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IN COVERING Jesse Jackson as the only possible Black Presidential candidate, the press now and then quotes him about the need for a rainbow coalition of Blacks, Latinos, women, poor people, and disadvantaged groups. Mostly, though, the media talks about the maturation of Blacks in politics; whether a Jackson candidacy would get people to register and vote; whether he would divide the Democratic party in the face of what looks to be a long, hard battle in the trenches to oust President Reagan in 1984. Yet the underlying assumption behind all this discussion is that Jackson would be a "Black" candidate, there to act as a power broker for Blacks at the Democratic convention in San Francisco.
But if Jackson becomes the candidate the media is portraying, he will fail to grab the real opportunity for Blacks in 1984. This is not the time for Blacks to run their own candidate--the days are past when "Black Power" was the only way. What will help the mass of poor Blacks more is a movement of all the poor combined with the political left, which Blacks will dominate--through sheer numbers--but not control. Radicals such as Francis Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward predict such a realignment of politics among class lines if only the left follows a new strategy of voter registration and coalition building.
Of the 76.5 million citizens who were eligible to vote in 1980 but did not, 75 per cent of these were poor; the numbers are a powerful argument for voter registration in the polarized age of Reagan. A coalition would emerge of constituencies that have not been listened to in the White House or the meeting rooms of the Democratic Party--Blacks. Latinos, the poor, women, progressive labor, peace groups, community groups, gays and lesbians. Led and spurred on by a Presidential candidate, these groups could form local and national coalitions, effectively creating a political apparatus not tied to the electoral process, able to work inside the Democratic Party but drawing much of its power from its constituency and organization outside. The key to all this, according to Black syndicated columnist and Colgate University professor Manning Marable, is the platform--not the candidate.
That platform would consist of planks like affirmative action, universal health care, withdrawal of American military involvement from Central America, and passage of the ERA. Within a multi-racial coalition, Black issues would not be seen as simple effects of racism, but rather part of a complex of class/race/gender oppression. The strategy rests not on the candidate, but on the candidate's ability to articulate the issues.
THE IMPACT of Reagan, the centrist drift of the Democratic Party, and the excitement generated by the showing of Blacks in major mayoral races make now the best time for this strategy. Reagan's policies have caused a new feeling of class consciousness among the working (and not working) classes: I overheard one Black teenager in a Fort Worth Dairy Queen ask another how it was going. The other replied, "Reaganomics, man. It's got me bad."
The Democrats have not responded to Reagan with as much vehemence as many on the left would like, largely because of the skill with which the party has isolated itself from the mass of low- and moderate-income citizens. ACORN, a national organization of the poor, protested at the 1980 Democratic National Convention for a quota of one-third of delegates to be low- and moderate-income, similar to the 50 per cent quota for women. A commission headed by Black activist and Congressman Michey Leland recommended the idea to the Democratic National Committee, which rejected it in favor of another proposal that about one-third of delegates be party officials--effectively closing off the party instead of opening it up.
But as Blacks saw the electoral power they could wield in the campaigns of Harold Washington, Wilson Goods, and Mel King, the idea of a Black candidate drew more support. At first these many possible candidates. Rep. Ron Dellums (D-Calif.), with a long faithful history not only to fellow Blacks but also to left-wing causes, would have been perfect had his name not been smeared by accusations that key aides were connected with narcotics. Those allegations are just now being cleared up after many months and $200,000, leading many to speculate that the accusations were a well-timed frame-up. Georgia State Senator Julian Bond, Atlanta Mayor Andrew Young, or Rep. John Conyers (D-Mich.), could also have run on the "rainbow platform"; but all decided not to. As for the possibility of a leftist coalition strategy led by a non-Black candidate, Alan Cranston lacks the strength with Blacks, Latinos, and progressive labor, while Gary Hart lacks the necessary political impact. By elimination and self-selection, Jackson emerged as the only viable candidate.
Jackson, who many on the inside feel will declare soon, brings many problems into the equation, which the media have not neglected to discuss. Among these problems are the questionable finances of Operation PUSH, Jackson's Chicago-based Black self-help group; the potential split which might occur among the middle-class Black leaders and politicians, though mass enthusiasm could still force anti-Jackson leaders into a more conciliatory stand; questions about Jackson's administrative capacity to run the $2-4 million-dollar campaign he needs to survive in the primaries; concerns that Jackson is an egotistical climber looking to become the one national Black political leader; and the possibility that a Jackson candidacy would drain votes from Walter Mondale's effort, increasing conservative John Glenn's likelihood of gaining the nomination.
TAKING ALL THIS into account, Marable points to three overriding possible benefits of a Jackson candidacy. First, of course, it would bring out hundreds of thousands of Blacks and other people who have never voted before, giving the Democratic nominee a better chance of beating Reagan in 1984. For example, Reagan won eight Southern states in 1980 by a total of 187,000 votes, while 3 million Blacks in those states were unregistered; Reagan won New York by 165,000 votes, and 900,000 New York Blacks were not registered. As anti-Reagan forces will become stronger, so will liberal forces in local and state elections; in at least four states--Texas, Maine, Tennessee and North Carolina--Senatorial races will very likely be extremely close. And if Jackson has the 300 delegates he is expected to at the Democratic Convention, he may be able to force Mondale to talk appointments and policy before the election, as Cranston and Hart throw their delegates to Mondale and the South goes to Glenn. Jackson will also raise questions no other candidate could about domestic policy and the treatment of the disadvantaged, as well as the United States role in places like South Africa and Central America.
Yet a coalition of conscience demands a presidential candidate now to unite the disparate groups for future power. Jackson is the only one who could do it now, but he must fight the instincts of the media by not allowing himself to become simply the Black candidate. Instead, he must argue for and form bridges with all the oppressed, disadvantaged, poor, and disaffected in this country.
The success of this new strategy, dependent on Jackson realizing that the platform and not he himself is the key, will be apparent be fore any of the first primaries. This strategy will live or die in the first three months, when Jackson must prove to wary Hispanics, women's groups, progressive labor groups, and others that this rainbow coalition is the key to future political power. If it succeeds, against all the known and unforeseen obstacles. The surge of grassroots citizens groups of the '70s may consolidate in the '80s into new local and national coalitions, capable of a class-based realignment of American politics.
As in the past, leaders must make the key decisions while the masses anxiously await a strong call for the new dream. The March on Washington was only one such sign that masses are listening. Recently a community leader, once kicked off a bus for refusing to sit in the back, told me at a neighborhood meeting. "We've fought too long, we've lost too much blood to give up now." Now, it is Jackson's move, but after that we on the local level must organize to build for the next leader--Black. Latino, or white--to take control of a movement faithful to the ideals of its nation.
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