Presidency in Absentia

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ONE OF RONALD REAGAN'S favorite jokes is the story of the old and the young psychiatrist. Both come to work each morning looking fresh, neatly dressed and alert. By the end of every day, the young doctor is frazzled, disheveled and red-eyed, while his colleague is as fresh and neat as ever. Finally, the younger psychiatrist asks, "How do you stay fresh after a whole day of listening to people's troubles?" The older psychiatrist pauses and replies, "I never listen."

As Reagan enters the seventh year of his presidency, recent events have emphasized that his approach to the presidency is disturbingly similar to that of the elder psychiatrist. Whereas Jimmy Carter aged prematurely during his presidency because of his workaholic's attention to details, Reagan's detachment from the daily workings of his Administration have enabled him to appear younger and rosier every year. But while detachment from the demanding work of the presidency may be physically healthy, it inevitably leads to a breakdown of the president's immunity to policy failure. The recent discovery of the "Contramania" scandal reveals the weaknesses such detachment can breed.

Contramania is not an anomally but rather a manifestation of Reagan's style of governing. His administration functions through decentralized chains of command and responsibility. Because these chains do not necessarily emanate from the Oval Office, Reagan does not always call the shots.

A suprisingly large number of Cabinet officials claim either opposition or ignorance to the diversion of arms to the Contras. The "opposers" include Shultz and Weinberger while the "ignorants" include policy makers as prominent as the Chief of Staff, the Vice President and the President himself. The fact that such a prominent assortment of officials were not involved in a deal that went directly against the Administration's stated foreign policy demonstrates the decentralization of that policy.

THIS IS NOT THE FIRST time Reagan has failed to pay attention to his foreign policy. At one point in Reagan's 1982 visit to Latin America he called for a toast to "the people of Bolivia," even though he was in Brazil. The president attempted to explain away the error by saying that Bolivia was his next stop when, in fact, Columbia was his next stop and he was not scheduled to visit Bolivia at all.

Reagan's lack of involvement in policy is not limited to the foreign policy front. In June 1981 he greeted the only Black member of his Cabinet, Samuel Pierce, at a conference for big city mayors. Reagan went up to his secretary of housing and urban affairs and said, "How are you Mr. Mayor? I'm glad to meet you. How are things in your city."

In the context of these examples, the president's claim to ignorance about Contramania is believable.

If Ronald Reagan is really as detached from his policies as these incidents suggest, how do we explain his success as governor of California and his attainment of the highest presidential approval rating since FDR? Reagan has outstanding political instincts. He has prevented potential political disasters such as his visit to Bitburg, his joke and the killing of Marines in Lebanon from materializing because he has an incredible ability to control and manipulate touchy situations.

REAGAN HAD CREATED A teflon presidency. Issues which would have destroyed most presidents seemed to roll off this one. (Imagine Carter or Nixon joking that the "bombing will begin in five minutes.") Most recently the president emerged from the Daniloff Affair and the Reykjavik non-summit touting the two events as policy touchdowns when they could more appropriately be considered safeties or touchbacks at best. The arms deal was provoked by the hubris the White House had developed over its ability to sell ideas.

The difference in Contramania was that Reagan was too detached. Donald Reagan had isolated the president from the issue. The disclosure was thrown at Reagan, forcing him to assume the role of "reactor" instead of his accustomed role as "actor."

Instead of utilizing his traditional tools, the only action that will work for Reagan is one he has not tried before. To escape the shadows of Contrameinia, he has to accept responsibility for the scandal, admit to a fundamental policy error and take steps to prevent such a situation from recurring. The president must admit as JFK did after the Bay of Pigs fiasco of April, 1961, "I am the responsible officer of this government." At the date of this writing, the Administration has only admitted that "mistakes were made." Reagan has detached himself from responsibility for the deal in the same way that he detached himself from the formulation of the deal.

Ultimately it is Reagan's campaign style that has come back to haunt him. After choosing to emphasize image over issues in the 1984 and 1986 elections, the president lacks a policy mandate. Americans have got what they voted for; a president with a successful image and a less successful ability to provide solutions to the issues.

Contramania has shown that we should be more skeptical of a psychiatrist who never looks tired. While he may temporarily make us feel better, he may not be solving our problems. Although Ronald Reagan has attained tremendous popularity and a superficially strong economy with lower inflation, he will probably be remembered as a president who was not able to translate his popularity into successful policy. His legacy of twin tower deficits, cuts in education and detachment from policy are demonstrative of the ills which plague our country. Just because the doctor smiles does not mean the patient is healthy.

Seth Goldman is a Winthrop House senior concentrating in comparative government. This fall he was the chairman of "Harvard students for Dukakis '86."