How to Avoid a Nuclear War

Three Harvard international relations experts last night described an alternative program for avoiding nuclear war to a crowd of 300 at an Institute of Political forum.

The trio--K-School Dean Graham T. Allison '62, K-School Academic Dean Albert Carnesale and Joseph S. Nye Jr., Dillon Professor of International Affairs--detailed what they believe to be a largely unexplored common ground in the nuclear arms debate.

In a book they recently co-authored and defended last night, the K-School scholars forwarded an "Owl" agenda as a compromise to the extremist "Hawk" and "Dove" camps. Hawks believe in "peace through strength," while Doves prescribe arms control and accommodation. Owls, on the other hand, think nuclear war is likely to stem from a loss of control and thus work to strengthen organizations and coordinate events to prevent such a catastrophe.

United

"People are destined to disagree forever about Star Wars and the nuclear freeze. But these people can unite on this program of actions to reduce the risks of nuclear war," said Allison, who was recently named special adviser to Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger '38.

"A loss of control is more likely to lead to a nuclear war than a deliberate decision to start one," said Carnesale, who was a member of the Salt I delegation.

Nye, who heads the K-School Institute for Science and International Affairs, told the crowd that he and his colleagues are concerned more with the use of weapons than with reduction or build-up.

"It's not important how many weapons we have--what's important is use and the factors affecting use," said Nye, a State Department official in the Carter Administration.

Informal Areas

The three argued that the Owl agenda does not oppose formal efforts, like the Geneva arms talks to control nuclear weapons, but is instead meant to complement arms control.

The "Owls' agenda," Nye said, includes:

*Maintaining a credible nuclear and coventional deterrent, which allows for a first-use policy but does not allow for provocation of the Soviet Union:

*Reducing the danger of accidents by, for example, fitting nuclear weapons with special locks that only presidential authorization could undo:

*Preventing and managing crises, including training top officials in the details of nuclear weapons systems and preventing "decapitation" strikes against the nation's capital.

*Limiting misconceptions by setting up regular meetings between top American and Soviet leaders and improving communication lines between all countries with nuclear capabilities