A New Approach to Africa?

THE NEW AMERICAN policies toward black Africa proclaimed by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger '50 represent a tactical retreat prompted by recent developments in Mozambique, Angola and Rhodesia. Before 1974, the United States was committed to supporting white-dominated minority regimes in southern Africa that are both repressive and exploitative. When the Angolan civil war broke out, the U.S. chose to resist Soviet influence rather than support a national liberation movement, allying itself with South Africa's armies against the MPLA.

The triumph of black leftist movements in Angola and Mozambique has placed the Rhodesian government in an untenable position. Prime Minister Ian Smith's stubborn refusal to cooperate in a raid transition to black majority rule has compelled neighboring black governments to support a full-scale guerilla war. Even such pro-Western leaders as Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda expressed their willingness to accept Soviet and Cuban aid to toppling the Smith regime.

Recognizing that continued support for the Rhodesian government could only further damage America credibility in the Third World, Kissinger has wisely decided to abandon Smith. On his recent African tour, he declared that the U.S. will support a majority government in Rhodesia, and offered sanctions on Smith's regime. Kissinger also pledged to seek the repeal of the Byrd amendment, which allows U.S. companies to import Rhodesian chrome despite a U.N. boycott. In addition, he committed the U.S. to push for a timetable for transition to black rule in South Africa.

These measures are good, but will require rigorous implementation to be effective. The U.S. must discourage investment by American-based multinationals in Rhodesia if the black nations' boycott is to have any impact. American nationals must be discouraged from visiting Rhodesia, whose white rulers rely on tourism to keep up white morale. The U.S. must also abandon its opposition to the MPLA government in Angola.

But the extent to which America is willing to disassociate itself from South Africa remains unclear. In the 1969 National Security Council review of American policy in Africa, the U.S. based its future policy on close cooperation with Prime Minister Vorster's apartheid regime. The U.S. is deeply involved in the South African economy. American investments amount to at least $1.6 billion, and American sales in South Africa were up to $1.1 billion in 1974. American corporations such as IBM, Polaroid and Boeing are mainstays of the South African police state, providing military and administrative devices for repression. General Electric applied last week for permission to sell nuclear arms to Vorster's government. The U.S. government has a strategic interest in retaining control over the sea routes of the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans, and therefore has encouraged cooperation with South Africa.

GIVEN, the scale of immediate American interests in South Africa, and past cooperation of the U.S. with Vorster--as in the Angolan civil war--it seems unlikely that Kissinger's recent policy statements signal a genuine commitment to black majority rule in South Africa. If black nations are to view Kissinger's new policy as more than a tactical maneuver, the U.S. must fully repudiate Vorster's regime. The U.S. government should force corporations to withdraw from South Africa, and to comply with international sanctions. It should also exert diplomatic pressure on the Vorster government to abandon its minority rule. If the U.S. fails to pursue such a program--as appears likely--black Africans will know it retains its generally racist perspective towards Africa, and Third World nations will continue to regard American policies and promises with justifiable suspicion.