What We Are Really Selling

THE REAGAN administration's decision to ask for Congressional approval of a major sale of advanced military hardware to Saudi Arabia was admittedly a tough one. Had the White House abandoned support of the sale, critics would have charged the President with backing down in the face of Congressional opposition, or with insulting the Saudi government when it is trying to convince radical Arab states of the value of American friendship. But the potential damage to the administration is certainly less grave than that which might result if Congress approves the sale.

In 1978 the Carter administration agreed to sell the Saudis 62 F-15 fighters on the condition that external fuel tanks not be included as part of the package because of their potential threat to Israel. But the Saudis now say they need the fuel tanks along with five Airborne Warning and Command System (AWACS) aircraft, claiming that their security needs have changed since then. The Soviets are in Afganistan, and Iran, once America's arsenal in the Persian Gulf, is now unfriendly to both the United States and Saudi Arabia.

The experience of America in Iran might prove illuminating to Reagan policy planners. Iran was a backward nation, the leader of which had a voracious appetite for arms and a noted aversion to civil rights for his people. While the Shah greedily collected all the gadgetry of death that we would sell him, he left Iran's social needs unmet and crushed all those who urged him to do otherwise. Those gadgets meant little indeed when the people of Iran rose up to defeat the Shah; we would be better off urging the Saudi princes to devote their resources to eliminating the need for social revolt.

Furthermore, the sale of arms to the Saudis represents one more example of the Reagan administration's increasingly dangerous policy of confrontation toward the Soviet Union. We should, in all cases, avoid escalating the world-wide arms race; selling sophisticated arms to a nation in so volitile a region is a needless acceleration of world militarism. America has now armed almost every nation in the Middle East, a dubious distinction that only readies the area for a blood-batn and does nothing to foster a long-term settlement.

By granting the Saudis their military wish-list (and the American advisers who must inevitably follow), the United States will be making a spineless capitulation to the world's leading oil-exporter. The sale won't help the Saudis, who don't need more weapons; won't help the Israelis, who will feel compelled to demand more arms themselves, and won't help Americans, who will be slipping further along the road to international confrontation and possible disaster.