Letters to the editor

Senate Was Correct Not to Rubber Stamp Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

It may be reasonable to compare the fate of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919-1920 with that of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1999, as did Shawn P. Saler '03 (Opinion, Oct. 18). But the implications of such a comparsion are not necessarily what Saler makes them out to be.

Among other things it is important to keep in mind that the Treaty of Versailles was, put simply, a historical disaster. The League of Nations covenant was only one of its many ill-conceived provisions: while noble in theory, the League was so poorly implemented that even had the United States joined, it is unclear whether anything substantive would have come of it.

At the same time, the harsh conditions imposed on Germany at Versailles--including the infamous "war guilt" clause--clearly led to the resurgence of German nationalism. That the United States did not ratify the agreement shows nothing more than that the Senate in 1920 recognized a bad treaty when it saw one. Perhaps if our European allies had followed our example and tried to work out a more equitable agreement, the catastrophes of the subsequent two decades might have been avoided.

Now as then, the United States Senate should not be in the business of rubber-stamping flawed agreements simply because the prevailing winds of international opinion are blowing in the same direction.

It was obvious in 1919 that the Allies needed to sign a peace with Germany, but far from obvious that the Treaty of Versailles was the best peace that could have been arranged.

Likewise, the question today is not whether we should have a nuclear arms agreement--clearly, we should--but rather what kind of agreement it should be.

Despite accusations of partisanship, the Republicans who voted against the test ban treaty last week did so because they believed that it was unenforceable and potentially dangerous.

Maybe it would have been better simply to scuttle the vote in order to save face. Maybe the treaty should even have been ratified as a symbolic statement of American leadership in nuclear deescalation; it is, after all, better than nothing.

But it is unfair to suggest that the Senate did not take a principled stand on the matter. Instead of casting blame, we should take this opportunity to figure out what kind of arms agreement will meaningfully safeguard the peaceful interests of the United States and the world in the years to come.

Kevin A. Shapiro '00

Oct. 18, 1999