Crises in Rhodesia

The failure of the independence negotiations between Britain and Rhodesia in London last week and reports coming out of that Central African country make it apparent that a unilateral declaration of independence by Rhodesia's white minority government can be expected almost any day. In the small hours of the morning, police and army units will close off the crowded African suburbs surrounding the capital of Salisbury, a state of preventive emergency will be declared, and Britain's Governor, Sir Humphrey Gibbs, will be placed under house arrest. What follows--in a land where black Africans outnumber whites 18 to one--could be disastrous, not only for Rhodesia, but for all of Africa and the West.

Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith has been promising complete independence for the self-governing colony since he took office in April, 1964. Although Rhodesia's 217,000 whites (fewer than Jersey City, New Jersey) make up 95 per cent of the electorate, they are only five per cent of the population. In order to perpetuate white rule, Smith believes, Rhodesia must be free from Britain. His answer to the question of when majority rule will come ("Not in my lifetime") has become the rallying cry for almost all of Rhodesia's whites. Using that slogan, Smith swept all 50 seats in the parliamentary election last May.

To prevent such a unilateral declaration of independence, Britain's governments, first under the Tories and then under Labour, offered to hand over independence if the colonists would guarantee "unimpeded progress toward majority rule." The British then promised strict economic sanctions if Rhodesia went ahead with its unilateral declaration. A freezing of Rhodesian funds in British banks, coupled with a loss of Commonwealth preferences on tobacco and sugar, could have crushing effects on the Rhodesian economy. But since the crops are already sold for this year, and since Rhodesia can expect financial support from racist South Africa, the effects of economic sanctions would be slow in making themselves felt. Still worse, France (which has picked up the South African arms trade dropped by Britain and the U.S.) and Japan appear eager to enter into the commercial void.

Even if sanctions were devastating, it is hardly likely that Smith's government would suddenly knuckle under and take it all back. "We'd rather be bankrupt than black," shouted the settlers when Smith returned from London, and they seem for the moment able to back up their preferences. Already over a thousand African nationalists are held in Rhodesian detention camps. The Rhodesian army is equipped with armored cars and automatic weapons and backed by an air force with French helicopters and British jets.

Even more tragic, Rhodesia holds a strangle-hold control on newly-independent Zambia to the north. Because of its copper mines, Zambia last year had a favorable trade balance of $280 million and is well on its way to becoming independent Africa's wealthiest nation. But it is totally dependent on Rhodesian railroads for an outlet to the sea, on power from Rhodesia's mighty Kariba Dam, and on coal from the Rhodesian mines at Wankie. In the face of economic sanctions, in which Zambia would definitely take part, the white Rhodesians would promptly cut off transport, power and coal and plunge Zambia into economic chaos and possible racial strife.

Since sanctions, then, seem an inadequate threat for Rhodesia and a dismal prospect for all of Central Africa, what policy remains to prevent the solidification of another racist state in Southern Africa? The only possible action which could ward off Rhodesia's declaration of independence an immediate and forceful threat of military intervention. It is unrealistic, however, to expect Britain, whose Conservative Party is split over whether or not to go through with the application of sanctions, to take such decisive action on its own. It is necessary that the initiative come first from the United Nations, and that it have unequivocal American support.

The UN implied the use of force last week, when it called on Britain by a vote of 107 to 2 "to prevent...and put an immediate end to rebellion." A promise of U.N. intervention, with American support, would indeed cause the Rhodesians to hesitate. They are not Afrikaaners (80 per cent of the adults are foreign born), and they would think twice before drawing in U.N. troops. Furthermore, such a promise would strengthen the British government's hand. Wilson's alternatives would appear more palatable to the Rhodesians, and with the threat of independent U.S. & U.N. action, Britain might be able to able to solve the problem on her own.