Seven Years of McNamara

It is still unclear when Robert S. McNamara will step down as Secretary of Defense, why he is leaving the Pentagon for the World Bank, and whether it was McNamara or President Johnson who made the actual decision to transfer jobs.

Nonetheless, word of his departure has already aroused a new wave of concern at home and abroad that the Johnson Administration is about the re-escalate the war in Vietnam.

Critics insist that McNamara was the last of the President's top national advisers to counsel a course of military restraint and diplomatic flexibility in Vietnam.

Since McNamara has always publicly supported the Administration's decisions in Southeast Asia, it is impossible to determine his "dovishness." In the past year, however, it has become quite clear that the Secretary disagreed sharply with the recommendations his military subordinates gave to President Johnson.

McNamara and the brass hats disagreed sharply last August in testimony before the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee on the effectiveness of the bombing raids on North Vietnam. The generals and admirals insisted that the bombing, particularly if it were intensified, could force the North Vietnamese to capitulate. Furthermore, they said that the raids were of material help to American troops fighting in the South.

McNamara said that the bombing could not have any coercive effect but merely impeded Hanoi's efforts to infiltrate men and supplies below the 17th parallel. He also hinted that the restrained bombing might have significant diplomatic bargaining value. But just following McNamara testimony, the Administration approved raids on areas--like the port city of Haiphong--McNamara wanted left untouched.

In any case, it is almost certain that the escalation of the bombing would have proceeded more quickly if McNamara's eloquent, detailed counsel had not been offered.

Clash Over Troops

The outgoing Secretary and the military commanders also clashed last spring over the extent of a troop increase. McNamara was successful in persuading the President to give General Westmoreland only a fraction of the new troops he wanted for 1968, thereby avoiding a call-up of the reserves.

During this controversy, however, McNamara further jeopardized his relations with the military by openly criticizing the manpower efficiency of Westmoreland's command in Vietnam. He forced the U.S. commanders in Vietnam to increase the percentage of troops in the field, while cutting the number needed for non-combat operations.

McNamara's third major clash with the generals over Vietnam policy in the last year concerned the construction of a $3 billion anti-infiltration barrier across the 17th parallel. McNamara is understood to have though that the success of this device--yet to go into operation--might have obviated the need for air raids into the North. But the pro-bombing generals insisted that it would be ineffectual, and would commit large numbers of troops to stand guard at the border. Since McNamara is now leaving, there is some doubt that the controversial barrier will ever go into operation. In any case, whatever action is taken in the next few months will provide some criteria for judging the impact of McNamara's transfer on the war.

In any event, most non-civilian officials in the Pentagon--and Vietnam--are likely to breathe a good deal easier than they have for the past seven years. McNamara, almost alone among the eight Defense Secretaries since the National Defense Act of 1947, considered himself and acted as the President's top adviser on all matters pertaining to American military operations.

More important, and far more disturbing to the military chieftains, McNamara was able to strip the services of much of their political and economic power. He fully centralized Pentagon budgeting procedures and placed the three services' procurement operations under civilian direction--saving billions and sharply cutting the military's domestic political influence.

In short, McNamara achieved President Truman's frustrated dream of unifying and centrally controlling the armed services. But this was not accomplished without heavy political costs--particularly on Capitol Hill, where many Congressmen preferred to deal with the services individually. It is likely that the political debits that McNamara accumulated in fulfilling this revolutionary task made him, after seven years of infighting, something of a liability in President Johnson's eyes.

The Secretary's legendary resilience and competence aside, it is difficult to separate the utility of the innovations McNamara brought into the Pentagon from the foreign policies they served. For example, under McNamara, the size, mobility, and adaptability of U.S. ground, air, and sea forces increased many times over. This novel rapidity in deploying our forces undoubtedly made President Kennedy's limited threats to the Soviets during the Cuban missile crisis more credible and effective.

But this same capacity to commit American forces quickly to developing crises made it that much easier for President Johnson to escalate the Vietnam war in 1965 without sustaining immediate political and economic costs at home. The gnawing question remains: was McNamara so effective in making American forces immediately responsive to war that he removed our military operations from popular scrutiny?

After Vietnam, of course, the American public is likely to be far more vigilant when any President begins a piecemeal commitment of American forces to small, strife-torn countries several thousand miles away., It should be recalled, of course, that the post-1965 stage of U.S. involvement in Vietnam saw McNamara make a number of rosy--and utterly specious--predictions about the future of our operations there.

Despite his erratic track record on Vietnam, McNamara probably did more to illuminate publicly the complex strategic problems of the nuclear age than any American official since 1945. He demonstrated with compelling logic and eloquence the need for a strong "second-strike" nuclear capability--and noted, with accuracy, the need for forces to fight non-nuclear wars once it was clear that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. could not longer use nuclear weapons against each other without risking mutual destruction.

By Similar logic, according to Adam Yarmolinsky '43, his former top aide, McNamara recently backed the development of a "thin" anti-ballistic missile system to protect the Chinese,--who lacking a "second strike" or "comeback" nuclear capability, are more likely than America or Russia to use nuclear weapons rashly.

It remains McNamara's tragedy, perhaps, despite the power of his arguments that he has frequently failed to appreciate the political consequences of his decisions. For his deployment of a thin ABM system may in time generate pressure to build a far more costly, unnecessary "thick" system to defend against the Russians.

Similarly, McNamara demonstrated political insensitivity in his dealings with Congress and the career military. He apparently felt that intelligence, reason, and eloquence were adequate compensation for skilled bureaucratic diplomacy. In seizing perquisites from Armed Services committees, admirals, and generals, he cultivated so many enemies throughout Washington that his influence in the past year could not do anything but wane.

For all of McNamara's much-ballyhooed computer efficiency and the extraordinary attention he gave to his department, he also influenced the operations of the entire Executive branch more than any of this predecessors. He spearheaded President Kennedy's drive for the 1963 nuclear test-ban treaty, decried the refusal of the rich nations to expedite the development of the poor ones, and was a behind-the-scenes force in federal civil rights and poverty planning. In short, he felt that American defense consisted of more than nuclear hardware, and American prosperity more than a high growth rate and stable price index. For this as much as Vietnam he might be remembered.