Wilson's Dilemma in Rhodesia - A Policy for Peace

When Britain imposed economic sanctions on the rebellious Southern Rhodesian government four months ago, it seemed unrealistic to argue over the terms of any future settlement. The Conservatives supported the Labour Government's economic measures, and national concord was maintained. Now that the sanctions are taking their toll on the Rhodesian economy and a negotiated settlement seems probably, areas of disagreement have opened up between the British political parties. Out of these disputes must come a definite plan of reconciliation for the Rhodesians to consider during the next few months.

The Worst is Still to Come

Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith is not now preparing to renounce his UDI government and admit defeat. All mutual trade has been cancelled by Britain, and Rhodesia will be crippled by the embargo on petroleum when her ten weeks' supply runs out. But the consensus of the white populace is not yet for submission. Rumore of growing opposition to the Smith regime and of the formation of shadow cabinets are exaggerated. The Minister of Law and Order has received extra-constitutional powers from Smith to hold anyone suspected of such treason in prison indefinitely without trial. And the Rhodesian government continues to demand the death penalty for two Africans accused of attempted arson although they have already received royal pardon. This is not yet a mood of acquiesence.

The worst is still to come for Rhodesia. The decline in demand induced by the trade embargoes has forced manufacturers to lay off workers and the credit squeeze has forced small retailers out of business. British Prime Minister Wilson and Dr. Kaunda of Zambia have kept their most effective weapon in reserve. They could still halt all trade between Rhodesia and neighboring Zambia, a measure which would do serious damage to Rhodesia's secondary industry and her foreign exchange position.

The effective use of sanctions has convinced South Africa not to interfere, Dr. Verwoerd's continuing policy of strict neutrality belies predictions that supplies from South Africa will keep Rhodesia going indefinitely. The privately subsidized shipments of South African oil should not surpass 80,000 gallons per month, less than one day's rationed consumption. Continued application of sanctions, coupled with a British offer of acceptable settlement terms, could lead to negotiations within a few months.

Conquest of Rapprochement

Recent debates in Britain have centered around just what these terms should be. Three possible lines of policy can be distinguished, each of which represents a different attitude toward current Rhodesian leaders.

The Conservatives advocate conciliation and a speedy attempt to negotiate directly with Smith over Rhodesia's future. They refuse to condemn the white settlers and they even sympathize with their leaders. Fearing that Wilson will delay negotiating with the UDI government until the Rhodesian economy has lapsed into chaos, the Conservatives have sent Selwyn Lloyd to Rhodesia on a "fact-finding" mission. The Tories will capitalize on any indications of submissiveness he may detect. They insist that there must be no question of direct rule by Britain at the time of the rebellion. Rhodesia should be subject to limited white control under a constitution which protects African rights and provides for eventual majority rule.

Wilson, however, remains opposed to any discussion with the rebels on the subject of Rhodesia's constitutional future. He believes that control will have to be placed initially in the hands of a royal Governor and a council of Rhodesian advisors. This centralized rule linked to Britain will be needed to replace rebellious members of the current government, the armed forces and police with men loyal to the Crown. Elections for an interim independent government will be held after the African franchise has been increased. A constitution would be written with provisions to give the Africans a "blocking third" in the legislature and to assure them of increasing participation in the government, leading to majority rule. An international treaty imposing strict sanctions and control would insure against any attempts by whites to subvert the constitution. This policy implies faith in the Rhodesians' willingness to accept the principle of majority rule, and to abide by the terms of the settlement.

Those less willing to trust the rebels demand direct British rule by an Executive Council made up of British colonial civil servants. They assert that independence for Rhodesia is unthinkable before majority rule is established. Rhodesia should remain a colony until control by the Africans is a fact and not a promise.

Striking a Balance

Of the three proposals, Wilson's is the one most likely to convince the Rhodesians to surrender. The Conservative plan must be rejected for its leniency. The UDI government engineered the rebellion. It is unrealistic to hope that the government officials would later abide by a constitution similar to the one against which they rebelled. Wilson recognizes the need for short-term British control. Yet he also sees that the threat of continued colonialism under an Executive Council might create diehard resistance to settlement which could only be broken by military force. Wilson's plan strikes a balance between the conciliatory and aggressive alternates.

But Wilson must express a willingness to negotiate with Prime Minister Smith, and must urge his policy upon the rebels. Any settlement with Britain will have to include acceptance by the Rhodesians of majority rule. The increasing effectiveness of the economic sanctions, together with Wilson's proposal of a royal Governor's council to lead Rhodesia to independence, should tempt the Rhodesians to end their rebellion.