Powell for President?

The coronation ceremony has begun. No sooner than Colin Powell retires as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the media is abuzz with speculation about his political future; many have predicted outright that he will soon be president. At the very least, pundits expect him to be tapped for the vice-presidency or a major Cabinet post.

With his political affiliation still unknown, both parties are salivating over the prospect of the general gracing their ticket. And in many ways he is the ideal candidate. He is a true American success story, he has strong credentials on race issues, and he is one of the most popular military leaders since Dwight Eisenhower. While his domestic views are an unknown quantity, rumor has it that he is progressive at heart.

Powell's background as an advisor to President Reagan and Chairman under Presidents Bush and Clinton seems to give him all the foreign policy clout he needs. As a recent Wall Street Journal piece put it, "there's no risk of anyone critiquing you as a softie." This is the leader who presided over the American military during the fall of the Soviet Union and the victory of the Gulf War.

But before conceding his expertise on foreign affairs, it's worth taking a closer look at Powell's record. Is he really the leader to take American foreign policy into a new era?

The revival of the United Nations has led to a proliferation of peacekeeping and nation-building operations in places like Somalia, Cambodia, Angola and El Salvador. These are often long term operations that have social or political goals rather than military ones; they focus, not on vanquishing an enemy, but on rebuilding societies. Still, these U.N. operations often involve some military presence, and forces are still necessary both for general security and for providing occasional muscle.

In many cases, at least part of these military forces must come from the U.S. We are the sole provider of certain types of military endeavors, notably quick reaction attacks and air and sea lift operations. Playing the role of a superpower at the new U.N. will involve significant, sometimes open-ended commitments of military force.

It is not at all clear that Powell could swallow this responsibility. He has a clear history of opposing U.S. commitments abroad, from the Gulf War to Somalia and Bosnia. His opposition appears to stem from the trauma of Vietnam; he is determined not to let an ill-advised deployment hurt the military, an institution to which, in the words of The New York Times, he has a "mystical attachment."

Powell's devotion to the military is not something to demean. Nothing is more admirable than a leader who cares about the welfare of his troops, and who zealously guards the reputation of his institution. Powell's caution is fine if it consists mainly of rigorous examination of deployments before they begin. (This realism was apparently lacking when the Bush administration committed troops to Somalia without a serious plan to disarm the warlords.)

But a wariness of commitment can go too far, and Powell's seems to border on isolationism. His initial opposition to the Gulf War reveals a philosophy that hedges on the use of force even in the face of clear national interest.

His systematic opposition to any deployment in Bosnia indicates a lack of imagination, a commodity desperately needed there. A detailed American plan of support for the Bosnian Muslims could have pressured the Serbs into accepting a viable Bosnian state and peace. But as Presidents Bush and Clinton wavered, Powell's constant nay-saying cemented a policy of inaction.

The essence of Powell's beliefs is the "doctrine of invincible force." This post-Vietnam philosophy says that when military action is necessary it should be overwhelming, fast and thorough. The doctrine is a good guideline for major military efforts but increasingly inappropriate for the new strategic situation of ethnic conflict and humanitarian intervention.

Ironically, Powell may be most qualified for high office as a domestically-oriented candidate, not as a foreign affairs specialist. Domestically, Powell can both break the lock of white males on high office and serve as an inspiration to increasingly disaffected and demoralized minority groups.

The danger is that Powell's strong appeal will lead a major party to nominate him on the unthinking assumption that his foreign policy is right for the nation.

If Powell remains true to his past tendencies, his policies will not benefit his country. At this critical period for international relations, America cannot afford an isolationist president, no matter how loved he is.