will do otherwise.

It is also a supreme irony for a military junta to claim it intends to depoliticize state institutions. Not only will the armed forces play a direct political role but they will work, as in the past, through the civil bureaucracy, picking and choosing their civilian allies and in the process undermining institutional norms and procedures. In its first few weeks in power, the Musharraf regime has already appointed and dismissed a number of key bureaucrats and political expediency will continue to dictate its interaction with the civil administration.

Devolution of power is probably the most dubious of Musharraf's numerous justifications for prolonging military rule. Past military regimes in multi-ethnic Pakistan either overrode or distorted constitutional provisions for the distribution of power between the center and the units of the federation, undermining national cohesion and dividing society along ethnic and territorial lines. To retain power, the Musharraf regime will require and will inevitably exercise centralized control, if not for any other reason than to ensure the continued support of its main constituency, the armed forces. To truly devolve power, the regime would deprive itself of its control over the country's economic resources, a substantive portion of which sustain a half-a-million-strong military establishment in one of the poorest and most underdeveloped states in the world.

Military rule is no solution to the problems that presently confront Pakistan. While the elected government should be held responsible for its inability to meet the demands of its constituents for good governance, political stability and economic development, the military is equally, if not more, culpable, since it was responsible for dictating and overseeing the framework under which it handed over power in 1988. Sharif himself was handpicked by the military and installed in power not once, but twice through manipulated elections. Tutored by his military mentors, it is but natural that Sharif behaved more like a civilian despot than an elected prime minister, riding roughshod over his political opposition and demolishing every government institution that stood in his way.

Did the Pakistani military intervene to save democracy as its current army chief claims? Musharraf willingly accepted the position of army chief, superceding two senior officers when Sharif dismissed General Karamat in October 1998, and only acted when he faced a summary dismissal. Nor did his corps commanders have any objections to working under Sharif until the Prime Minister made the grave error of encroaching on the military's autonomy. Will the military deliver "true" democracy to Pakistan, as Musharraf has pledged? In the past fifty years, Pakistan's fragile democratic base has eroded as a result of repeated military interventions. With the October coup, Pakistan is back to square one and time is fast running out. Should the present junta decide to retain power indefinitely, depriving 130 million Pakistanis of democratic avenues for bargaining, participation and dissent, political instability and internal divisions will threaten the very fabric of a state where history has the tendency of repeating itself as a farce.

Samina Ahmed is a fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the John F. Kennedy School of Government.