Building a Political Base

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ON FEBRUARY 26, 1986, Corazon C. Aquino was sworn in as President of the Philippines and Ferdinand Marcos fled the country for exile abroad. It was the final act of a morality play, in which the courageous widow of a martyred Filipino leader, starting without political experience or power, had "spoken truth to power" and mobilized the Philippine people to overthrow an entrenched, autocratic head of state.

President Aquino's year of living dangerously began the next day. The struggle ahead to reconstruct her nation is against even greater odds than those surmounted in what is popularly called "The February Revolution."

The task is to create a new political system replacing that established by Marcos, to revive the economy sunk in deep depression and debt and to bring about a more equitable distribution of the nation's wealth. All of which she has to accomplish in the face of a serious armed uprising in the countryside.

IN THE MIDST of so momentous a triumph, her powers and those of the people she led seemed capable of surmounting any problem. However, the unity of the people's crusade to overthrow Marcos masked the widely divergent interests of the groups that formed that movement.

The longer term interests of the participants has emerged in the wake of that success. Many groups have a concept of what the post-Marcos Philippines should be, and each represents an important force resisting rapid change.

Very broadly defined, these include an economic elite that had once dominated the economy, but had been displaced by Marcos loyalists. With power based in land, commerce and manufacturing, they seek an open, minimally regulated economy in which they can reestablish their dominance. A political elite, also once powerful, but displaced by Marcos' followers, are typically non-ideological, but ambitious and tend to align themselves with the economic elite.

The Armed Forces have typically remained out of politics, but did join the anti-Marcos movement, not to take power themselves, but for a variety of idealistic and practical reasons. Their chief concern is that they are fighting and dying to put down a rural insurgency, and they want a mandate and resources to pursue that in the way they see as best.

The powerful Catholic Church, mobilized by Cardinal Sin, and the United States, through the efforts of Ambassador Stephen Bosworth, also play an influential role.

The one major group outside this coalition is the left wing, represented by the National Democratic Front and its military wing, the National Peoples' Army (NPA). They boycotted the February elections, anticipating that the outcome would be manipulated by Marcos. Caught by surprise when Aquino emerged successful, they found themselves outside the new Government, but still in command of a powerful armed movement which controlled significant sections of the countryside.

President Aquino has drawn her Cabinet from across the spectrum of her coalition. She has acted courageously to bring about a new order. She is standing firmly for reconciliation with the left opposition. She has approved an economic plan that emphasizes rural employment and increasing rural incomes and is working to rebuild an open free enterprise economy.

Yet the evidence of trouble grows. As this is being written, we hear that the army has been mobilized by General Fidel Ramos to resist a coup attempt by military forces loyal to Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile. Should the army, led by Enrile and his security chief Colonel Gregorio Honasan, assume power, then the attempts at reconciliation for which Aquino stands will be abandoned for an all-out military confrontation with the left. Should the military backing Aquino predominate, she will have a renewed chance to pursue her vision, but with the army's power considerably enhanced.

Violence is extending from the countryside to a more targeted urban political warfare. About a week ago Roland Olalia, a prominent leftist political and labor leader, was killed. A few days later a right wing pro-Marcos politician, who was an associate of Enrile's, was murdered. Inevitably we ask what is going on, what has happened to the triumphant coalition to build a new Philippines of less than a year ago?

TO UNDERSTAND CURRENT Philippine affairs, it is necessary to recognize that February 1986 was not the completion of a revolution but the beginning. The old order was removed and the real forces of society moved into contention to determine the new. In this situation there are few institutions, traditions or clear lines of power to influence behavior or inhibit efforts to gain power.

No other public figure can rival Aquino's popularity. But she has yet to show the same command of the situation that she did in leading the movement against Marcos. Early in 1987 there will be a nationwide referendum on the Constitution that has been drawn up by a commission she appointed. This will be a chance for her to reestablish her mandate. If the Constitution receives a strong majority, as it probably will, it will be a reaffirmation of her leadership. The question then will be whether she will be able to use that to shape the future of the nation.

The task requires a vision of a new Philippines, an ability to organize the process, and a political base different from the coalition that overthrew Marcos. Without such a new base, it will be difficult to take the tough and often unpopular measures that will be required. It is in building this new political base that Aquino has been most uncertain.

Aquino has said she wants to be above party and be seen serving only the interests of the country. In that role, she will endorse candidates of various parties. However, that stance leaves her without any organized support that she can rely on across the range of political issues she must confront.

She is a gifted leader, who should survive the military threat and the coming referendum. But she must realize that her government's survival depends on political organization which she has resisted.

John W. Thomas is a lecturer in Public Policy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government and an Institute Fellow of the Harvard Institute for International Development. He was in the Philippines in August and September as a consultant to the Philippine Government on its agrarian reform program.