Selling Your Soul to the President

ONLY A QUACK offers a quick, painless fix for a serious illness. And although we may be tempted at times to seek such expedient treatment, sound judgement tells us to forebear.

At the urging of President Reagan, Congress is presently flirting with the line-item veto--the cure, we are told, to all our budgetary woes. It appears, after all, to be a simple remedy to a complex problem. As deficits continue and as budget deadlocks seem to recur annually, congressmen from both parties are starting to wave their hands, yearning for the White House to assume an additional power--and take away from them a frightful responsibility.

However, despite its simplicity, the line-item veto promises less, both to Congress and to the cause of a balanced budget, than the panacea it has been made out to be. It is too superficial and has too many potential side effects to cure our budgets' ills. Congress should defer to its better judgement and resist this instance of political quackery.

Proponents of the line-item veto argue persuasively that only the President completely represents the national interest. Congress, they note, has on more than one occasion produced a budget bristling with a hodge-podge of local and special interest-pleasing items. No dispute so far. But will the proposed solution, the line-item veto, solve the problem which proponents cite, or might the consequences be more drastic than proponents tell us?

After all, the proposal does significantly alter the balance of power between the President and Congress, placing substantial new authority in the executive. The item veto is a powerful political tool, and there is no limit to how the White House can use it. In addition to simply cutting spending, the President can use his new veto for narrow ideological purposes or as a threat to individual congressmen.

Suppose, for example, that Congress presents the President with a large, multi-item spending bill. One of the provisions appropriates, say, a small sum of money for enforcement of the Voting Rights Act. Even though this item would cost peanuts in the scheme of things, it would be among the first that a conservative President who opposes extension of the Voting Rights Act (such as Reagan) would veto. Thus, the President can legally take a tool ostensibly designed to reduce spending and use it instead to thwart the will of Congress and to kill programs to which he is ideologically opposed. Is this what we mean when we speak of representing the "national interest"? The merits of extending the Voting Rights Act are not at issue here, for the same type of thing can happen with any item involving an appropriation of any amount.

BUT PERHAPS THE most dangerous aspect of the proposal is that it gives the President legislative power in addition to his executive power. He can modify, reshape, or nullify laws as he sees fit through the item veto. Further, by exercising it, he can alter bills so drastically that they will bear little resemblance to the ones which Congress originally passed. In just a few strokes of the pen, he can practically create his own legislation, Congress need not really involve itself. If James Madison were alive today....

Currently, Congress thrives on compromise and give and take. And when the President either signs or vetoes a bill, he accepts or rejects all of the compromises made. But under the line-item plan, the President can undo and nullify compromises as he wishes. Suppose, for example, that liberal and conservative congressmen compromise on a spending bill, while a liberal president is in office. The President will, of course, veto the conservative provisions of the bill but will leave intact the bill's liberal aspects. The resulting law, bearing only partial resemblance to the measure which Congress originally passed, is now unacceptable to the conservatives who voted for it. And since these conservatives would most likely not compose a two-thirds majority, they could not override the item vetoes. Had they known that their favorite items would be vetoed, however, they wouldn't have voted for the bill in the first place. Thus, a bill which lacks Congressional support becomes law. Clearly, the item veto places too much unchecked power in the President.

After enough of these aggravating situations, however, Congressmen might begin to wise up. Realizing that the President might eliminate substantial portions of their compromises, they might then refuse to pass a budget at all, unless the President agrees beforehand not to cut certain items. It happened in 1983 in California, a state where the governor has a line-item veto. And the results were not exactly ideal: deadlock and delay which left state employees going unpaid for two and a half weeks.

If he wishes, the President can use the line-item veto as a tool for rewarding, or as a weapon for punishing, individual congressmen. Used in this way, it can actually increase government spending. Congressmen have traditionally attached district-pleasing pork barrel to major spending legislation to protect their pet projects from vetoes. The President, proponents would argue, should have an item veto so that he can trim away this unnecessary spending. So far so good. But suppose that a new weapons system, which the President strongly favors, comes up. He now needs votes in Congress. Ordinarily, he would bargain, compromise, appear on television, and do whatever he could to persuade congressmen and their constituents to see things his way.

The line-item plan affords the President a new--and quite powerful--stratagem: he can threaten to item veto only the pork barrel projects of the congressmen who vote against the weapon system. Many congressmen, eager for re-election, might cave in to these threats and vote for a costly military device which they would ordinarily oppose. As a result, both the pork barrel and the weapons system pass Congress and are signed into law--not exactly what the line-item veto was supposed to do.

Substantial deficit reduction did not occur this term in Congress. Thus, some argue, we need the line-item veto. Yet while we must reduce the deficit, undermining the separation of powers and the system of checks and balances is not the way. Vesting both executive and legislative power in one person, the President, is asking for abuse. Congress must not sell itself to the President.