Double Vision

LAST WEEK, Soviet Premier Yuri Andropov offered what could well be the last chance for success in the negotiations over Euromissiles. "The Soviet Union," he said in a major state speech, "has stated readiness not to have in Europe a single missile and a single plane more than possessed today by NATO countries." This offer of parity with British and French nuclear forces would require a Soviet reduction of intermediate-range missiles and warheads--a condition Andropov vowed could and would be met. However, the central requirement of the offer, and the central U.S. prohibition in the talks at Geneva, unhappily coincide--namely, Soviet insistence that French and British nuclear weapons be included in the negotiations, and firm refusal of the West to do so.

This latest Soviet move throws new light on a basic American hypocrisy in Europe. True, the State Department replied with approval to Andropov's offer of counting warheads as well as missiles in the negotiations, calling it a "sign of progress." But the same statement reiterated American insistence on a solely bilateral approach. As far as the U.S. seems to be concerned, Western Europe should serve merely as a forward basing area for missiles which can easily reach all of European Russia. It's OK for us, to put missiles in your backyard, the Administration seems to say; but you'd better not do anything in our hemisphere.

How has the French and British nuclear deterrent been thus ignored? Certainly no one can deny Western Europe's interest in the talks, indeed, these countries have far more directly at stake than the U.S., nor the degree to which U.S. and European goals are the same. The NATO decision to deploy the missiles in the first place was exactly that--a joint decision by the NATO governments, as advised by their military staffs. Why, then, does this mutuality break down when the debate turns to individual nuclear forces? The public argument, identical in London and Paris as well as in Washington, goes something like this. French and British weapons, based mainly in submarines, are targeted on the Soviet Union. Therefore, they are "strategic," not "tactical," weapons and should not be included in intermediate-range nuclear negotiations.

Two glaring fallacies strike down this explanation. The first is the rather obvious weakness of the "tactical" vs. "strategic" concept when dealing with modern nuclear weapons in Europe. All of the weapons at the core of the current debate--572 yet-to-be-deployed American cruise and ballistic missiles, 243 Soviet SS-20s with three warheads each, French and British subs with 272 warheads in all, and an assortment of aircraft on both sides--can travel hundreds of miles and destroy every major target in Europe, including Russia. Tactical weapons, by definition, are short-range, low-yield nuclear devices designed for battlefield use against military targets. In contrast, strategic weapons can destroy the mainland U.S. and U.S.S.R.

Actually, the only true tactical nuclear weapons in use today are small missiles launched from aircraft, artillery shells, and small ground-to-ground missiles. Especially from the Soviet point of view, the proposed missiles are not tactical and never were. They can destroy the major part of Soviet civilization in a matter of minutes. And any decision to launch them will be made by Americans.

This leads to the second fallacy. Why should the United States even consider basing missiles in Europe independently of the military organizations of the countries involved? For good or ill, the futures of the NATO countries are inextricably intertwined. This is not true in only a military sense. The common interests of the Western democracies have multiplied since 1945. The economic and social fabric of the Atlantic alliance grows stronger each year. Any disruption of this unified situation can only be viewed in a negative light--and the remote possibility of a Soviet invasion through West Germany is the most negative one of all.

A New York Times editorial recently described the French force as "French say, or at least the necessity to take France into account when people talk about how the world is going to be run." No plains exist for wartime use of French weapons integrated with the rest of NATO. The British force by contrast would be completely integrated with NATO forces in the event of an emergency. But Mrs. Thatcher's government also feels that Britain "should have its own nuclear strike force so as not to be completely dependent upon the Americans."

SUCH IS ONE facet of the refusal: national vanity. It is only natural for countries as economically powerful and historically great as Britain and France to want to be militarily strong as well. But there is a more ominous motivation for refusal--one which the alliance must immediately address.

The British, French, Soviet and future American weapons in Europe are relatively few and cheap. NATO's conventional commitment also remains relatively small compared to the Communist bloc forces. By having nuclear forces, Britain and France receive "more bang for the buck," so to speak; in theory these weapons serve as a deterrent to the huge conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact. In practice, they would have to survive a first strike by the Soviet SS-20s, and in any case their use in a wartime situation would be subject to innumerable uncertainties and problems. Because of the numerical superiority of the SS-20s, they would hardly stand up alone.

Enter the U.S. Western European leaders believe that the military power of American remains the only check on an alleged Soviet drive for world hegemony. By encouraging the United States to station missiles on their soil, they accomplish three interrelated goals first, a supposedly greater deterrent; second, the money saved by not increasing their forces as much as they had planned; and third, the absolute assurance that any conflict in Europe will involve U.S. nuclear weapons. This is the ultimate deterrent, because after deployment the nuclear East Coast of the United States will be the West German border. America will be committed the moment the first SS-20 hits the first Pershing II.

Of course it's all well and good for America to be completely committed to the defense of Western Europe. The commitment is in our own interest, for one thing, and for all practical purposes has existed for 40 years anyway. But going about it this way is madness. The unrest in Europe and the steady worsening of East/West relations supply abundant proof that the U.S. can no longer maintain this surety while acting as if it does not exist. Andropov's remarks last week once again showed that if the talks fail, the West will have only itself to blame. If the Western alliance wants to be completely interdependent, then it should go ahead and do it. The NATO nuclear and conventional forces, including American weapons, should be completely integrated. They should be built into a credible deterrent for the future, despite Western Europe's reluctance to commit itself.