Grandeur and the Button

Why did President de Gaulle choose this time to renew his attacks on the Multi-Lateral Force and Britain's participation in it? The answer is not clear because de Gaulle does not have to be as explicit with his public as President Johnson and Prime Minister Wilson do.

But the Frenchman's indignation may well have been raised by what seems to have been a bargain between British and American diplomats, whereby Americans agreed to help negotiate the one billion dollar loan Britain needed in return for her attachment to the MLF. The deal however it necessary it was to Wilson, left the Prime Minister in a difficult position. He had consistently opposed the MLF's mixed-nationality crews, and could not execute a complete about-face. Hence the British tentatively proposed to contribute national units to the MLF, to avoid joining the mixed crews.

Such an agreement between the United States and Britain would upset de Gaulle, since it would threaten to give new life to what has been until now an American policy failure. Of the three great European powers, only Germany had been enthusiastic about MLF.

Definite British approval of MLF would emphasize Atlantic interdependence and isolate France in opposition to the Force. De Gaulle's rationale for the French nuclear deterrent has always been that if America did not want her cities destroyed as a result of a purely Continental struggle, France would provide the atomic umbrella for Europe. De Gaulle fears that MLF might eventually provide, as Kennedy hinted, for sharing control of the nuclear button. Shared control of existing weapons would largely obviate the raison d'etre of the separate French deterrent. The deterrent, in turn, is on of the keys to the General's blueprint for French leadership of an independent Europe.

But the threat de Gaulle sees in the MLF is not the sole explanation for his current displeasure with England. The awkwardness of the British position on MLF provides him with a convenient target for retaliation for other things. The new Wilson government has informed Paris that it would like to "revise" schedules for building the superconic airline Concorde and the tunnel under the Channel. The British wish to delay these projects because their cost would upset their austerity program. But de Gaulle is upset by Britain's new reluctance because he hoped the Concorde would cut significantly into American domination of the profitable airline industry.

The third explanation of de Gaulle's behavior attaches to the timing of his pronouncements. His Latin American tour this fall did not create the impression he had hoped it would: he needed an opportunity to recover prestige. The pre-Inauguration quiet in the United States, the internal machinations in the Soviet Union, and the passing of all the other great figures except Mao Tse-tung, have left the world stage bare. Any move he made now would receive maximum attention.

De Gaulle may believe that by using a big threat (dropping NATO membership) for a small concession (the end of MLF) he can rid himself of a troublesome problem and enhance his prestige. He may also hope to have President Johnson at a disadvantage when they meet, as they are likely to, this winter. He has other weapons than the threat of dropping out of NATO at his command, however, and it will be interesting to see how he uses them. Will France push for Red Chinese admission to the U.N.? Will de Gaulle continue to embarass us in Vietnam? Will France attempt to make our trade relations with the Common Market particularly difficult? The General is acutely aware of the inter-relationships of diplomacy--one chess piece may be sacrificed for another which is not, commonly speaking, on the same board.

But de Gaulle is limited by the power of his American opposition. Johnson may call his bluff on NATO, believing that the General can not take France out of one alliance without incurring formidable domestic opposition. In the U.N. the American President may feel strong enough to withstand France's efforts on behalf of Peking. Alternatively, if the French campaign makes Chinese admission look inevitable, Johnson may see an excellent opportunity to fight a valiant battle against China while losing conveniently in the end. He could then go before the American people and attribute Chinese presence in the world body not to the realities of world politics but to the obstinacy and egotism of Charles de Gaulle.