Chemical Rivalry

THE United States earlier this month announced its intention to resume production of chemical weapons, discontinued a decade ago. The New York Times, commenting on the decision, said that one crucial question was left unanswered--the ultimate cost of the program.

In our minds, though, there is another, far larger question open-- whether it is sound policy for the United States to re-enter the chemical weaponry business. "Chemical weapons" is actually too cosmetic a name: what we will be producing, more accurately, is nerve gas, which kills by paralyzing the central nervous system. While death by nerve gas is no more horrible than death by other means, its use poses serious questions-- can it be used strictly as a weapon, and not, like napalm in Vietnam, end up as a means of destroying civilians? And will this gradual re-deployment open the door to the production of uncontrollable biological weaponry?

Resumption of chemical weaponry production also poses all the usual problems--more money for defense, money that is badly needed elsewhere in this world, and the dangerous potential for escalation inherent in any attempt to match the Soviet Union item for item in every aspect of military spending. In addition, the environmental hazards posed by the manufacture of nerve gas would seem to mirror those currently plaguing plutonium production. Those who argue that the new binary systems will be "safe" are not supported by past experience with hazardous materials.

Congress should not have appropriated start-up funds for the program until those questions had been answered. And unless the answers are more convincing than seems likely, Congress should cut off the supply of money next year and concentrate instead on building a small, capable military, not an overgrown monster to match the excesses of the Soviets.