Henry A. Kissinger '50: The Unrealpolitik

THE MIDEAST was never Henry A. Kissinger's area of expertise. During his nearly five years as President Nixon's adviser for national security, Kissinger devoted himself to almost every aspect of American foreign policy, even to the point of upstaging then Secretary of State William P. Rogers, except for this one. His reasons for delegating high-level Mideast policy-making to Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco seem to have been largely personal. He had published no less on this topic than on China or Vietnam, yet he was a dominant force in Asian affairs. Perhaps because political pressures before October 1973 made the type of policy he would have liked to pursue in the Mideast impossible to adopt, perhaps because as a Jew he believed Arab nations would not trust his intentions, or perhaps simply because he realized that the possibility of any sort of serious settlement in the area was a long way off, Kissinger refrained both from participating in, and commenting on, the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The situation there during his tenure as national security advisor was relatively calm, and there was no immediate pressure on Kissinger to declare his position on the Mideast, which of course suited him just fine. But, as luck would have it, just a little more than a month after his appointment as Secretary of State, the fourth Arab-Israeli war in 25 years began. Suddenly, the area of the world which he had signally avoided involving himself in because Kissinger's highest priority.

From the outset, it was clear that Kissinger did not share the mainstream American view that the Israelis were right in refusing to return territories occupied in the Six Day War until the Arab states granted Israel diplomatic recognition. Then as now, the Secretary of State felt that Israel should be prepared to return the occupied territories for less extensive concessions. His handling of American policy during the October War gave clear in cation of how he analyzed the situation Kissinger saw another massive Israeli victory as potentially detrimental to both achieving a settlement in the area, and more importantly, to the cause of detente. Should the Israelis be about to repeat the rout of 1967, he believed, the Soviet Union would intervene, even at the risk of a direct confrontation with the United States. The development which would have pleased Kissinger most then was a modest but definitive Israeli defeat. With this in mind, he and Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger '50 limited arms shipments to Israel during the first days of the war, while Egyptians were performing at their peak level.

All this feverish activity during those two weeks in October 1973, ending with the cease-fire which robbed the Israelis of victory in a war which they did not start served as a prelude to further Kissinger involvement in the area. Since the end of the war, he has, through the use of techniques know as the "step-by-step approach," or "shuttle diplomacy," achieved one military disengagement in the Golan Heights. Israeli troop withdrawals in the Sinai, and generally created the impression that the situation in the Mideast has significantly improved. However, Kissinger has yet to convince the Arabs to deal with Israel on a political rather than military level, and his last attempt at bringing about a third withdrawal of Israeli forces in Sinai failed when Egypt ruled out a declaration of non-belligerency toward Israel. Kissinger, not surprisingly, agreed with Egypt that non-belligerency was too much to ask in return for abandoning key defensive fortifications, the Mitla and Gidi passes, and since has blamed Israel, both privately and publicly, for the breakdown of the talks.

To those who have been observing developments in the Middle East since Kissinger began his diplomatic initiatives, it is more than obvious that the so-called Kissinger approach is doomed to failure. There are several reasons why Kissinger's diplomacy by its very nature cannot bring about a lasting peace in the area. Of primary importance is the fact that a permanent agreement is not the Secretary of States goal it is father to end hostilities and relieve international tension. Thus there is no long range peace plan under consideration which takes into account the Palestinian question. "Step by step" takes place not in the context of an overall scheme for peace, but in a vacuum. Also, Kissinger has ignored the necessity for Arabs and Israelis to negotiate directly, at the same table, and has instead created a situation where the Arabs, particularly the Egyptians, approach the problem as though the United States is Israel's spokesman. Due to Kissinger's obsessive desire to have the United States, and particularly Henry Kissinger, conduct the negotiations. Israel and the Arabs are no closer to direct talks than they ever were. Indeed, Egyptian President Sadat has said openly that he has never made an agreement with Israel, only with the United States.

To compound this regressive aspect of his policy, Kissinger has made a conscious effort, seemingly successful, to establish a cult of personality intertwined with the negotiations. Both sides feel, at this point, that Kissinger is indispensible to the talks. In essence, all the keys are in his pocket; neither Arab nor Israeli has had anything but dealings with Henry Kissinger since the end of the October War. In the end, his effort to be the mortal who moves mountains can only lead to continued strife. By now, twenty-seven years after the first Arab-Israeli war, the warring parties should not, and cannot afford to, depend on the good offices of one man in their mutual quest for peace.

Kissinger's pre-eminent role must come to an end. His approach is too limited, his plans too global, for either side to rely on him entirely. His attempt to arouse anti-Israel sentiment in this country, and pressure the Rabin government into accepting his scheme for a troop withdrawal should be recognized as a cruel and reckless response of a man who fears that his role as the power to be reckoned with is in danger.

The Mideast conflict should be resolved through negotiations that deal with the fundamental issues, not the peripheral questions of how far regiments should pull back. Peace talks will be a long and arduous process, but they should not be written off and replaced by a one man show designed not to achieve peace, but to extend American influence.