News
HMS Is Facing a Deficit. Under Trump, Some Fear It May Get Worse.
News
Cambridge Police Respond to Three Armed Robberies Over Holiday Weekend
News
What’s Next for Harvard’s Legacy of Slavery Initiative?
News
MassDOT Adds Unpopular Train Layover to Allston I-90 Project in Sudden Reversal
News
Denied Winter Campus Housing, International Students Scramble to Find Alternative Options
I attended the Veteran's Day lectures here at Harvard, and gave a short talk at an undergraduate house. I did so because I felt that public awareness of these issues is important. I still think so, but I now have considerable doubts about the utility of these Veteran's Day activities. I am glad people are concerned, but I am worried because these discussions may make matters worse. Why? Because they encourage rhetoric and public posturing more than sober analysis. And if any subject needs sobriety, it is the prospect of nuclear war.
As I listened to the speakers and spoke myself. I heard strong opinions marching out unarmored by evidence or a careful weighing of alternative views. Paul Warnke, an able man who should know better, stated flatly that the proposed improvements in NATO long-range theatre nuclear forces provide no possible military advantage. This statement is easily challengeable. For example, the precision and remarkable accuracy of these systems could make them ideal for striking logistical "choke-points" at the rear of an attacking Soviet army.
Yuri Kapralov, the lone Soviet participant in the nationwide proceedings, offered similarly questionable statements. It may be too optimistic to expect objectivity from a government spokesman, but Kapralov demonstrated a disdain for factual clarity that was truly remarkable. His claim that the United States had been the first to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles and missile launching submarines, thereby forcing the Soviet Union to respond, is simply not true. The Soviets first tested an ICBM in 1957, well before the first U.S. test firing in November 1958. Soviet missile submarines, though markedly inferior to the American Polaris system, appeared earlier. And the Soviet nuclear weapons program, which included organized espionage within the Manhattan project, began no later than 1943, well before Hiroshima. Again, how many in the audience knew these details, and knew Kapralov was indulging in propaganda? Very few, if one judges from the applause he received Kapralov clearly knew how to play to his audience, and didn't mind stretching the truth to give them just what they wanted to hear.
Why should we worry about the problem of rhetoric overtaking reality? Isn't some concern better than none? Such a view is in the best democratic tradition, but if the issues don't lend themselves to the kind of misleading simplicity displayed last week, than a little knowledge, as we all know, becomes a dangerous thing. I see two chief dangers.
First, the tendency to oversimplify encourages incomplete analysis and bad ideas. For example, calling for sharp decreases in current weapons stockpiles as many of those at the convocation did, may not enhance our security. With current levels of weapons, a possible disarming strike is essentially impossible. If each side had few weapons, one would have to worry quite seriously that the other side would be tempted to destroy those few in a first strike.
Second, when opponents of current policy use oversimplified and ultimately erroneous arguments to make their points, they encourage their political opponents to do the same. Given the resources available to the Pentagon both for publicity and data manipulation, this is unlikely to prove an effective tactic for changing current policy. It would be far better to force the administration to justify its policies with detailed, careful discussions, rather than to indulge in theatrical displays.
So let us not be too impressed with this national event. It may have sparked some interest and increased our collective concern. It also provided a series of forums for disinformation and unsupported opinion. A complex set of issues was homogenized for public consumption. Important questions, alas, deserve better--not simply more--public scrutiny.
Stephen M. Walt is a research associate at the Center for Science and International Affairs. Kennedy School of Government.
Want to keep up with breaking news? Subscribe to our email newsletter.