A Divided Alliance

The death of one of the sacred cows of modern weaponry, the Skybolt, has been loudly lamented by its British worshippers, who have accused its executioner, Robert McNamara, of betraying them. Some protests have been quieted by the Nassau Pact, but the Skybolt controversy highlights a deep misunderstanding between the United States and her European allies concerning their mutual defense against Soviet attack, nuclear or otherwise.

The United States possesses a nuclear arsenal fully sufficient, for the defense of herself and her allies without the help of the Skybolt. Yet the British and the French have exhibited uneasiness about the reliability of U.S. protection by attempting to create nuclear weapons of their own.

West European statesmen are haunted by the fear that the U.S. will not use her nuclear weapons in case of a massive Soviet attack on Europe, if U.S. territory is not directly threatened. They desperately want some weapons to be under their absolute control.

These feelings are understandable, especially in the light of U.S. secrecy and vacillations in policy of which the Skybolt affair is the most recent noticeable example. Yet the attempt of other NATO powers such as France to create separate nuclear forces may damage rather than promote the military effectiveness of the alliance.

A so-called independent European deterrent could hardly increase the alliance's total strength, and would make NATO relatively useless against Russia. The nuclear capability of Great Britain is at present two per cent of that of the U.S., and de Gaulle's "force de frappe" will amount to only another two per cent when completed. Germany might add an additional two per cent.

These weapons, moreover, divert vital resources from the buildup of conventional forces to repel any non-nuclear attack on Europe. As Dean Acheson has pointed out, England, France and Germany could gain far greater control over day-by-day alliance strategy simply by contributing a larger share of NATO's conventional forces.

Several steps are required to wean our allies away from their dreams of nuclear prowess and to draw them into a coordinated nuclear command structure. The Administration should give allied governments more detailed information about our nuclear weapons, even at the cost of certain risks to security. Such information should hopefully reassure them that the U.S. had adequate nuclear forces specifically earmarked for the defense of Europe.

Even more important, the U.S. must convince Britain, France and Germany that it will use its nuclear deterrent in designated situations on which all four have agreed and that it will abide by its commitments through thick and thin. To achieve this aim, close and skillful consultation between the allied governments is required.

Such an agreement, which would leave the ultimate decision when to push the button in U.S. hands, must be based on a mutual understanding of Western Europe in the U.S. Although this country has not obtained it to date, such an understanding can be created.