The South Korean Connection

THE CONTINUING SERIES of revelations concerning pervasive South Korean covert activities in this country raises a number of important questions about American commitments to the Seoul government. But more importantly, it highlights the apparent systematic corruption of our own foreign policy--in particular, the perverse relations between America and some of the countries America chooses as "allies."

Although the investigation of South Korean lobbying efforts is still in its early stages, enough information has already surfaced to outline a relationship based on widespread bribery and corruption, an extensive and well-financed campaign of influence buying, apparently ordered by South Korean President Park Chung Hee and supervised by the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA).

The principal figures in the Washington-based operation is a Korean businessman known as Tongsun Park. Park is a man of rather substantial income, apparently derived from a lucrative rice-exporting operation that is sanctioned and supported by key figures in both the United States and South Korean governments. The evidence at this time indicates that Park contacted the KCIA in the United States and offered to begin a lobbying effort based in Washington in return for certain concessions in rice exporting to South Korea. Park's and South Korea's lobbying campaign grew in size and scope, changing into a high-level secret operation in 1970. At that time, the United States had decided to withdraw 20,000 of its 60,000 troops and other personnel from South Korea, and the pressures of the Vietnam War seemed likely to increase demands for U.S. disengagement from South Korea in the future.

One of the initial steps in the campaign was the compilation of a list of 90 U.S. Senators and Congressmen targeted for lobbying and bribery. A memo containing that list fell into the hands of U.S. officials in 1973, but the FBI has only recently requested it in its official investigation of the Korea-Congress nexus. The investigation has revealed that American congressmen and assorted other government officials, including a state governor, accepted money and gifts from Park and his associates. Several of the contributions, including the one made to House Majority Whip John F. McFall, have not been in the form of campaign contributions, but have been donations obviously intended for personal use. Many of the transactions have occurred in cash and have thus been difficult to trace.

In addition to the cash and campaign contributions, South Korean businessmen and government officials have lavished gifts upon American congressmen both in the United States and during official visits to Seoul. The South Koreans in Washington, particularly Park, are not only generous with their money, but with entertainment. Many a congressman and senator has enjoyed evenings of fun and frolic at Park's famous Washington events. The Georgetown Club, a private social organization including officials like Tip O'Neill and Gerald Ford in its non-paying membership, is owned by Mr. Park.

THE KCIA has also conducted systematic surveillance and harassment of South Koreans living in the United States, with activities ranging from economic sanctions to physical assault.

But the litany of corruption does not stop at the Pacific's shores. Pentagon investigations recently made public have confirmed that the American taxpayers have been losing between $25 and $50 million a year as a result of collusive bidding practices for Army construction projects in South Korea. The arrangements have resulted in sizeable kickbacks for South Korean and American officials living in Korea willing to direct contract to a special construction association. Where it has met resistance, the association's strongarm subsidiary has threatened potential contractors, beaten American and Korean citizens, stolen U.S. Government bid documents, and engaged in numerous forms of bribery and intimidation.

This long and dirty list of corrupt practices and covert activities naturally calls into question the advisability of American economic and military aid to South Korea. It also underlines a number of reprehensible features of American foreign policy in general. First, South Korean covert activities in this country are not unique, nor have they been strictly opposed by the U.S. government. A number of other countries have placed members of their intelligence services here with the CIA's permission. In a recent interview, the Shah of Iran admitted that agents of Savak, the Iranian intelligence organization, have operated with CIA permission in the U.S. to keep an eye on Iranian students. Apparently both Chile and Taiwan have similar operatives in the United States performing similar functions.

THE MOST INTERESTING aspect of these arrangements is that the U.S. intelligence services' cooperation with foreign counterparts has generally taken the shape of agreements permitting agents to operate freely in each other's countries. The objects of concern are not only the activities of one's own citizens abroad, but the conduct of governments supposedly regarded as allies. While this sort of concern seems justified given the sort of allies American administrations have been inclined to choose, it is indicative of the perversity of American foreign relations. Not only has the United States chosen allies that it cannot trust, but the integrity of the American political process has been jeopardized for the sake of these allies and the mutual suspicions engendered by the alliances themselves.

Even more disturbing has been the official American response to evidence of the South Korean scandal. While State Department officials acknowledge that relations with South Korea have been severely strained by these revelations, they are quick to publicly assure President Park of America's steadfast military commitment. Concern about public support for this commitment has probably contributed to the delay of the official investigation. Suspicions of South Korean covert activities have existed for a decade and tangible evidence has been in the possession of American officials for at least four years. And yet these officials have only recently gathered the energy necessary for an effective investigation.

While strategic geopolitical interests seem to have constrained American concern about the lobbying effort, there have been other reasons. Recently a State Department official revealed that senior members of the Nixon administration did little to curb the lobbying activity for fear of losing the Korean commitment of 52,000 troops during the Vietnam War. President Nixon sent a personal letter requesting that the South Koreans maintain their military aid to the Vietnam effort, with full knowledge of the South Korea activities and Seoul's fear of investigation.

The conclusions one is forced to reach are rather frightening. Not only did an American president order CIA covert activities in other countries and preside over the organized subversion of the American political system, but he sanctioned the continuing efforts of a foreign government to subvert that system for the sake of a cruel and misguided foreign policy. Given the evidence of Watergate, it is unlikely that Nixon was too gravely disturbed by the evidence of South Korean subversion, even if the object of the activities was the United States government. It is all too easy to conjure the nightmare of two despots like Presidents Nixon and Park, plotting over a global chessboard--with their own countries as sacrificial pawns.

There is probably still another reason for America's official reluctance to deal with South Korean corruption. Those officials may well possess a sufficient sense of hypocrisy not to condemn foreign governments for the sort of actions that America has practiced for decades. Like South Korea, the United States has funneled money to foreign politicians and granted gifts (usually weapons instead of antiques) to those it wished to influence. And, unlike South Korea, America has manipulated massive sums of financial aid, directed programs of assassination of foreign officials and conducted secret wars abroad. South Korea has only brought home to the United States the sorts of sordid campaigns that the American government has ordered against other countries for at least a generation. The difference is that the South Korean regime is totalitarian, while the United States is, officially, the largest democracy on earth.

AMONG THE HOPES that are traditionally harbored for new administrations, there are always some demands for changes in foreign policy. Unfortunately, the covert activities mentioned above and the choice of allies to which America has been inclined seem to be the by-products of a consensus on foreign policy that has endured since the 1950s. Whether or not that consensus has been sufficiently fragmented to permit a new direction and style for American foreign policy will only be revealed with time. But new directions will certainly be necessary before the United States can confidently tell the dictatorships of the world to end their totalitarianism without a lingering sense of hypocrisy. And if the U.S. is to avoid another kind of hypocrisy, it would seem advisable for the new administration to terminate the close relationship that has developed over the years with South Korea, not merely because that relationship demands our troops in an uncontrollable situation, nor because it legitimizes a corrupt and authoritarian regime, but because the health of the American political system demands that we terminate it.