Alternate Katanga History

To the Editors of the CRIMSON:

In your article on Mr. Tshombe (Nov. 10) you mention that he was at first unwilling to let U.N troops into Katanga, even though Dag Hammar-skjold assured Tshombe that U.N troops would not interfere in his affairs. You do not mention that, when Tshombe did let the U.N troops in, his distrust proved to be justified. In late 1961, U.N troops attempted to end the secession of Katanga by arresting a number of katagan officials, including Tshombe and Munongo, on warrants issued by the central government. I think this may reasonably be described as interfering in Tshombe's affairs, however, justified it may have been.

The above description of the U.N's actions differs considerably from the official story issued by the U.N., according to which some Indian troops, an route to put out a fire in a garage, were attacked by gendarmeri and defended themselves.

My source is To Katanga And Back by Conor Cruise O'Brien. According to Mr. O'Brien, the code name for the operation was Morthor, a Hindi word which does not mean "put out the fire in the garage," or "defend yourself". It means "smash." Mr. O'Brien can hardly be accused either of ignorance or of pro-katagese bias; he was the U.N official in charge in Elizabethville during the operation. His only major objection to the way Morthor was handled was that the lie, invented after Tshombe had eluded the U.N. and the operation had apparently failed, made it impossible to continue the operation and end the secession.

From Mr. O'Brien book, I couclude that everyone who trusted anyone else in the Congo was fool. Mr. Tshombe was completely justified in believing that Hammarskjold's word, like his own, was worthless. David D. Friedman '65