Backing Alfonsin

AFTER a half century of virtually uninterrupted military rule, a hint of democracy has finally penetrated Argentina's totalitarian armor President Raul Alfonsin's government, succeeding a brutal military regime, offers many Argentines what it ought to offer the Reagan Administration a chance to make a Latin American nation survive and prosper And, perhaps more importantly for the U.S. Alfonsin has given the Administration a plum chance to put its money where its mouth to really work for liberty and justice.

Whether or not Argentina again turns its back on democracy may in large part be determined by what the United States does to help Alfonsin. Only if Alfonsin is able to solve his country's problems can he prove that democracy can succeed where dictatorship has failed. The new president has to overcome some serious obstacles first. Inflation runs at annual rate of 1000 percent, the foreign debt stands at $40 billion, unemployment is over 20 percent, while underemployment (the number of people who work no more than one hour each day) has reached 30 percent. But the situation is not hopeless. Argentina has enough oil alone to power all of its industry and can feed a population 28 times its size. Its detoriorating economy is largely a result of a decade without economic growth, caused by 50 years of inept military rule (Since the '30s all but eight of 24 Argentine presidents have been military leaders). Before the military took over running the economy, Argentina had a GNP twice the size of Italy's and a mere $30 less than that of France. Now it is considered a Third World country.

Alfonsin has already proven himself more than worthy of unfailing United States aid. He has placed the army under civilian authority and is reducing the size of the armed forces. He has also abandoned the American tactic of supporting secret wars to overthrow existing Latin American governments, and has promised to peacefully resolve a potentially fractious conflict with Chile over the Beagle Channel.

Alfonsin claims that United States aid is crucial to the success of his policies and his administration. It is vital that American markets be opened to Argentine goods if the country is to grow at all. Realizing that only if the debtor is allowed to do business will the creditor collect, Alfonsin is willing to implement an austerity program, but not a recessionary one.

UNFORTUNATELY, the Reagan Administration has not taken the bait. Recently, Argentina's IMF loans fell due and the country was incapable of paying them. The United States finally showed a modicum of support and gave Argentina money, but only after Mexico had taken the lead.

What little attention the U.S. has paid, has been to use the country as a military pawn. To avoid Congressional disapproval over covert military actions in Nicaragua, Reagan requested that the then-Argentina military junta and train anti-Sandinista guerilla to attack from bases in Honderas. The Argentines agreed. But when the country tried to claim the Falkland Islands, America not only dropped its pawn like a hot potato, but supported Britain in the war. Mislead by Reagan, and by their own political naivete, Argentine leaders believed themselves wholeheartedly supported by the United States, an assumption which proved wholeheartedly wrong.

After the war, when the military, showing signs of postwar exhaustion, announced that it would return power to the civilians, the United States tried to resume arms sales in the summer of 1982 to win back Argentine good will (Arms sales had been prohibited in 1978 because of human rights violations). It was supposedly a measure of good faith, but it seemed to indicate that the United States had no faith in democracy and that the military was expected to play an important political role in the years to come. Congress thankfully blocked the arms sales, but the blunders continued. Embassy officials criticized human rights workers, explaining that a Peronist victory would best serve American interests. In November, just one month after Alfonsin's election, Robert Schweitzer, an official with the Inter-American Defense Board, slipped into Argentina to meet with top military officials, without telling the new leaders. This enraged Alfonsin--and rightly so--enough that the United States lifted the arms ban, for lack of anything better to do. But the move was too late.

If the Reagan Administration wishes to beef up Argentina's military prowess by strengthening its arsenal, there should be no strenuous objections. But what the United States must first, and more importantly, do is to show explicit and active support for Alfonsin's attempts to democratize the country. Open commitment to human rights and economic growth in Argentina must replace the "quiet diplomacy" which has thus far served only to alienate and distance the Reagan Administration from Alfonsin if the United States considers a Latin American ally a priority at all.