STANLEY HOFFMANN'S U.N.?

To the Editors of the CRIMSON:

It seems to me that an ardent supporter of Hammarskjold's conception of the U.N. should be impressed by the late Secretary-General's consistent refusal to use force against Tshombe--precisely because he feared that such an attempt would create so much dissension that the future usefulness of the U.N. might be imperiled.

My reasons for objecting to the U.N.'s use of force may not be valid, but they are perfectly clair, and--since they are to be the core of my New Republic piece--you might have tried to mention them. It is a bit too easy to dismiss an opinion which one has not accurately described. What ain't fair ain't American. Stanley Hoffmann,   Associate Professor of Govt.

MR. SCHWARTZ WRITES: There is little point in guessing what Mr. Hammarskjold's policy towards Tshombe would have been after the Katangan attack on U.N. forces in early September. His "consistent refusal to use force" before then was, I think, simply a reflection of his belief that the U.N. would have been defeated--the one thing which would imperil its future usefulness.

Mr. Hoffmann's objections to the attack on Tshombe--as outlined in his article--are based on skepticism about the U.N.'s ability to follow its own precedent without disaster, should another "Congo" develop. He does not see what, in fact, has been the heart of the U.N.'s problem since Hammarskjold's death. The U.N. must be willing to undertake a military operation where it is necessary and where it is likely to succeed, but be able to resist any faction (and anti-colonialism is only one of these) which tries to use such an action as a "precedent" to involve the U.N. where it is undeeded or outnumbered. The tragedy of Hammarskjold's death is that the U.N. lost a Secretary-General whose strength and intelligence gave him some chance of pursuing such a pragmatic policy successfully.

Mr. Hoffmann's different interpretation of all this is indeed "perfectly clair" and well worth reading. What he left unclair in his article was his reason for thinking the Indian action similar to the U.N.'s in inspiration and probable effect. If I was unfair to him, It was in not pointing out that he very wisely drops the parallel after a few paragraphs, and concentrates on his objections to the U.N. Itself; I was only astonished that he had seen any similarity in the first place.