Trying to Understand Iran

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AFTER YEARS OF BENIGN NEGLECT of Iran, the recent events have once more made that country the focus of public attention. The President tried to explain his arms for hostage initiative by underlining Iran's strategic significance. He and his aides have been hard at work to convince the public of the wisdom of reaching accommodation with "moderate" elements in Iran.

The desire to free U.S. hostages could be understood without invoking either of the above two issues. These must be raised on their own merits, provided the internal Iranian political situation is accurately perceived. What is happening in Iran? How does Khomeini operate? Which domestic forces are the main actors in Iran's present and immediate future? And what are the U.S.-Soviet stakes?

Answers to these questions can put Iran's internal-external politics into the proper perspective. The Islamic Republic, now approaching its seventh year of volatile tenure, has taken every possible measure to entrench itself as a theocratic despotism. Its leaders, armed with the radical Iranian brand of Shia ideology, which utilizes the modern totalitarian techniques of mass mobilization and suppression of all opposition, believe they are in firm conrtol of the country.

After six years of bloody warfare with Iraq, a Moslem but Arab neighbor, the Republic has achieved most but not all of its objectives. It has liberated its occupied territories. It has crossed the international borders at three locations and now occupies Iraqi land equivalent to nearly 10 percent of its own territory lost to Iraq in 1980.

But the war continues because of Iran's failure, so far, to achieve two other goals. It has not successfully made a decisive military breakthrough to topple Iraq's Saddam Hussein. Nor has it been able to incite the Iraqi Shia population to an open rebellion in favor of Khomeini's version of an Islamic regime.

IN PURSUIT OF THESE GOALS, Iran has devoted nearly 40 percent of its national budget and almost all of its oil revenue to the war effort. The recent decline in oil prices, cutting its national revenue by about 50 percent, plus the more effective use of Iraqi air power to intercept Iranian oil exports created a major crisis earlier this year. In response, Iran has been seeking the recovery of its credits and other assets in the West and even a resumption of the sale to the Soviets of natural gas, which was interrupted after the revolution.

The toning down of its radical rhetoric, using its influence with Lebanese hostage takers and clandestine contacts with its sworn enemies, the U.S. and Israel, were deemed affordable costs, compared with expected tangible benefits. Is this type of cost-benefit analysis supported by all factions of the ruling theocracy, or is there a polarization of opinion within Khomeini's entourage?

All evidence suggests that the aging Ayatollah continues to solicit views from a variety of cleric and non-cleric representatives of political institutions and even some cleric outside the government, notably his son, Ahmed. When the Imam feels strongly about an issue, he makes the ultimate decision, which is binding on all, regardless of the advice of some or even all his aides. When he does not, he may delegate limited authority to others, as in the case of the 1981 U.S. hostage crisis, where he let the legislature resolve the matter.

It is quite conceivable that some of his aides presented a bleak picture of the military-economic situation in 1985. While feeling strongly about the war and hostility toward the U.S., he must have authorized the initiative towards an arms-hostage deal with the U.S. As it turned out, the venture was quite rewarding for Iran.

THE DEAL COULD BECOME a formidable victory for Iran if the nation achieves a decisive breakthrough in their next offensive against Iraq--probably in February to coincide with the Revolution's anniversary. For the time being, Khomeini can afford to return to his vehement anti-Americanism, and even denounce unnamed Iranian officials for harboring pro-Satanic tendencies.

Does it make sense for the U.S. to seek moderate, as opposed to radical elements in Tehran? To be sure, on some domestic issues, such as land reform, the ruling class may have its moderate and extremist factions. But on such fundamental issues of life and death, war and foreign relations, there are no moderate groups or individuals in the government.

However, Khomeini's stance concerning even these crucial issues can be temporarily, and on his own terms, moderated. This kind of alteration of policy has occurred several times in the past. U.S. effort in that direction is sensible and even desirable, provided the costs for the U.S. will be affordable.

What will happen in post-Khomeini Iran depends on the interplay of such political forces as the clergy, the military, and some of the opposition forces. The Left, which is now fragmented, might unite to influence the succession after Khomeini, just as it did in the struggle to overthrow the Shah. Some clergymen who have coexisted with Khomeni without totally or irreversibly identifying with his despotism may also act, particularly if this crisis degenerates into a civil war.

Looming in the background is the Soviet Union, and its distant rival, the United States. In the inevitable struggle of internal political forces to succeed Khomeini, the potential of Soviet intervention cannot be completely ruled out. The 1921 treaty with Iran could be invoked to justify such an intervention on the grounds that chaos in Iran endangers Soviet security. If the 1979 Afghanistan scenario unfolds in Iran, the U.S. will be compelled to act in order to "cut its losses." It may be done through a tacit partition of Iran so that the Soviets could not reach the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

Evidently, it is difficult to accurately predict the course of events in Iran in the next few years. But there are sufficient reasons to abandon the U.S. policy of neglecting Iran simply because it is ruled by a radical fundamentalist class.

President Reagan's belated recognition of Iran's geopolitical significance is perhaps the only positive point in the disarray and confusion which plague his presidency now. But whether this realization presages a genuine accomodation with that country seems more dependent on Iran than the United States.

Sepehr Zabih is a research fellow at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies. He has written six books on Iranian politics, the latest of which is The Left in Contemporary Iran, published by The Hoover Press.