The Right Direction

FINALLY, A STEP in the right direction. Last week, the Reagan Administration offered Nicaragua a new eight-point plan that would put a thaw to the Cold War that has developed in recent months between the two countries. In essence, the proposal calls for the U.S. to resume aid to the Central American nation, pledge non-intervention in Nicaraguan affairs and pressure counter-revolutionaries training on American soil to cease their activities. In return, the Sandinistas must agree to end aid to leftist guerrillas in El Salvador and put a limit on their arms build-up and the number of foreign military advisors in the region.

In the past, the main obstacle to an agreement had been Managua's refusal to disclaim support for the Salvadoran leftists. The Administration believes the Sandinistas send arms to and train the guerrillas. Nicaragua has denied this allegation, saying only that it gives "moral support" to its ideological soulmates.

To this regard, the U.S. proposal as indicated to the press is poorly worded and may thus prove to be ineffective. According to a State Department official. Washington has asked for "an end to Nicaraguan support for insurgencies in neighboring countries." The problem lies with the ambiguity of the word "support." Clearly the Sandinistas will not agree to curtailing their moral support for any leftist group in Central America. And it hardly seems likely that the leaders in Managua will publicly disavow material support for insurgencies--support they have consistently claimed does not exist. In the world of international relations, where every word is carefully weighed this minor rhetorical point could undermine the U.S. plan.

The best way around this problem would be for the U.S. to ask Nicaragua to state it "will not give material support for insurgencies in neighboring countries." By striking the word "end" from the proposal, the U.S. can get Nicaraguan backing for the plan without making the Sandinistas look like liars.

The other points, though, are balanced and make sense. The Sandinistas have stated convincingly that their significant military build-up is a necessary response to perceived U.S. belligerence.

The Nicaraguans point, for example, to recent revelations that the U.S. is considering financing a 500-man covert paramilitary force whose goal would be to destabilize the Sandinista government. By arguing to crack down on counter-revolutionaries-in the U.S. and declaring it will not interfere in Nicaraguan affairs. Washington should go a long way toward assuaging the fears of the Sandinistas.

Equally important is the proposed resumption of U.S. economic aid to Nicaragua. The Nicaraguan economy is hurting and the public sector in particular sorely needs the funds it would receive from Washington. In addition, the U.S. plan would make Nicaragua eligible for the trade and investment incentives proposed in President Reagan's Caribbean Basin initiative.

The proposal represents a dramatic about-face in Administration policy. For the past few months, Washington has attempted--with often counter-productive results--to paint the Sandinistas as Soviet lackeys bent on exporting Communism to the rest of Central America.

The list of failed propaganda efforts--for example, the incident of the alleged Nicaraguan mercenary captured in El Salvador who told a room filled with reporters that he had been tortured to lie about his activities--is long and has only served to make Washington, and not Managua, look bad.

Washington's reversal, even if it does not lead to immediate detente with the Sandinistas, at least opens the doors for continued negotiations. Maybe the Administration has come to realize that a policy of talk and compromise beats one of threats and rhetoric, at least with regard to Nicaragua. One can be skeptical of the Administration's good intentions toward the Sandinistas but the very existence of the new plan demonstrates that moderates carry some weight within Reagan's foreign policy team. And that is cause enough to celebrate.