Excerpts from Speeches

The following are excerpts taken from a tape recording which the CRIMSON made at yesterday's meting in Lowell Lecture Hall. They begin with a statement by McGeorge Bundy and continue with questions from both the panel and the floor.

BUNDY:

It is sometimes suggested that the, Administration is looking for an excuse to get into a final contest [in Vietnam]. Nothing could be further from the truth. It is not the purpose of the Administration, of the United States to conduct that kind of contest even against North Vietnam. We are talking about the use of limited means of military, political, economic, and social power in a situation in which there will be serious costs of failure.

QUESTION:

Administration reports as to the amount of aid supplied to the Vietcong have varied. Could you clarify the relative importance of both North Vietnam and Communism in the present contest?

BUNDY:

Current estimates of the Department of Defense are on the order of 30-40 per cent of the currently proven weapon supply comes from North.

This contest has its heart in a 40 year ambition of the Communist Party in Vietnam of taking over that whole country and I do not have to tell you that United States action is premised on, its assessment of that fact...

QUESTION:

What is the outlook on South Vietnam? Since 1961, there have been varying estimates by different government spokesmen as to when the war would end. We have sent troops and aid to Vietnam and the situation now seems worse than ever.

BUNDY:

Neither President Kennedy nor President Johnson has ever supposed that this was going to be an easy contest or one in which there would be a rapid and decisive solution... I do not think we can now predict the exact shape of the eventual settlement. I myself believe that the question of the internal political organization and prospects of non-Communist South Vietnam is quite critical. This indeed is one of the uncertainties in the current situation... The bulk of the effort in Vietnam-in terms of human suffering and human loss-is being made by Vietnamese. I do not think anyone... can say to anyone else that he knows exactly how the South Vietnamese, with our support, will work out this contest and this unfinished political story... I believe that the situation in Vietnam is serious, is dangerous, is critical. I do not believe that it is hopeless and it seems to me that that is the precise problem...

QUESTION:

Would you think it a sign of hopelessness if the military effort in South Vietnam came to depend wholly on American arms?

BUNDY:

I certainly would, and I don't my self believe that there is any plan or any desire or any good sense really in supposing that this thing can be handled if it comes to depend entirely on American arms...

QUESTION:

You said that neither President Kennedy nor President Johnson had foreseen a rapid solution to the War. I think one of the problems here is that many students at Harvard tend to make a distinction between the policies of the two administrations. When President Kennedy began the effort, we understood that the men the United States was sending over were advisors. The implication at that time was that this was a Vietnamese was and that we couldn't win it for them. It seems that the emphasis has quite definitely changed, so that the situation is now discussed in terms of how much help Vietnam should give to the United States... Are we prepared to make this essentially an, American war? Is there any limit to the size of our commitment in Vietnam, and if this limit is high, what exactly is the rationale of American presence in Vietnam?

BUNDY:

I myself believe that the fundamental policy of the United States toward Vietnam is now as it was in President Kennedy's administration...He regarded it as important, difficult, demanding, dangerous, and requiring a very substantial American investment and effort in the situation as it was at that time. Our investment has increased. We are accountable for our decisions now and we are facing the possibility that American troops may play a quite different role. Indeed, the engagement of American forces has changed tactically a number of times over recent years. So the question comes-"Are we making it an American war?". I said before that I don't think it makes sense to try to make it an all-American war. I believe that it does have to be construed fundamentally as an effort in support of a society... to which we are deeply committed.

As to the question of "to what end" the contest is directed, I believe that there is a double purpose here. I do not think it can be defined in terms of a blanket "end Communism." There are situations in which it is not possible for the influence of the United States to be such... In Vietnam we have resources and we have made commitments. We are engaged there in a situation in which both the interests of the society to which we are committed and wider interests-both of the people of Southeast Asia and of the people of the United States-are at stake. If a position is held in Vietnam [such that] there is growing freedom of choice for that society in determining its own future, then the hope that this kind of openness of choice may be extended to other areas is increased. If the effort in Vietnam falls, that hope is decreased. I believe that the neighboring peoples in Southeast Asia realize that this is the kind of stake involved...

QUESTION

How many Americans is the Administration prepared to send to Vietnam?

BUNDY

I cannot tell you the exact decisions which the Administration is going to make. It makes its decisions by a process of discussion and analysis... The President did not give me a day off for the purpose of my announcing decisions he hasn't made.

I think it is possible that there will be more Americans in South Vietnam...

QUESTION

Wouldn't some sort of international negotiations be preferable to the tactics of terror and killing now going on in Vietnam?

BUNDY

... The government is trying to get a serious international discussion going... It is ready to discuss this matter and work toward a peaceful settlement. It has tried a number of forums to see whether there is readiness for this kind of effort. The record is clear that the unreadiness for negotiation is not now in the United States... Whatever happens in Vietnam, there is every reason for the United States to persevere in the effort to give appropriate support and encouragement to governments which are trying to work their way toward the establishment of viable political societies outside of the kind of costs which Communist imposes...

QUESTION

In regard to American foreign policy, it seems that in the case of the Dominican Republic the United States took on, the responsibility of defining the social revolution as Communist-dominated. This represents a danger as to future involvement... There seem to be two sides to the American policy here. On the one hand, we consider the situation to be so chaotic that American intervention is justified in fear of a Communist takeover. On the other hand, we seem to expect some sort of stable coalition to result from our effort...

BUNDY

The problem [is] that we realize what things we must do, but there is great difficulty involved in doing them... It is not exactly clear how we are to move forward in a direction which offers real prospects of hope, once we have taken such emergency measures...

Dominican society has been torn by violence to a degree that we cannot understand from any part of our national history as a matter of direct experience. And yet there is a very deepseated desire for something different, something which will correspond more to the genuine desires and hopes of the people involved. Now how to move from where we are to there in the current situation is exactly the problem.

QUESTION

There seems to at least have been a chance that the Dominicans could have finished this off for themselves. There is an indication that Bosch's forces were winning at the time that the United States decided to intervene... We have been given different reasons for American intervention, from protection of property to fear of Communist takeover. How can the President expects the students to support his policy when all the reasons for which he followed it are not made clear, are "classified?"

BUNDY

There was quite persuasive evidence-certainly persuasive to me-that the breakdown in authority which had led many on both sides to take cover had produced a situation in which there was a serious danger that the people who would take hold of power were the people who had stood it out and had shown readiness to take desperate forms of action-who were, in fact, Communists, It has been the policy of the United States for a long time-certainly since it became clear as to what had happened in Cuba-that the American must be ready to act to prevent the establishment of another Communist state, especially in the Caribbean area. This was the policy of the Kennedy administration; this has been the policy of the Johnson administration; this is certainly the overwhelming and convinced sentiment of this country... So a President faced with a substantial risk (I would put it even higher): a very serious danger that what had passed in a moment of crisis into the hands of Communists might become a new Communist authority; a President faced with that kind of situation had no other choice. I feel that there has been no shortage of explanations of this basic position