A Scary Situation

"THE SURVIVAL OF ISRAEL is not a political issue," Jimmy Carter once said. "It's a moral imperative."

Of course, political expediency and moral respectability are not mutually exclusive. For years, the U.S./Israeli "special relationship" served America's strategic interests as well as its ethical ideals.

No longer. Israel is still dependent on American military and financial support, but the U.S. is running out of Realpolitik reasons to continue providing it.

Last week, Alan Dershowitz stood on the Widener steps to exhort supporters of the Jewish state to "make the case for Israel." His case had nothing to do with U.S. strategic interests. It had nothing to do with the Middle East balance of power. It had everything to do with "the rightness of the Israeli cause."

"Unless we convince the world that support for Israel is fundamentally a human rights issue, a moral issue, we will lose," Dershowitz warned.

He's right. And that's scary.

"IN STATESMANSHIP get the formalities right; never mind about the moralities," Twain's Pudd'nhead Wilson declared.

Nowadays, few would agree with ultrarealists like Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes or Pudd'nhead--ethical concerns can and do affect the alliance behavior of some states.

But the strongest bonds between sovereign nations are undoubtedly those held together by a solid community of interests, those that benefit both parties.

Until recently, the benefits America derived from its close relationship with Israel clearly outweighed the alliance's costs. The U.S. had four self-interested reasons to pledge money and might to the Jewish state:

1. Bolster a "strategic asset." Israel was a key component of America's fervent struggle to contain Communism during the Cold War. Rather than station American troops in the Middle East as it did in Western Europe and the Far East, the U.S. relied on Israel's quick-to-mobilize national army to keep the Evil Empire's influence out of the region.

2. Maintain American credibility. Once the U.S. made its initial rhetorical commitments to Israel, it could not afford to rescind them. In the zero-sum bipolar world, the U.S. feared that nonsupport for one of its allies would send others scurrying to the Soviet Union for protection. In the spirit of Machiavelli, America has preferred to reassure the Western bloc that its resident superpower would remain "a true friend."

3. Promote Middle East stability. To a certain extent, "Middle East stability" is an oxymoron. Arabs and Israelis rarely see eye to eye. More often, they see eye-for-an-eye. But the U.S. has had a strong stake in preventing massive conflagrations in this oil-rich, strategically vital region.

On one hand, U.S. support for its encircled ally has aimed to even out the regional balance of power. Although most Arab nations remain committed to Israel's eventual destruction, they have hesitated before attacking an American-built military machine backed by American military guarantees.

On the other hand, the U.S. has tried to restrain Israel from undertaking preemptive strikes against its Arab neighbors or from escalating conflicts that have already begun. Massive aid packages have given the U.S. the leverage to apply the carrot as well as the stick to rein in its often bellicose ally.

4. Get reelected. Members of Congress have discovered that the quickest way to join the ranks of the unemployed is to cross the pro-Israel lobby (on Capitol Hill, it's often referred to merely as "The Lobby"). Led by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), The Lobby is rich, powerful and aggressive. Its power goes a long way towards explaining the $40 billion Israel has received in American aid over the last 20 years.

CLEARLY, the survival of Israel has been at least somewhat of a political issue for America. However, recent developments have conspired to eliminate U.S. strategic incentives for supporting its longtime friend.

The end of the Cold War and the decline of bipolarity has driven a large wedge into the U.S./Israeli "community of interests." The U.S. no longer needs a vigilant standard bearer in the global battle to stem the tide of Communism. It no longer needs to maintain costly alliances that have outlived their usefulness in order to preserve America's status as a trustworthy protector. Budget deficits now take precedence over credibility crises.

The ongoing saga in the Persian Gulf has further widened the gap between American and Israeli strategic goals. U.S. leaders can no longer view pro-Western Arab leaders as dispensable allies. Not when they form a key component of the international coalition that will shape George Bush's New World Order. Not when the free flow of Arab oil has moved to the forefront of American concerns.

With the populous Arab world already outspending the Israelis on defense by a 14:1 ratio, American policymakers have given up on the hopelessly skewed Arab/Israeli balance of power. Instead, they have focused on restoring the Arab/Arab balance of power. Last December, for instance, the U.S. completed a $20 billion arms sale to Saudi Arabia. In Israel's entire history, it has only received $23 billion worth of American military equipment.

Israeli Ambassador Simcha Dinitz once boasted that "Israel is respected as an ally who is dependable, strong and who can win." In 1970, for instance, the U.S. asked Israel to mobilize troops to protect the Jordanian army from Syria. Israel readily compiled--even though it was officially at war with Jordan at the time. But the U.S. no longer needs Israel to "win" anything. When the Gulf War is over, America will rely on U.N. peacekeeping forces--not Israeli troops--to maintain stability in the Middle East.

Of course, the U.S. still wants to deter Israel from initiating conflicts in the region, especially nuclear conflicts. But Israel is most likely to conform its behavior to American requests when American abandonment is a credible threat--when U.S./Israeli relations are frostiest. If Israel were confident of unqualified American support, it would be unwilling to exhibit such remarkable restraint while absorbing Iraqi Scuds.

Even The Lobby is under siege. A cascade of anti-AIPAC scholarship has chronicled the alleged power of pro-Israeli special interests to pervert the American national interest. Political action committees in general are under attack by politicians from both parties (AIPAC is not a PAC, but it controls an impressive array of PACs). And while The Lobby has always found its most receptive audience in Congress, the legislative branch's ability and willingness to influence American foreign policy is in rapid decline. Congress may still be browbeaten into large aid packages, but an executive branch less susceptible to AIPAC pressure will decide how much--or how little--diplomatic or military support the U.S. will provide Israel.

MANY DIEHARD SUPPORTERS of Israel continue to insist that the U.S. needs Israel more than it needs its Arab allies. They cling to two basic strategic arguments:

1. "Moderate" Arab governments are unstable and therefore unreliable. Unfortunately, the way to prevent anti-Western revolutionaries from assuming control of Arab nations tomorrow is to bolster the pro-Western leaders who control them today.

2. The U.S. cannot trust dictators. Unfortunately, the U.S. has proven itself as willing to climb into bed with Assad's Syria as it was to consort with Pinochet's Chile, Marcos' Phillipines and even Hussein's Iraq. Nasty governments do not necessarily make inexpedient allies.

Those of us who shiver at the thought of the destruction of Israel can no longer afford to couch our arguments in cold, calculating terms of Realpolitik. If we rely on these obsolete arguments, we will lose..

Instead, we should insist on a U.S. foreign policy that supports Israel for Israel's sake--not because of a cost/benefit analysis, but because it's the right thing to do. Jews have been persecuted by Babylonia, by Persia, by ancient Greece, by ancient Rome, by the Ottoman Empire, by Nazi Germany and yes, by its Arab neighbors. The U.S. shut its doors to Jewish refugees during the Holocaust. It has a duty to resist future attempts at the systematic annihilation of this perennially oppressed people.

Let's not forget--Israel is the sole liberal democracy in the Middle East. It does share the American concern for civil liberties and political participation. It does boast the best human rights record in the Middle East. Carter's moral imperative is still valid today.

However, Israel's human rights record--while easily the most impressive in the wartorn region--is not perfect. Since the beginning of the intifada, it has been far from perfect.

Israel asks a great deal of a nation with a 3 percent Jewish constituency. It needs a continued U.S. guarantee of military support to stave off invasion. It needs continued U.S. grants to keep its deteriorating economy afloat. And it has little to offer in return. If Israel expects to sustain a moral claim to altruistic American support, it will have to be perfect. Better than perfect. It will have to be a shining moral example U.S. leaders can show off to the world.

Shining moral examples cannot afford to cling to occupied territories. They cannot afford to be perceived as opponents of self-determination. They cannot afford to be perceived as opponents of self-determination. They cannot afford to leave themselves open to harshly critical U.N. resolutions. They cannot afford to offend a superpower whose last five presidents have pushed for a resolution to the Palestinian question.

A shining moral example cannot even afford to respond when unprovoked bombs rain down on its cities. In order to earn the continued protection of an ally that no longer benefits from providing it, it must prove itself a paragon of restraint.

And that's scary.