Animal Rights

To the Editors of The Crimson:

I am writing in response to an article by Joshua M. Sharfstein, entitled "Of Mice and Men," which appeared in The Crimson on January 18, 1989. In my opinion, this article, besides lacking proper substantiation of its claims and failing to take many quite important issues into consideration, illustrates the ignorance and biased asumptions which are truly the greatest enemies of the "animal rights movement."

Sharfstein's argument is based on the new Heritage Dictionary's definition of murder. What Sharfstein unfortunately overlooks is the fact that the issues which he raises hinge on a moral dialogue, and that such a discussion should not and cannot be based on literary definitions. Whether the killing of animals can be called murder or not does not change the fact that the lives of the animals are being taken from them, and that the motivations for this killing (and the mistreatment which frequently precedes it) arises quite often from the moral vacuum of purely economic considerations rather than from real necessity.

Because humans "can understand morality, can reason, can conceive of [their] own existence [and] can fully comprehend pain," Sharfstein's argument implies, the death of another species of animal is less significant than the death of a human. However, it is precisely because of humanity's ability to understand morality, reason, and its own existence that it must bear the burden of responsible conduct toward other creatures in this world. Furthermore, the criteria (mentioned above) which are the basis of Sharfstein's unenlightened argument fail to take into account the circumstances which surround many of the issues to which the "animal rights movement" addresses itself; that is based on criteria which are in many respects more relevant to this discussion--the issues of the qualitive capability for significant mental anguish and pain, and the animals' dependence on humans (as a result of circumstances created by humans), for example--animals may indeed be considered equivalent to humans. Yet the relative significance of the lives of different species of animals need not be the central question; rather, one must question the extent to which this significance can, has been, and continues to be manipulated to justify or legitimize the unethical treatment of animals. Unfortunately, Sharfstein disregards this central question.

By not sufficiently distinguishing the interests and means of action of various groups in what Sharfstein collectively refers to as the "animal rights movement," Sharstein's insensitivity further promotes the misunderstandings to which he himself has succumbed. The actions of certain radical groups may be considered deplorable, but this should not be allowed to influence one's judgement of the philosophies and intentions of non-violent groups, such as PETA, which constitute the vast majority of the "movement." The $400 which PETA spent in rescuing lobsters, which Sharfstein suggests could have been used more productively, is less than what many students probably spend in a year for alcohol or in a week for a vacation, yet Sharfstein does not refer to the "perverted values" which, according to his logic, are responsible for this behavior.

In these and many other ways, Sharfstein's article represents an incomplete, irresponsible, and morally complacent attack which fails to appreciate the complexities and significance of the goals of the "animal rights movement," and hence serves to perpetuate the dangerous attitudes behind the acceptance of the exploitation of animals in modern society. James M. Grossman '89