Harvard Corporation Free of Conflicts

Although Nan Zheng's article, "Can Corporation Members Serve Multiple Masters?" (new article, April 2X, 1994) raises a number of interesting issues, it omits information necessary to evaluate this question at Harvard.

My senior thesis studied the governing boards of 15 private universities and colleges, including Harvard, and so I may be able to provide some of this information. Zheng opens the article by stating that Corporation Member Robert Stone's other responsibilities allow him to devote "just a tiny fraction" of his time to the Corporation, implying that his other commitments prevent Stone from being an effective member.

This statement reflects a poor understanding of the depth and quality of Stone's involvement here. For example, anyone familiar with fundraising at Harvard would agree that the institution's unparalleled success attracting private support is due in large part to Stone's constant involvement as the University's leading volunteer fundraiser.

Zheng's article also leaves the impression that Harvard's governing board members are characterized by and selected for their wealth. While it is true, as Zheng states, that most members "are far from poor," personal wealth is a less important selection criteria at Harvard than any other Ivy League School. Traditionally, none of Harvard's largest donors have been on the Corporation. This contrasts sharply with schools such as Stanford, Yale and Penn where board members have recently made a majority of the largest gifts received by their respective schools.

In fact, Harvard's governance structure is unusually effective at preventing the types of conflict of interest mentioned in the article. Where other schools place the wealthiest alumni on their governing board, Harvard places these alumni more often on the Committee on University Resources (COUR), which has relatively little power to determine policy. David Weiden '94