Troubled Nigeria

For six months, Lt. Col. Tokubu Gowon, head of Nigeria's military government, has been struggling to prevent tribal antagonisms from ripping apart his West African nation. Until two weeks ago, his efforts seemed futile. The leaders of Nigeria's four ethnic regions seemed unable to agree on a place to meet, much less on a way to keep the tottering federal government on its feet. Then, suddenly, Gowon and the four regional heads dropped everything and took off for Accra, Ghana. After two whirlwind days of secret negotiations at one of Kwama Nkrumah's old villas, the five men, gushing optimism, emerged from the conference table. Lt. Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu, leader of the Eastern Ibos whose threatened secession precipitated the present crisis, called the negotiations "a very big success." Gowon said simply, "Nigeria will definitely remain united." The entire episode seemed nothing short of a miracle, but it soon became clear that many of Nigeria's most crucial problems had not been solved.

Nigeria's present crisis is rooted in tribal tensions which have been maturing for decades. The most violent antagonism is between the progressive Ibos, who dominate Nigeria's Eastern Region, and the less-educated Hausas, a Moslem people from the vast and largely arid Northern Region. After World War II, the Ibos, whose Eastern home is badly overpopulated, migrated north in droves to take advantage of the opportunities offered by their underdeveloped and underpopulated neighbor. The Ibos soon dominated major northern industries and captured crucial transportation and communications jobs. The Hausas, frustrated by their inability to complete with the "foreigners," became steadily more hostile toward the Ibo minority in their midst. In the Western Region, the Yorubas, who form the third major tribal division, remained largely neutral, although they looked upon the Easterners as "aggressive upstarts."

For six years, the central government managed to keep the lid on these divisive forces. Then, last October, the bubble burst. In the North, rioting Hausas slaughtered 3000 Ibos and injured 10,000 more. The Eastern Region accepted the more than one million refugees who fled the North in the wake of the rioting and then closed its doors, cutting off communications with its Nigerian neighbors. Ojukwu declared that unless the federal government compensated the displaced Ibos for death of relatives, property damage, and injury, the East would secede from the Nigerian federation. During November, he refused to attend a constitutional conference in Lagos, the federal capital, claiming that large contingents of Hausa troops made the city unsafe for an Easterner. At the same time he insisted that nothing but the loosest sort of confederation would be acceptable to the Eastern Region. The only alternative, he said, was secession.

Nigeria's Northern and Western Regions consider a loose confederation and Ibo secession equally unattractive. The East has just discovered large deposits of oil, and its neighbors want to make sure that they share in the benefits. The North declared that if the East tried to pull out of the federation, it would use force to bring the rebels back. The Ibos responded by arming.

It was in this atmosphere of terror and intransigence that Gowon had to fight for negotiations. His success was no small achievement. And the conference undoubtedly accomplished much. It relieved at least temporarily the accumulating tensions that seemed to be driving Nigeria toward civil war. It also brought an agreement to hold further talks, this time in Nigeria.

But there was one conspicuous omission in the communique issued after the Accra negotiations. The five men avoided Nigerial's most pressing difficulty, the future form of the central government. With this issue unresolved, no one can be certain of Nigeria's fate. The negotiated agreements have deterred the East's immediate secession. But there is still no certainty that the Ibos will be willing to settle for anything but the loose confederation of states that they have wanted all along.

And if the Ibos refuse to yield, they would not be without justification. Nigeria is now, more than ever before, divided into separate and hostile regions. Last October's riots seem to have convinced the Nigerians that they cannot live safely among members of another tribe. The surge of refugees fleeging homeward has included not only Ibos, but also Yorubas returning to the West and Hausas to the North. With communications closed, trade between the regions has come to a standstill. Even Nigeria's universities, traditionally neutral meeting places for members of feuding tribes, have been crippled by the new crisis. Almost all the Ibos at the University of Ibadan in the Yoruba West have retreated to the University of Nsukka in the East. In late December, Dr. Kenneth Dike, head of the University of Ibadan and an Ibo, followed suit, complaining that he lacked "the support" of the community around the university.

With Nigeria already so deeply divided it seems unlikely that an immediate restoration of strong federal rule would really achieve anything. The ethnic segregation of the country will take years to overcome--if it can be overcome at all--and until it is, any expression of political solidarity would be largely artificial. On the other hand, forcing the centralization of Nigeria could do a great deal of harm. With tribal hostilities still intense, political integration and the consequent tribal intermingling could spark a repetition of last October's devastating riots.

But it is also clear that unless the four regions make some gesture toward unity, the present division may harden even further and become totally irreparable. Many observers feel that the only alternative is to accept the East's demands for a loose confederation and hope that time will heal the country's wounds, allowing a gradual extension of federal power. Others feel that Lt. Col. Gowon's proposal that the country be divided into 14 states instead of the present four may offer a way out. Gowon suggests that such a realignment might minimize tribal antagonisms. The details of the plan, however, remain indefinite.

In the meantime, only one thing is certain. Even if Gowon does manage to keep his country together, it will be a long time before Nigerians stop calling each other foreigners.