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A YEAR of crisis after crisis in Lebanon, from last fall's Sabra and Chatila massacres to the Druse ravages this month, has ironically dulled the Western panic nerve. Once, every new incident chilled observers with the thought that an international free-for-all was around the corner; now, as casualties mount in the "interim" Marine peacekeeping force, and as Marines fire back, violence has come to seem almost like stability.
This acclimation made the shock almost imperceptible when last week a ticklish situation turned into a veritable powder keg. The change came with the Reagan Administration's decision to authorize the Marines to fire not only in self-defense but also in aid to any European peacekeeping forces in the area.
The ensuing wrangle between Congress and the President over whether that change constitutes virtual war has, fortunately, reminded President and Congress alike just how inflammable the region really is, prompting them to focus on containing the situation. What it has not been able to provide is a desperately needed look beyond containment, to the causes which make keeping order in Lebanon akin to piling weight atop a steaming kettle--impossible to maintain indefinitely.
As everyone agrees in the abstract, the forces disrupting Lebanon have been boiling for centuries; the pressure first became unbearable in the 1950s when the British Empire withdrew from the region, leaving a precarious and artificial structure of accord among the country's factions. All U.S. negotiations, though, have followed an endless and fruitless circle, attempting and repeatedly failing to normalize the region as it now stands.
In a grievously complicated situation, the U.S. and other powers with peacekeeping forces in Lebanon must have moved beyond the unattractive military options that now face them--pulling out to let violence erupt immediately, or upping the peacekeeping pressure until that violence becomes stronger than any barrier. And they must avoid the other easy, backward-looking--and unfair--tack of blaming the violence on the Israeli pullout, so long clamored for, and trying hypocritically to reinvolve Israel in Lebanon's affairs. Instead, the U.S. must marshal all its resources of political analysis for a deeper look--even if it means helping Lebanon change its political structure. When curing a malady's symptoms involves invoking the War Powers Act, it is high time to look to the disease.
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