Kissinger: After the Fall

WHILE PRESIDENT Ford's honeymoon with world leaders, the news media and the Congress may be just beginning, there are increasing indications that the honeymoon is finally drawing to a close for Henry A. Kissinger '50, secretary of state and former professor of government. Nobody is predicting the imminent downfall of the United States's perennial ace in the hole, but recent events do appear to indicate that Kissinger's bedfellows have finally discovered that he too is only human.

When it became apparent that Richard M. Nixon had finally painted himself into a corner, one of the biggest concerns of the Congress, then Vice President Ford and World leaders was that Kissinger might go out on Nixon's coattails as he had previously said he would if it became apparent that Nixon was guilty. Ford was able to receive assurances from Kissinger that he would stay on at least until 1976 as secretary of state and a member of the National Security Council. But what is yet to be seen is how Kissinger's role in setting U.S. foreign policy will change as the Ford administration "gets its legs."

Kissinger had virtually a free hand in setting affairs of state from the time Nixon first began to get mired in Watergate. Even before that, Nixon had relied almost solely on Kissinger for high-level advice. His string of international coups that brought him super-human status--despite his previous role in charting an immoral war that killed thousands of people in North Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos--began with, ironically enough, his sensational "Peace at Hand" trick mastered just in time to deal George McGovern the final death blow right before the 1972 election. Since then, Kissinger had shuttled back and forth through the Middle East, China and the Soviet Union in his relatively successful efforts to keep the world from exploding. There's little doube that Kissinger's role under Ford is going to change. He will continue to be a keystone in the public conduct of foreign affairs--Kissinger maintains wide respect and infuses a flamboyancy that Ford would be a fool not to exploit--but what remains to be seen is how different Kissinger's behind-the-scenes influence will be and how he will react to it.

Since Ford will not be operating with the burdens of Watergate upon his shoulder, he will surely take the natural course of all previous presidents and set out to make his own imprint upon the nation's foreign policy. If nothing else, this means a switch from Kissinger carrying out Kissinger's policy to Kissinger carrying out Ford's. This change will mean little if Ford relies as heavily upon Kissinger as Nixon did. However, there are several compelling reasons to believe that Ford's foreign policy will be formulated from a much wider base than the Nixon-Kissinger axis.

First, Ford has emphasized his plans to be an executive who is available to more than just his top aides. The process by which Nelson A. Rockefeller was tapped as the vice president-designate makes it apparent that Ford, in sharp contrast to Nixon, will consult Congressional leaders, and a wide variety of friends and even political opponents before making any big decisions. This naturally will diminish the degree to which Ford will rely upon Kissinger as a supreme advisor.

Further, Ford's stated desire to conduct his administration more in the open and not entirely behind closed doors conflicts with Kissinger's previous methods. Kissinger has always carried out his affairs under a cloak of secrecy. His irritations at criticism or questioning during the past year, though partly a facade geared to trump up sympathy for Nixon's sinking ship, indicate that Kissinger may not be up to laying all his cards on the table and taking the salt with the sugar.

The world and domestic economic problems may dictate a change in foreign policy emphasis that also could lighten the Kissinger brand on foreign affairs. So far during this decade, United States foreign policy has been highlighted by moves to establish detente with China and the Soviet Union and efforts to cool-off the Mid East hothouse. But the current economic situation seems to necessitate more emphasis on relations with Japan and Europe. Diplomacy with these countries are not susceptible to dramatic moves and quick back and forth shuttles with offer and counter-offer that have come to characterize Kissinger's style.

The reported riff between Kissinger and Melvin Laird, one of Ford's closest associates and reportedly the man who convinced Ford to pick Rockefeller (a choice that was urged by Kissinger, too), will play some role in how well Kissinger fits in to Ford's game plan. However, reports that Laird, still seething from Kissinger's reputed efforts to lessen Laird's hand in the Nixon administration, intends to try to persuade Ford to ease Kissinger into a completely subservient position seem exaggerated.

In general, Kissinger is going to have to alter his style if he plans to continue to carry the ball in Ford's backfield. The change will more than likely be a gradual one and will probably not be immediately apparent to those outside of the National Security Council and other policy-making forums.

Aside from the indications that Kissinger's role in U.S. foreign policy may change between now and 1976, his ability to muster support among newsmen and Congressmen and his God-like status abroad seem to be wearing off.

THE UNITED STATES's ineffectual actions during a month and a half of crises in Cyprus indicate that, while Kissinger is able to deal with situations in which he is able to grab the initiative, he may be as ineffectual as anyone else once a situation degenerates beyond a certain point.

Admittedly, the Cyprus situation has been an extremely confusing affair--beginning with an act of illegal aggression on the part of the Greek military junta, progressing to the hopeful replacement of that oppressive government with a more open civilian one in Greece, and rapidly deteriorating into the re-opening of the thousand year rivalry between the Greeks and the Turks. Still, Kissinger's role and lack of action at certain decisive points during the crises are puzzling.

There is every indication that Kissinger and the State Department knew of the Greek junta's planned coup in Cyprus a long time in advance. Although the official U.S. line is that the junta was warned of the possible consequences of the act, there is no evidence that the U.S. made real efforts to stop the Greeks from engineering the Cyprus coup. Judging from past statements and policies, this probably was because Kissinger and the State Department had long been irritated by the neutrality of Cyprus President Archbishop Makarios in the light of U.S. bids to strengthen NATO's base in the eastern Meditarranean, and Kissinger's old desire to maintain a strong NATO alliance to counter the Communist bloc dictated an unwillingness to intercede on Makarios's behalf. But how is subsequent U.S. behavior explained? Only when the junta was deposed did it become evident just how heavy a role U.S. agents had played in it. Perhaps the perceived need to keep vast military installations for NATO on Greece and the alleged desire to have Cyprus for NATO hardware, too, also forced Kissinger and the U.S. to make only ineffective and belated moves to tie up the Cyprus matter before it inevitably degenerated into tribal warfare.

BY FAILING to enter the situation at the outset as he characteristically has attempted to do in times of crisis, it appears Kissinger lost whatever initiative and leverage his reputation could have brought to the cause. All along Kissinger showed no sign of alarm or awareness to the potential dangers the situation posed in Cyprus--highly uncharacteristic of the meticulous and generally extremely foresighted professor. While Kissinger appeared willing to aid the Greek junta, he didn't even make a move to ease the Turkish invasion of Cyprus once the new Greek government was installed. For some reason, the repressive Greek military dictatorship could arouse sympathy and support that the new government is unable to get from Kissinger.

Kissinger must have been too preoccupied and slightly fuddled with the increasingly apparent downslide of his mentor to be able to look seriously at Cyprus from the outset, many analysts are now saying. But if that is so, it represents a fundamental flaw that has now been exposed to the world.

At any rate, Kissinger has failed in his Johnny-come-lately efforts to solve the Cyprus dilemma. He no longer is the magical fireman poised to come to the rescue at the first sign that an international crisis is brewing.

One of the reasons for Kissinger's previous successes--and perhaps also a cause of his failure in Cyprus--is his fundamental desire for immediate stability rather than long-term solution. Kissinger has proven a master at heading off impending crisis for the time being, but the fact that few believe the Mid East will remain in peace more than a year indicates that the solution Kissinger engineered is far from permanent. Kissinger still is not willing to depart from the basic framework that has characterized American foreign policy since World War II. This is obvious in Cyprus, where he stayed by the junta that was sympathetic to the U.S. over the Soviet Union, refused to protect a democratic government that was neutral, and jumped to side with Turkey when it seemed possible to lure them more into the U.S. camp and further from the Soviet Union. It held true in Vietnam and Korea, where Kissinger and Nixon chose to continue to prop up and arm dictatorships rather than risk the Communist appeal in democratic elections.

Kissinger's recent failings may be a blessing in disguise for America. As long as he was able to produce the illusion that American foreign policies were responsible for keeping world-wide peace and were geared fundamentally to upholding democracy everywhere, there could be no basic reassessment in Congressional and public forums of purpose and whose ends our policies really serve. Now that even saintly Henry has not been able to succeed or perpetuate the image of success, maybe the United States is ready to give serious consideration to revamping its antiquated, Cold War politics and foreign diplomacy.