Candidate Rockefeller

An aspirant for a Presidential nomination follows a ritual; he travels across the country, pumps hands, attacks the opposition--in effect acts like a candidate without ever admitting that he is one. New York's Governor Nelson Rockefeller is no exception.

In recent weeks he has discussed Cuba, Vietnam, the Atlantic community and the problems of economic growth--topics related only indirectly to the governing of New York State--yet he has never admitted that the Republican nomination in 1964 is his ambition. He knows it; his audiences know it; nevertheless tradition remains intact.

Lately Governor Rockefeller has been projecting a vastly different image from the one associated with him in 1960. In that year by threatening to withhold his support from the Republican platform he forced the party to accept stronger planks on civil rights, foreign affairs, and defense. He challenged Republican conservatism and won.

Ever since then he has attempted to appease the party regulars whom he alienated at the Chicago convention. His stand on President Kennedy's proposal to create a secretary of Urban Affairs is one example. When he served as chairman of President Eisenhower's committee to reorganize the Executive, Rockefeller issued a report which called the creation of such a post the necessary first step in any reorganization. However, when opposition to this proposal became the approved position of be Republican party, the Governor changed his mind, adopting his party's view.

Not all of Rockefeller's views have metamorphosed room liberal to conservative. His stand on civil rights and his conception of a united Europe have remained remarkably constant. More representative of his thinking, however, are his increasingly conservative attitudes on social services, particularly welfare, and on the practicality of negotiating with the Russians.

The transformation itself has assumed an interesting term. In 1960 Governor Rockefeller chided Vice-President Nixon for his failure to present: coherent program: The path of great leadership does not lie along the top of a fence. It climbs heights. It speaks truths. The people want one thing above all others--leadership of clear purpose, candidly expressed." The very candor and clarity of purpose which Rockefeller saw missing in Nixon's speeches are today missing in his own.

Rockefeller has usurped a favorite technique of Nixon's--attack by implication. At the nuclear test ban negotiations last summer, the United States government lowered its requirements for on-site inspections. On August 9, 1962 the Governor attacked the Kennedy Administration for moving "steadily toward the Russian position." "Why should the Soviets accept the United States proposal," he asked, "when every refusal elicits a new United States offer?" Rockefeller's statement completely disregarded Ambassador Arthur Dean's testimony before a Senate Foreign Relations sub-committee on August 2, 1962. Dean, the United States representative at the Geneva Disarmament Conference, outlined in detail the scientific data that prompted the government to alter its position. Rockefeller's statement, because of its failure to consider all available information, presented neither a reasonable nor a constructive criticism. It seemed to be merely an attempt to imply that President Kennedy and his advisers were "soft" on Communism.

This theme appeared in a recent Washington press conference where Rockefeller said he was unable to understand why American supported "freedom fighters" in South Vietnam while "we are holding them back in Cuba." "And I hope," he added, "it is not as a means or as an endeavor to appease the Soviets."

In neither of these cases did he added, "it is not as a means or as an endeavor to appease the Soviets."

In neither of these cases did he propose any concrete changes in United States policy; he merely hinted that the Kennedy Administration might be appeasing the Communists. The Governor's use of implication and innuendo hardly constitutes "leadership of purpose, candidly expressed." As James Reston has pointed out, Rockefeller is beginning to talk like Harold Stassen and act like Richard Nixon.

The task of appealing to a party containing a Barry Goldwater obviously directs his truculence and conservatism toward overcoming this difficulty. Long regarded as the leader of Republican liberalism, Rockefeller is today attempting to comfort, if not actually placate, his more conservative associates. He can now tell them that he is saying the same things as Halleck and Dirksen. If the recent compliments paid him by Senator Goldwater have any meaning, Rockefeller can consider his strategy successful.

Some observers believe that the "new" Rockefeller image is directed as much at the electorate as at the Republican party leadership. They argue that if the Governor stood by his earlier more liberal positions, he would be saying much the same thing as Kennedy. These observers see his present strategy as an attempt to appeal to traditional Republican strongholds such as the Middle West and to make inroads in the normally Democratic south. But the two most consistent aspects of his appeal, his strong internationalism and his liberal stand on civil rights, undercut this argument. The former hardly seems calculated to endear him to Middle Western isolationists, and the latter is certainly not the best method of attracting Southern support.

At this point Rockefeller is interested primarily in obtaining the nomination and with it control of the Republican party and only secondarily in preparing an election strategy. If, however, he sacrifices too much of his liberalism, he will lose what chance he has of being elected. Governor Rockefeller should remember that in 1962 the liberal Republicans, such as Kuchel and Javits, emerged with the most impressive pluralities, while Capehart and Nixon were defeated.

It would be possible for Rockefeller both to regain his liberalism and to receive the nomination. By amassing an impressive record in primary contests he could bring pressure on the party leadership from the general membership. Kennedy used this technique to force the Democratic party's leaders to accept him, and he did not compromise either his policies or programs in the process. Such compromise appeared later, in his dealings with Congress. In fact Rockefeller would face a less difficult task than did Kennedy, for at present there are no other candidates of his stature and reputation in the Republican party.

The major threat to Rockefeller's bid for the nomination does not come from opposition in the Republican party but rather from an investigation of the New York State Liquor Authority. Already three important Rockefeller appointees, including the former Republican State Chairman, have resigned under pressure, and it appears that the revelations have only begun. Although the Governor has acted quickly and deliberately on all charges, his actions cannot change the fact that his appointees are at fault.

It would be ironic if Nelson Rockefeller, having travelled so far and sacrificed so many of his earlier liberal beliefs in order to obtain the Republican nomination, saw it denied to him because of something which had happened in his state administration.