U.S. Must Sign Test Ban

The U.S. Senate has a unique opportunity this week to shred American credibility in international affairs. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), a measure created through U.S. diplomacy and signed by 154 nations, is coming up for a vote in the Senate today or tomorrow and appears to be headed for defeat. The treaty should be ratified immediately or, if the necessary votes are unavailable, delayed until a more extensive public debate can take place.

The CTBT, which requires a two-thirds vote of the Senate for ratification, was stalled for two years by Republican senators while the White House foolishly neglected to lobby in its favor. During that time, the treaty's opponents have solicited support; now the treaty has been yanked back into action when the Republicans feel certain that they have the votes to block it. The treaty was scheduled to come to a vote today, although President Clinton has requested that it be delayed to give the country more time to consider a vital issue of security.

The United States has already made a unilateral commitment not to test nuclear weapons--we have not conducted a nuclear test since 1992. In light of this commitment, we have little reason not to sign on to a treaty preventing other nations from building new arsenals. The logic of a test ban was recognized 40 years ago by former president Dwight D. Eisenhower when he called for a treaty ending nuclear tests: because no arsenal can be developed without testing the components, a test ban would be a perhaps insurmountable barrier to any would-be nuclear power.

Some argue that the United States needs testing, that our weapon stockpile will deteriorate over time without testing, and could become ineffective or unsafe. Many experts, however, believe that computer simulations and tests of conventional explosives will keep the stockpile reliable. Indeed, a recent letter to the Senate signed by 32 Nobel laureates in Physics (including Higgins Professor of Physics Sheldon L. Glashow) stated that "fully informed technical studies" had confirmed that nuclear tests are unnecessary to maintain the current arsenal. The environmental consequences of exploding a nuclear weapon and releasing radiation provide additional incentives for the U.S. to refrain from breaking its self-imposed commitment.

Others worry that rogue nations would violate a test ban treaty, conducting surreptitious tests and building their arsenals while the world lay complacent. This argument is frivolous. The treaty calls for a global network of sensitive seismic monitoring stations that would detect any nuclear test large enough to be militarily useful. If, indeed, the Chinese government did steal secrets from our nation's nuclear laboratories, only a ban on testing could prevent those secrets from being put to use. Furthermore, any illicit testing that the treaty's enforcement provisions would miss could certainly occur (and undoubtedly would) if the treaty were never signed and the monitoring devices never put in place. The treaty can only aid the world community in detecting nuclear testing, punishing the offending nations and preventing a more rapid spread of nuclear technology.

That proliferation of nuclear weapons is a threat that the U.S. government has an absolute responsibility to prevent. The U.S. has traditionally supported measures such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and made proliferation a substantial concern of our foreign policy. Of the 154 nations that have signed the CTBT, relatively few have ratified the treaty yet--many are watching to see whether America's actions will measure up to its words. Failing to ratify the treaty would destroy any credibility the U.S. possesses in the arena of nuclear proliferation. The treaty is too important to be reduced to a political football.