Algiers On Battle St.

Swept away as we are by recent events in Haiti and Cuba, we risk forgetting that American foreign policy is daily being put to test around the world. Algeria leaps to mind as an example of a less favored foreign policy desideratum whose reverberations will nonetheless be heard throughout the Middle East and beyond for many years to come.

The current crisis in Algieria began in early 1992 when the secular political-military regime, anticipating a victory by the Islamic Salvation Front in the country's first freely-held elections, canceled the vote. The Front is an umbrella organization of Islamists, or Islamic fundamentalists, who believe that normative religious law should have a greater say in determining the political culture of Algeria.

The philosophical justification for annulling the election was as follows: The Islamic parties gave every sign that once democratically elected, they would proceed to vote Algerian democracy out of existence. Some Front leaders publicly declared that their victory at the polls was nothing short of the actualization of the will of Allah, a mandate from heaven that could never be overturned.

But in canceling the results of the election, the secular government also proved a fair-weather friend of the democratic process. When it looked like its secure hold on Algerian politics was about to give way, principle gave way first.

What has ensued is more than two years of undeclared war. The Islamists--and particularly the Armed Islamic Group, the most radical element in their camp--have perpetrated some gruesome acts of violence against Algerian politicians and intellectuals, women who don't wear the veil and, as of last year, foreigners.

At the same time the government rounds up Islamists wholesale--and often times, worse. A vocal contingent of Algerian officials who have been dubbed 'Eradicators' still feel the best way to resolve the crisis is to quash any Islamist opposition mercilessly.

American foreign policy vis-a-vis Algeria has implications well beyond the borders of that former Soviet satellite state. How we deal with the crisis in Algeria sets an important precedent for our dealings with political Islam throughout the Middle East. More generally, our policy sets the tone for our stance on democratization--officially one of the pillars of Clintonian diplomacy--the world over.

Over all, American policy has been well-conceived and clearly articulated. While officially recognizing the current government, the State Department also maintains low-level contact with the Islamists. The goal of this "double diplomacy" is ultimately to bring both sides to the negotiating table, to convince each that the other will not simply disappear.

Our policy is at once principled and self-interested. In demanding that the Islamists who reject violence be given a greater say in the political structure of Algeria, America lives up to its calling as international patron saint of democracy. The United States also makes clear that political Islam is not to be confused with its most radical manifestations. That is to say, Islamic fundamentalism ought not conjure up images of the World Trade Center bombing or the vicious anti-Americanism of the current government in Iran.

At the same time, our policy is not excessively naive or optimistic. Our willingness to negotiate with both parties to the current crisis in Algeria stems also from a profound uncertainty as to who will be calling the shots from Algiers in the months and years to come. To the extent we are able, it makes good sense to court both the Islamists and the government simultaneously.

Samuel J. Rascoff's column appears on alternate Fridays.