Shifting Gears in Israel

Laurie A. Mylroie is an assistant professor of Government. She is an assistant director for academic affairs in the Center for Middle Eastern Studies and is the editor of the Harvard Middle East Papers. She was a fellow last summer at Tel Aviv University's Dayan Center as an American Professor for Peace in the Middle East.

THE TWO YEARS OF National Unity Government under Shimon Peres produced something of a transformation in Israel--the chronic turbulence of Israeli politics, which reached new heights in the second term of the Begin government, abated radically under Peres.

The accomplishments of his tenure were considerable: the inflation rate fell from 800 percent to 25 percent; the army withdrew from the morass in Lebanon, where Israeli casualties (relative to the population) in three years surpassed America's Vietnam losses in 10, Israel's relations with the U.S. were better than they had been in a decade, perhaps better than they had ever been; and a tone of civility had been restored to political debate in Israel.

Now that Labor's Peres and Likud's Shamir have switched jobs (Peres becoming Foreign Minister, Shamir Prime Minister) there is apprehension. Are the good times over?

The accomplishments of the unity government--whether the economic austerity program or the withdrawal from Lebanon--were pushed by Labor over Likud's opposition. There is also a split over the West Bank. Likud lays claim to the area on principle; Labor does not. Likud wants to settle it as intensively and quickly as possible; Labor wants to limit settlement. The U.S. is particularly sensitive on the issue; no sooner was Shamir installed in his new job, than Washington reiterated its concern.

The anxiety is that now that Likud has the prime minister's portfolio, the relative calm in Israel and in American-Israeli relations may deteriorate.

Secondary changes in the new government also give it a slightly more hawkish tilt. The hard-line Moshe Arens took over responsibility for Arab affairs from the dovish Ezer Weizmann. Labor's first Health Minister refused to serve under Shamir; his replacement is inevitably more hawkish. And Zevulun Hammer was chosen by the National Religious Party to replace the long-tenured Yosef Burg, reflecting the general merger of religious sentiment and extreme nationalism, expressed in its most alarming form by Member of Knesset Meir Kahane.

Will the reshuffling of portfolios add up to a major change in policy? Arguments cut both ways. No, the fundamental balance in the government has not changed. Shamir is as constrained by the coalition agreement as Peres was. Peres has affirmed his intent to continue his conciliatory Arab policy as Foreign Minister.

Perhaps even the hawkish Shamir has more freedom of maneuver than Peres had. Like Nixon's opening to China and Begin's treaty with Egypt, the hawks can deliver what the doves cannot. Perhaps.

There are arguments on the other side. Shamir, as Prime Minister, will be more able to shape the public debate, and his agenda is not the same as Peres'. While Likud was junior partner, Peres had special leverage, since Likud had a keen interest in avoiding the break-up of the government.

Moreover, Likud is not the most hawkish party in Israel, nor is Shamir the most extreme member of Likud. For reasons of party politics, Shamir may opt for a noisy show of ideological fervor on West Bank settlements. Indeed, already he has called for "Zionist economics" (mirroring the equally vague "Islamic economics").

Will the National Unity Government last? It surprised many that it endured the rotation, given Labor's inherent lack of interest in implementing the agreement. Labor does not have Likud's incentive to accomodate the Prime Minister of a rival party. Frictions will increase.

But given the even split in the Israeli public, the National Unity Government accomplished more than either party alone could have, governing inevitably in coalition with small parties and commanding only a thin majority in the Knesset. The public is tired of the instability of Israeli politics and the seemingly petty and self-serving disputes among its politicians.

Israelis like the National Unity Government. Despite Peres' great popularity, the public wanted to see the rotation proceed. The coalition lasted because there was never enough reason to bring it down (only the start of peace negotiations could have done that). The same is likely true for the next two years. Labor has no interest in calling for early elections unless the results would be better than the last time. It can't afford responsibility for what would be seen as an opportunistic move.

As during Peres' tenure, the key to Israel's politics remains in Arab hands. An Arab initiative, or at least willingness, to start negotiations would bring new Israeli elections. But such a move looks unlikely, and there is little U.S. diplomacy with either side to promote one. Since the bombing of the U.S. Marine headquarters in Beirut, the U.S. has basically backed a stalemate in the Arab-Israel conflict.

Will things get worse again? It is hard to see how they could get better, such have been the achievements of Peres' government. But as long as Shamir does not play too noisily to his own constituency and those to his right, there is, at least, no big conflict between Israel and the U.S.

In some ways, it is regrettable that the rotation does not make a bigger difference. That reflects the stalemate in the region more broadly. The Arab states, hostage to Syria and its unique style of diplomacy, cannot formulate a policy to confront their two big challenges: the Arab-Israeli conflict and Iraq-Iran war. Indeed for many, including the oil-rich Arab states of the Gulf, it is the latter which directly threaten them and has top priority. To some that may seem a good thing. But the Arab-Israeli conflict has a peculiar tenacity. If the results of the Gulf war were to radicalize the region, that would undermine the Arab moderates, reinforcing the stalemate in the Arab-Israeli arena and perhaps unravelling the progress already made.