Book Champions Theory of Evolution

Book

Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life

by Daniel Dennett

Simon & Schuster

586 pp., $30.00

There are two responses one could have to the fact that human beings are nothing but the accidental product of a mindless algorithmic process. The first is the path of reluctance, feat, even dread; this has been the main response of Western arts and letters since Darwin, and its products have ranged from the sentimental agnosticism of Matthew Arnold to the brutal existentialism of Sartre. The second is the path of gleeful Philistinism, which glories in exposing the rubes like Plato, Aquinas and Kant whose faith in human divnity has been overthrown by the glittering progress of Science.

In his new opus on evolution, Darwin's Dangerous Idea, Daniel Dennett is inevitably taking the second path; while he professes genuine respect for Philosophy and Meaning, he has no patience for those who cling to them rather than face the truth about evolution. And while he is sanguine about the prospect of reconstituting philosophy on the basis of Darwinism, his attempts to do so in the present book are far from reassuring.

The book, be forewarned, is not a layman's treatise on the mechanisms of natural selection. Dennett plunges right into the philosophical implications of evolution without giving a thorough explanation of Mendelian genetics or the process of DNA replication, so that the biology novice will no doubt feel a bit swamped from the beginning. Unfortunately, the situation does not improve as Dennett rockets through literally dozens of debates and subtopics within Darwinism. The sheer breadth of the book makes it better suited for someone already acquainted with the state of current evolutionary biology.

The feeling that Dennett is writing for his peers is reinforced by the fact that much of the book, including some whole chapters, are dedicated to taking on individual scientists who aren't pure enough Darwinian for Dennett's taste. His standard for orthodoxy is simple and strict: there are those who believe in "skyhooks," metaphysical interventions in human development which make us qualitatively different from all other creatures, and those, like him, who believe that "cranes," mechanisms which arise only from natural selection, can explain selection, everything that sets humanity apart.

As one might expect, religious believers fail this test completely, and Dennett spares them no mockery. The scientific Philistine element will no doubt be overjoyed by passages like the following:

The Philosopher Ronald de Sousa once memorably described philosophical theology as `tennis without a net'...But we can lower it if you [i.e. the religious believer] really want to...Whatever you serve, suppose I return service rudely as follows: `What you say implies that God is a ham sandwich wrapped in tinfoil. That's not much of a God to worship!" If you then...[demand] to know how I can Iogically justify my claim...I will reply; `Oh, do you want the net up for my returns, but not for

What is more surprising is that Dennett alsotakes on eminent scientists like Steven Jay Gould,Noam Chomsky and Roger Penrose, each of whomattempts to introduce some kind of skyhook thatwill put a halt to the evolutionary explanation ofhuman capabilities. The nature of Dennett'sdisagreement with his foes is often obscure, andthere is such a flurry of names and citations thatthe inattentive reader will probably begin to justtake Dennett's word for it. What it all comes downto is that Dennett sees Darwin's dangerousidea--that everything from consciousness to ethicscan be explained by the function of naturalselection over time--as a "universal acid," eatingaway all attempts to limit its scope.

In the end, having knowked down all opponentsto Darwinism, Dennett fails to make a strong casefor a Darwinian morality. maybe we aren't . justmachines for eating and reproducing; but where dowe go from there? Are we consigned to a sterilerelativism, or is some more normative ethicspossible? The title of the chapter "The MoralFirst Aid Manual" should give some indication:Dennett sees the process of moral reasoning asessentially chaotic and endless, and he valuesmoral rules simply as semi-arbitrary ways ofending a moral deliberation. He has no deepcommitment to any principle, but merely wants aresult, and it doesn't seem to much matter whatthat result is: "We cannot expect there to be asingle stable solution...but rather a variety ofuncertain and temporary equilibria, with theconversation-stoppers tending to accrete pearlylayers of supporting dogma which cannot themselveswithstand extended scrutiny but do actually serveon occasion, blessedly, to deflect and terminateconsideration." In that list ofconversation-stoppers, utilitarian calculus andKantian imperatives are equally valid.

It is true, of course, that the end of Goddoesn't necessarily correspond to the end ofethics. But whether any philosophy based onassertions about authentic human nature is stillpossible after Darwinism remains a matter fordebate. Much of the book is spent attacking thenotion of essences and teleologies, yet Dennettdoesn't address how one could formulate any kindof human ethics without some essential conceptionof human nature. This question is not answered bythe Moral First Aid manual, and without answeringit Dennett cannot claim to have assuaged all ourfears about Darwinism.

Darwin's Dangerous Ideais rather toosophisticated to be popular science, yet it stopsshort of where many less scientifically-inclinedreaders would like to go. It will probably pleasemost of those whom it is designed to please: thescientifically literate who are just proud enoughof their knowledge to get a frisson of superiorityfrom attacks on the evolutionary Luddites.Luddites, however, should beware: after readingthis book, you too will be reminded that Darwinismis here to stay, and you will also be reminded ofwhy what frightens you

What is more surprising is that Dennett alsotakes on eminent scientists like Steven Jay Gould,Noam Chomsky and Roger Penrose, each of whomattempts to introduce some kind of skyhook thatwill put a halt to the evolutionary explanation ofhuman capabilities. The nature of Dennett'sdisagreement with his foes is often obscure, andthere is such a flurry of names and citations thatthe inattentive reader will probably begin to justtake Dennett's word for it. What it all comes downto is that Dennett sees Darwin's dangerousidea--that everything from consciousness to ethicscan be explained by the function of naturalselection over time--as a "universal acid," eatingaway all attempts to limit its scope.

In the end, having knowked down all opponentsto Darwinism, Dennett fails to make a strong casefor a Darwinian morality. maybe we aren't . justmachines for eating and reproducing; but where dowe go from there? Are we consigned to a sterilerelativism, or is some more normative ethicspossible? The title of the chapter "The MoralFirst Aid Manual" should give some indication:Dennett sees the process of moral reasoning asessentially chaotic and endless, and he valuesmoral rules simply as semi-arbitrary ways ofending a moral deliberation. He has no deepcommitment to any principle, but merely wants aresult, and it doesn't seem to much matter whatthat result is: "We cannot expect there to be asingle stable solution...but rather a variety ofuncertain and temporary equilibria, with theconversation-stoppers tending to accrete pearlylayers of supporting dogma which cannot themselveswithstand extended scrutiny but do actually serveon occasion, blessedly, to deflect and terminateconsideration." In that list ofconversation-stoppers, utilitarian calculus andKantian imperatives are equally valid.

It is true, of course, that the end of Goddoesn't necessarily correspond to the end ofethics. But whether any philosophy based onassertions about authentic human nature is stillpossible after Darwinism remains a matter fordebate. Much of the book is spent attacking thenotion of essences and teleologies, yet Dennettdoesn't address how one could formulate any kindof human ethics without some essential conceptionof human nature. This question is not answered bythe Moral First Aid manual, and without answeringit Dennett cannot claim to have assuaged all ourfears about Darwinism.

Darwin's Dangerous Ideais rather toosophisticated to be popular science, yet it stopsshort of where many less scientifically-inclinedreaders would like to go. It will probably pleasemost of those whom it is designed to please: thescientifically literate who are just proud enoughof their knowledge to get a frisson of superiorityfrom attacks on the evolutionary Luddites.Luddites, however, should beware: after readingthis book, you too will be reminded that Darwinismis here to stay, and you will also be reminded ofwhy what frightens you