Spreading Aggravation

LEAVES are again rustling in the winds of Indochina. Instead of panicking at the sound of their crackling as China's sage predicted, the master of the B52s seems intent on seeking new ways to work his magic.

The Nixon administration has been trying recently to justify its bombing of Cambodia. A "key official" told The New York Times on April 3 that North Vietnam "fully understood" that the United States would continue bombing until a ceasefire took effect in Cambodia. The State Department has also alleged that Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho agreed during January that ceasefires would start in Laos and Cambodia two weeks after the beginning of the Vietnam ceasefire, CBS news reported.

One effect of Nixon's January bombing threat was to harden the already obdurate position of the Cambodian guerilla forces led by Prince Sihanouk, whom Nixon refused to speak with during the February 1972 China trip, according to Harrison Salisbury's recent book To Peking and Beyond. The Cambodian resistance leaders alleged on January 26 that the United States had plans to destroy their zone of control, which they claim constitutes 80 per cent of the land area and 90 per cent of the population.

The resistance leaders also refused to participate in the so-called "cessation of offensive operations" proposed several days later by the U.S. backed regime of General Lon No1. No less a personage than Sirik Matak, former premier under Lon No1 and favorite of U.S. Embassy officials in Phnom Penh who was purged last year reportedly at the insistence of Lon No1's brother Lon Non, has said that Lon No1's January overtures were a "bluff." His former employer intended to force the Sihanoukist forces to surrender before the holding of elections, he stated in a March 23 interview with The New York Times.

Lon No1 certainly could not have attempted such a "bluff" without encouragement in the form of assurances of continued aid from Washington. As alluded to by Prince Sihanouk on February 27, although his Vietnamese allies had removed the bulk of their troops from Cambodian territory in accordance with the Paris agreement signed on January 27, the United States had not only continued its bombing and military assistance to Lon No1 but it had also maintained support personnel in Phnom Penh.

IT WOULD APPEAR that through his threats against Prince Sihanouk's forces and his seemingly blanket assurances to Lon No1, President Nixon jeopardized chances that the Cambodians might come to a truce by their own efforts. At present, while the chances for some kind of a compromise must not be ruled out entirely, the Phnom Penh regime is in an even more disastrous military position than at the time of the signing of the Vietnam peace agreement.

According to Sirik Matak, "The important thing is to open a dialogue" in which no demands of any of the participants should be barred. Sirik Matak appears to recognize that it will be necessary to form a new government in Phnom Penh; he told The New York Times that when the United States supports a regime such as that of Lon No1 which lacks the people's confidence, "you help the Communists."

Sirik Matak's proposal appears amenable to the position outlined by Prince Sihanouk on March 23, 1970, although the very complexity of the Cambodian situation would appear to work against a rapprochement. It is difficult to determine whether Sirik Matak is sincere about his proposal or if he will ever again be in a position to implement it, although the reported purge last weekend of Lon Non may help Sirik Matak's chances. Sihanouk has repeatedly said that he would never negotiate with the "Lon No1 clique," and his superior military position at present would seem to give him little incentive to negotiate. If negotiations ever did occur, they would easily break down for a multitude of reasons including Sirik Matak's and Prince Sihanouk's long-standing personal vendetta.

Nevertheless, a ceasefire in Cambodia would be highly desirable. The end of the fighting there would add a sense of permanence to the ceasefires already achieved elsewhere in Indochina, but in particular it might help stabilize the situation in neighboring South Vietnam. The recent attacks on the helicopters of the International Control Commission by the forces of the Provisional Revolutionary Government underscore the extremely tense situation in South Vietnam. President Nixon's less than veiled threat during South Vietnamese president Nguyen Van Thieu's visit to San Clemente last week to resume U.S. air bombardment in Vietnam can only serve to make the Saigon leader more adventurous.

After two and one-half months of the Vietnam ceasefire, the situation remains unsatisfactory for everyone. It would be unnatural if the situation was otherwise. Perhaps the best way to insure the continuance of the Paris agreement is to spur efforts for a negotiated settlement in Cambodia.