Sending the PACs Packing

"By a faction I understand a number of citizens...who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse...to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." James Madison in The Federalist

FEW GROUPS IN American politics today come closer to Madison's definition of "faction" than political action committees (PACs). Created as a result of a federal election law reform, PACs have steadily--and ironically--mushroomed into a powerful tool for influencing legislation. And as the PACs have grown, so too have the number of congressmen who know how to transform skillfully the groups' ready and generous campaign contributions into repeated electoral victories.

Nonetheless, by the beginning of next month, Senators David Boren (D-Okla.) and Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) will ask their colleagues to place a cap on their newfound wellspring of campaign funds. With Senate PAC contributions up 385 percent between 1976 and 1984 and with special interests using their influence to help bury this measure, PAC reform seems as likely a prospect this spring as real tax reform. But if this bill fails, the spectre of quid pro quo campaign contributions will further haunt American politics.

In the last decade, legislators have become regular customers of political action committees, the only contributors able to meet the high cost of political campaigns. In 1974, 608 PACs gave $12.5 million to congressional candidates; by 1984, 4009 PACs were donating $110 million, more than an eightfold increase. House members received, on average, 41 percent of their campaign funds from political action committees, according to Common Cause. The small individual contributor (now almost a romantic fiction) carries little political significance when matched up against the Sunkist PAC, which promises $5000 for every campaign.

THE BOREN-GOLDWATER amendment would be a step toward cutting the power of the big PACs. It would reduce the amount that a committee could give a congressman by 40 percent, and it would limit the total amount of PAC funds a legislator could accept. While the measure falls short of eliminating the PACs altogether, it would certainly reduce their excessive influence.

According to Senator Howell Heflin (D-Ala.), the Senate takes "a break whenever somebody has a fundraiser." With fundraising taking on such importance, special interest funds tend to distort the political system. PACs favor incumbents, with 72 percent of their contributions going to those already in office. This way, PACs can obtain more influence per dollar, wasting little on those who are not "safe" contenders for office. Unfortunately, with the average House seat costing $500,000 and a six-year lease on a chair in the Senate Chamber running its occupant around $3 million, challengers, receiving few PAC funds, cannot run effective campaigns.

Just look at the Congressional committees currently handling tax reform. Think they're likely to vote to restrict PAC action? Members collected $3.7 million in payoffs from the tax loophole lobby in the first six months of 1985, a non-election year. With PACs pouring $5000 check after $5000 check into the coffers of committee members, it's difficult to imagine a fair, loopholefree tax plan emerging from Congress.

While the reform plan of Boren-Goldwater is far from complete, the amendment is the only piece of viable campaign reform legislation introduced in this session of Congress. The bill will remove some, but not nearly all, of the hurdles a challenger faces and lessen the extent to which incumbents are beholden to the special interests.

Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) spent $16.5 million on his latest campaign; such political extravagance will not be possible in an era of Boren-Goldwater. It is hardly practical to refuse PAC donations considering the high cost of a campaign. Legislators who rely solely on individual contributions are a dying breed; few politicians remain willing to brave the political waters without trusty PAC donations to hold onto. PAC reform would consequently make resisting the encroachment of special interests significantly more practical for legislators.

The strength of the Boren-Goldwater amendment is its potential to humiliate members who vote against it. No one wants to vote against good government. Campaign reform has come up four times since 1979, yet not one vote has been taken on the issue. The fact that this bill may actually make it to the floor suggests that the nation is finally ready for campaign reform.