Wishful Thinking About Disarmament

In An End of Arms Walter Millis his back on the body on knowledge most relevant to his subject. This "new vision of the end of the arms race" overlooks the looks the research already done on the problems of , economic reconversion, and loss of geographic hegemonies which disarmament will entail. He amply says that modern weaponry is relevant to international relations and that missiles and bombs can be within the present international system.

It is important to realize that Millis not set out to write a technical book: he is addressing the layman and the policy-maker, not the scholar, his aim is to bring about a qualitative change in the rhetoric of international relations, to this end he is more concerned with concepts than with figures, with ways of thinking than with graphs. This is no excuse, however, for blithely disregarding the obstacles for blithely disregarding the obstacles that have brought recent disarmament conferences to a standstill, nor does it justify ignoring the economic interests in the United States which thrive on the arms race and and seek to perpetuate it.

Strangely, Millis fails to make a strong case for the necessity of disarming. Like most thinkers on these problems, he has come to appreciate the efficiency of the Cold War as a mechanism for restraining armed conflict. In his words, "...we have achieved a substantially nonmilitary form of international politics, which has shown a remarkable capacity to deal with the problem of the power struggle--the one problem that has always been advanced as insoluble in any demilitarized system." Millis' respect for the system has probably been shaken by the turn of events in Vietnam. Writing in 1964, he saw accidental war as the chief threat posed by the arms race. Since it now seems that influential Western strategists may be seriously thinking of deliberately using these weapons, his tone, were he writing today, would doubtless be more urgent.

The whipping boy in Millis' analysis is the language of international relations. He feels that the arms race is perpetuated by the use of words whose origins antedate modern weapons. Such concepts as the "national interest," have imprisoned statesmen, he feels, and are keeping them from behaving rationally--from disarming. When baldly stated, this assertion loses what little force it has in the context of Millis' argument. It also belies the ten years of work Millis has devoted to the problem as Director of the Demilitarization Study of the Fund for the Republic. To suggest, as he does, that progress towards disarmament merely awaits a new voice describing the international situation in non-agressive language is to ignore all the technical problems posed by multilateral disarmament. He fails to establish any causal relationship between a demilitarized political vocabulary and disarmament.

This gross mistake is followed by an equally distorted view of the nature of a disarmed world. He argues that nations are growing increasingly adept at policing their internal affairs and at restraining those who would aggrandize irresponsibly. This process is, according to Millis, constantly reducing the burden that will have to be placed on the international police charged with enforcing disarmament. He perceives a civilizing element at work throughout the world, building a consensus against the use of modern weapons--a consensus which will make the international police problems easier than is frequently supposed. Millis does not foresee a comprehensive world government nor does he seek to purge the power element from international relations. His international police will only have the authority to insist that power disputes be settled non-militarily. Their success in this endeavor rests squarely on the endurance of the pacifist consensus; the international police will be unable to prevent the resumption of the arms race, for their job will be purely investigatory.

Millis manages to obscure the crucial role that this consensus plays in his scheme by insisting that he would work no basic change on the international system. What evidence does he adduce then, to support his optimism about this consensus? First he cites the past decade of peace among the major powers and concludes that violence has been permanently localized. Second, he points to the ability of the two major alliances to settle peacefully their internal disputes, and extrapolates from their success to a vision of world stability. In both cases he refuses to admit that the presence of nuclear stockpiles has anything to do with the tranquility he finds so attractive. He never meets the conventional argument: that the weapons alone have suppressed violence, that the terror which they inspire is so great as to effectively militate against their use. He fails to demonstrate why it is not more logical to attribute the recent international detente to fear rather than to moral enlightenment, to terror rather than to a fundamental pacifist consensus.

Worse yet, Millis' premises are as wrong as his conclusions. For the United States has not managed to remain aloof from local violence, nor have France and China been content with purely verbal dissent over the course of the Cold War. In Vietnam the administration seems to have forgotten about the disutility of arms: Gen. Taylor is reported to have said that there are no measures we are not prepared to take to win the war. Nor does the fact that France and China are both working on an independent deterrent bear out Millis' assertion that weapons are largely ornamental.

Recent history suggests that an intentional nuclear war may not be as preposterous as Millis seems to think, and that there may be more to worry about than nuclear accidents. Sadly, Millis' book is a classic piece of wishful thinking, and perhaps of prejudgment. When a foundation has supported a study of demilitarization for ten years, its Director is bound to develop a vested interest in producing positive findings. This is the curse of philanthropy--objectivity is harder to come by in big foundations than it is in academia

It is important to realize that Millis not set out to write a technical book: he is addressing the layman and the policy-maker, not the scholar, his aim is to bring about a qualitative change in the rhetoric of international relations, to this end he is more concerned with concepts than with figures, with ways of thinking than with graphs. This is no excuse, however, for blithely disregarding the obstacles for blithely disregarding the obstacles that have brought recent disarmament conferences to a standstill, nor does it justify ignoring the economic interests in the United States which thrive on the arms race and and seek to perpetuate it.

Strangely, Millis fails to make a strong case for the necessity of disarming. Like most thinkers on these problems, he has come to appreciate the efficiency of the Cold War as a mechanism for restraining armed conflict. In his words, "...we have achieved a substantially nonmilitary form of international politics, which has shown a remarkable capacity to deal with the problem of the power struggle--the one problem that has always been advanced as insoluble in any demilitarized system." Millis' respect for the system has probably been shaken by the turn of events in Vietnam. Writing in 1964, he saw accidental war as the chief threat posed by the arms race. Since it now seems that influential Western strategists may be seriously thinking of deliberately using these weapons, his tone, were he writing today, would doubtless be more urgent.

The whipping boy in Millis' analysis is the language of international relations. He feels that the arms race is perpetuated by the use of words whose origins antedate modern weapons. Such concepts as the "national interest," have imprisoned statesmen, he feels, and are keeping them from behaving rationally--from disarming. When baldly stated, this assertion loses what little force it has in the context of Millis' argument. It also belies the ten years of work Millis has devoted to the problem as Director of the Demilitarization Study of the Fund for the Republic. To suggest, as he does, that progress towards disarmament merely awaits a new voice describing the international situation in non-agressive language is to ignore all the technical problems posed by multilateral disarmament. He fails to establish any causal relationship between a demilitarized political vocabulary and disarmament.

This gross mistake is followed by an equally distorted view of the nature of a disarmed world. He argues that nations are growing increasingly adept at policing their internal affairs and at restraining those who would aggrandize irresponsibly. This process is, according to Millis, constantly reducing the burden that will have to be placed on the international police charged with enforcing disarmament. He perceives a civilizing element at work throughout the world, building a consensus against the use of modern weapons--a consensus which will make the international police problems easier than is frequently supposed. Millis does not foresee a comprehensive world government nor does he seek to purge the power element from international relations. His international police will only have the authority to insist that power disputes be settled non-militarily. Their success in this endeavor rests squarely on the endurance of the pacifist consensus; the international police will be unable to prevent the resumption of the arms race, for their job will be purely investigatory.

Millis manages to obscure the crucial role that this consensus plays in his scheme by insisting that he would work no basic change on the international system. What evidence does he adduce then, to support his optimism about this consensus? First he cites the past decade of peace among the major powers and concludes that violence has been permanently localized. Second, he points to the ability of the two major alliances to settle peacefully their internal disputes, and extrapolates from their success to a vision of world stability. In both cases he refuses to admit that the presence of nuclear stockpiles has anything to do with the tranquility he finds so attractive. He never meets the conventional argument: that the weapons alone have suppressed violence, that the terror which they inspire is so great as to effectively militate against their use. He fails to demonstrate why it is not more logical to attribute the recent international detente to fear rather than to moral enlightenment, to terror rather than to a fundamental pacifist consensus.

Worse yet, Millis' premises are as wrong as his conclusions. For the United States has not managed to remain aloof from local violence, nor have France and China been content with purely verbal dissent over the course of the Cold War. In Vietnam the administration seems to have forgotten about the disutility of arms: Gen. Taylor is reported to have said that there are no measures we are not prepared to take to win the war. Nor does the fact that France and China are both working on an independent deterrent bear out Millis' assertion that weapons are largely ornamental.

Recent history suggests that an intentional nuclear war may not be as preposterous as Millis seems to think, and that there may be more to worry about than nuclear accidents. Sadly, Millis' book is a classic piece of wishful thinking, and perhaps of prejudgment. When a foundation has supported a study of demilitarization for ten years, its Director is bound to develop a vested interest in producing positive findings. This is the curse of philanthropy--objectivity is harder to come by in big foundations than it is in academia

Strangely, Millis fails to make a strong case for the necessity of disarming. Like most thinkers on these problems, he has come to appreciate the efficiency of the Cold War as a mechanism for restraining armed conflict. In his words, "...we have achieved a substantially nonmilitary form of international politics, which has shown a remarkable capacity to deal with the problem of the power struggle--the one problem that has always been advanced as insoluble in any demilitarized system." Millis' respect for the system has probably been shaken by the turn of events in Vietnam. Writing in 1964, he saw accidental war as the chief threat posed by the arms race. Since it now seems that influential Western strategists may be seriously thinking of deliberately using these weapons, his tone, were he writing today, would doubtless be more urgent.

The whipping boy in Millis' analysis is the language of international relations. He feels that the arms race is perpetuated by the use of words whose origins antedate modern weapons. Such concepts as the "national interest," have imprisoned statesmen, he feels, and are keeping them from behaving rationally--from disarming. When baldly stated, this assertion loses what little force it has in the context of Millis' argument. It also belies the ten years of work Millis has devoted to the problem as Director of the Demilitarization Study of the Fund for the Republic. To suggest, as he does, that progress towards disarmament merely awaits a new voice describing the international situation in non-agressive language is to ignore all the technical problems posed by multilateral disarmament. He fails to establish any causal relationship between a demilitarized political vocabulary and disarmament.

This gross mistake is followed by an equally distorted view of the nature of a disarmed world. He argues that nations are growing increasingly adept at policing their internal affairs and at restraining those who would aggrandize irresponsibly. This process is, according to Millis, constantly reducing the burden that will have to be placed on the international police charged with enforcing disarmament. He perceives a civilizing element at work throughout the world, building a consensus against the use of modern weapons--a consensus which will make the international police problems easier than is frequently supposed. Millis does not foresee a comprehensive world government nor does he seek to purge the power element from international relations. His international police will only have the authority to insist that power disputes be settled non-militarily. Their success in this endeavor rests squarely on the endurance of the pacifist consensus; the international police will be unable to prevent the resumption of the arms race, for their job will be purely investigatory.

Millis manages to obscure the crucial role that this consensus plays in his scheme by insisting that he would work no basic change on the international system. What evidence does he adduce then, to support his optimism about this consensus? First he cites the past decade of peace among the major powers and concludes that violence has been permanently localized. Second, he points to the ability of the two major alliances to settle peacefully their internal disputes, and extrapolates from their success to a vision of world stability. In both cases he refuses to admit that the presence of nuclear stockpiles has anything to do with the tranquility he finds so attractive. He never meets the conventional argument: that the weapons alone have suppressed violence, that the terror which they inspire is so great as to effectively militate against their use. He fails to demonstrate why it is not more logical to attribute the recent international detente to fear rather than to moral enlightenment, to terror rather than to a fundamental pacifist consensus.

Worse yet, Millis' premises are as wrong as his conclusions. For the United States has not managed to remain aloof from local violence, nor have France and China been content with purely verbal dissent over the course of the Cold War. In Vietnam the administration seems to have forgotten about the disutility of arms: Gen. Taylor is reported to have said that there are no measures we are not prepared to take to win the war. Nor does the fact that France and China are both working on an independent deterrent bear out Millis' assertion that weapons are largely ornamental.

Recent history suggests that an intentional nuclear war may not be as preposterous as Millis seems to think, and that there may be more to worry about than nuclear accidents. Sadly, Millis' book is a classic piece of wishful thinking, and perhaps of prejudgment. When a foundation has supported a study of demilitarization for ten years, its Director is bound to develop a vested interest in producing positive findings. This is the curse of philanthropy--objectivity is harder to come by in big foundations than it is in academia