Mr. Mann

The United States has a long history of supporting authoritarian and reactionary regimes in Latin America. When Kennedy came to office, many hoped that the pattern had been broken. There seemed at last to be clear vision in Washington that the interests of the United States lay with the aspirations of the oppressed peoples of Latin America rather than with the fleeting military and financial advantages to be gained by supporting petty tyrants.

Since Kennedy's death, this clear vision has been replaced by myopia. Thomas C. Mann, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, indicated Wednesday that he was unable to distinguish between democratic regimes and rightist dictatorships in Latin America. This is doubly alarming, since Mann has been entrusted by the President with sole responsibility for U.S. policy in this area; his speech therefore indicates what Johnson's Latin American policy will probably be.

Speaking at a briefing of high-ranking officials, Mann said that the former U.S. policy aimed at restraining dictatorships had proved unworkable. He further stated that the new administration's aims would be four: 1) Fostering of economic growth, 2) Protection of U.S. investment, 3) Non-intervention in the internal affairs of the republics, and 4) Opposition to Communism.

In a certain sense, of course, Mann is right. As the futile ten-year struggle to oust Peron demonstrated, American attempts to unseat Latin American dictators have been largely ineffective. The danger of a policy of supporting dictatorships, however, is that they eventually fall. At that time, those who supported them become targets for legitimate resentments aroused by the dictators.

Expressing distaste for dictators, on the other hand, encourages the liberal oppostion behind the authoritarian regimes. Whatever its defects, the United States remains for most Latin Americans the leading example of functioning democracy. To see Washington supporting repressive regimes undermines their faith in the workability of democratic ideals and open societies. Furthermore, acceptance of military take-over in one country stimulates reactionary groups in others. While suspension of recognition and aid may not succeed in overthrowing a specific despotic government, the threat of these steps nevertheless constitute an effective deterrent to those who would seize power elsewhere.

As for Mann's four points, they sin more by omission than commission. There is no mention in his speech of the struggle for economic reform and social justice to which the United States pledged itself at Punta del Este. The agrarian reform and changes in tax structure which are fundamental prerequisites of meaningful development in Latin America can scarcely be attained by a policy of protecting U.S. interests. Mann's declared policy aims represent, in fact, the abandonment of all the promising features of the Alliance for Progress, and a regression to the diplomacy of short-sighted pecuniary interest characteristic of the Eisenhower years.

That Mann would scuttle the Alliance was not unexpected in Latin America. Last November, former President Alberto Lleras Camargo of Colombia, a firm friend of the United States and of the Alliance, refused to head the inter-American committee which will administer the Alliance because he mistrusted Mann's views on social reform. But that the Alliance should be abandoned with so little ceremony was not foreseen. Mann's statement in effect gives a green light to the military in Latin America. With rightist elements in Brazil and eleswhere clamoring for military take-over in their countries, it will be suprising if the new U.S. position does not lead to coups in several countries.

The United States cannot afford to insist on isolation of all military regimes. A coup in Brazil, for example, could not profitably be opposed for long. But there is a difference between unwilling tolerance and declared acceptance of military dictatorship. If the United States, after 190 years of democratic government cannot distinguish between democracy and dictatorship, Latin American nations can hardly be expected to do so. If they cannot, there is slight hope for the peaceful and democratic change which U.S. policy should hope to foster.