McNamara: Test of Will

The Secretary of Defense did not especially want to talk about the war, and he suggested somewhat apologetically before WHRB rolled its tape that his interviewers might concentrate more profitably on other matters. But the hot-shot young reporters knew that no pro would let Robert S. McNamara, principal architect of U.S. military strategy, get away without talking about South East Asia. So they played Press Release.

In response to all the predictable questions -- about the effectiveness of the bombing, the prospects for negotiation, the Vietnam internal situation -- McNamara gave all the predictable answers. Concisely and logically, he explained that the bombing is forcing Hanoi to pay "a very heavy price;" that it won't bring about negotiations by itself, but that "in combination with action in the South" it will "lead to a change in behavior" in North Vietnam, "evidenced" either by negotiation or a "gradual reduction in pressure in the South." He said that the Vietnam economy looks "better" -- the Ky government having devalued the piastre with "considerable courage and some skill." He was asked if there was still a need for reform. "Oh yes, political and economic as there is in almost every country of the world. We need some reform in this country. . . ."

And when they turned, finally, to this country, McNamara kicked aside the ponderous language of interdepartmental memoranda, smiled gratefully behind his rimless glasses, and unloaded the theme of his trip: the people of this country, he said, are failing to deal effectively with the immense problems -- in education, health, the cities -- that threaten to choke off progress.

They have the resources to wipe out poverty and raise their standard of living to unparalleled heights; but they do not seem to have the will-power. Their children, the young men and women coming of age in the sixties, have an opportunity to participate in remaking society, to serve in engineering major social and economic change; but they do not appear to have the desire and feeling of obligation.

"Our society is in a very real sense on the verge of disarray, not because of international problems but because of domestic problems," he summed it up after the radio press conference closed.

Economically, the U.S. has the wealth to meet its domestic needs and still go on fighting the war abroad. The argument that it can't is a "red herring." "Why do I say it's a red herring? Because we are an affluent society -- Ken Galbraith's right. As long as we are buying and selling over nine million automobiles we can't be said to be without the resources."

Defense spending in 1966 was lower compared to the country's total product of goods and services than in four of the previous five years -- even including the Vietnam spending. But the question -- according to McNamara -- is "do we have the will power? And I don't think we do. We haven't demonstrated it to date and I'm afraid we're not going to demonstrate it in the future."

In the economic context, the reaffirmation of will would have to take the form of an increase in taxes, drawing offsome of the money now spent on consumption and pouring it into the public sector. "You can't rely on the President alone," he believes. "You can't rely on the federal government alone. Much more remains to be done at the local level and the state level, and when I talk about tax increases, I'm talking about tax increases at the state and local levels." Mindful of the delicate economic situation, he took off the record a reference to federal taxes.

But even more distressing to McNamara than this economic failure, and the desperate need to raise revenue, is the general complacency and lack of concern he sees spreading through the country. "I'm disheartened by the apathy of students," he said somewhat sadly on Monday.

The political activism of the civil rights demonstrations, he observed, has all but vanished. There is occasional involvement but no "continuity of interest." "There is no dearth of opportunities. There is a lack of feeling of obligation for service on the part of many young people."

Forgotten Third

Reforms in the draft, he believes, can play some part in reversing the growing apathy and non-involvement of young men. The commission appointed by Burke Marshall to suggest reforms must work on several "fronts" simultaneously: one, building the feeling of obligation; two, making it much easier for individuals to find opportunities; and three, expanding the use of the armed forces in rehabilitating those who do not meet mental and physical standards.

Only one half of the men capable of serving -- about 600,000 men yearly -- are needed. Since over 1.2 million men are capable of serving out of a total manpower force of 1.8 million, another 600,000, McNamara believes, should be offered alternatives to service in the armed forces -- in the Peace Corps, Vista, the National Teachers Corps, etc. They should not be required to serve; in fact, McNamara feels that President Pusey misinterpreted the proposal when he criticized it at last year's commencement. But "my personal feeling is that they have an obligation to serve," he said last week. "I do think it should be encouraged and that was the theme of Montreal."

The draft law revisions, however, should not only help the middle class young man use his skills more efficiently, but also raise the capabilities of men now rejected -- the forgotten third of the manpower force that fails every year to meet the very low standards for service. Compensating for the "failure of the public education system, which has thrown them-out into the economy without the ability to make a decent living, the army should put more of these men through remedial training; it should use them for military purposes, but "incidentally equipping them with the skills and attitudes" necessary for success.

McNamara dismissed as ridiculous the argument that this move would overweight the power of military in society. The extra training, he said, would require slightly more funds than the regular program. But there should be no danger of "diluting" the strength of the military and the benefits will be well worth the cost: "I wouldn't be surprised," he said, "if we would increase the life-time earnings of these people two or three times."

McNamara remarked, in response to a specific question, that the lottery would be one means of eliminating some of the uncertainty and inequity of the present system, but in the context of his total theme it was a relatively minor point. The lottery presumably would provide a mechanism for separating, among the men capable of service, those who go to the military from those who will be allowed to pick alternatives. But McNamara indicated that he prefered the separation to be made by choice, not by chance. Young men should seek opportunities for service outside the military, he said, suited to their particular skills and interests." The lottery "hasn't been discussed much" in government circles.

McNamara cited his own experience in government as evidence of the tremendous opportunities and benefits of public service. "Too many people consider it dull," he said, "I don't consider it dull. . . . it isn't a sacrifice, it's an opportunity."

He believes his most important achievements in the Defense Department have been: the "rationalization" of planning in terms of costs and benefits, the provision for limitations on the use of nuclear weapons, and the proof that "the defense department can be run from the top as any large organization ought to be." The new management procedures will survive his departure, McNamara believes, because "public pressure" would prevent his successor from returning to the old hit-or-miss techniques of planning. "I don't think we can walk away from what we've done in the past five years."

Though restrained and formal during the taped WHRB interview, McNamara was relaxed and engaging in conversation afterward. His responses were concise, tightly reasoned point-by-point capsule analyses. But his passion for exhausting the possibility of every idea sometimes carried his logic further than he meant to go on the record. And at these points, one of his aides would remind the secretary that if he let the remark stand he would be quoted in such a way on this or that issue; and the secretary would regretfully take it off the record. After one of these reminders, McNamara grinned broadly at the reporters and said, "Oh, now they wouldn't publish that any way, would they?" They didn't.

McNamara was game for every question, occasionally quipping his way out to avoid embarrassment. After telling reporters that staying in government too long drained an official's "imaginative creative energy," he was asked whether he had anyone particular in mind. "Just one," he said grinning, "myself." When he was asked about "a more personal question" -- whether he might make a special arrangment with a particular draft board -- McNamara nodded in mock seriousness, and then burst into laughter.

The secretary carried a black raincoat and insisted that it be put next to his chair in the WHRB "or else I'll forget it." But he left it under his seat as he left the studio, and he was halfway out the door before he realized that he'd forgotten it. He turned vaguely to one of his aides, and then realizing where it was, stepped briskly back through the door to retrieve the coat himself. Leaving for Quincy House, he walked, crisp and business-like to a waiting car, his sleekly combed hair unruffled by the sharp wind overhead.