TV and the Congress

Television's Emmy awards came just a week too late this year. Had the industry waited a few days, it could have presented Newton N. Minow, the new chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, with the plaque for "most impolitic performance of the year in a good cause." As things stand now, however, Mr. Minow will receive no plaque, but, instead, an ill-deserved rebuff.

Earlier this month Mr. Minow went before the National Association of Broadcasters, and told them bluntly that violence and medicocrity make contemporary television programming a "vast wasteland" which "squanders the public's airwaves." And, in words even less welcome to his audience, he promised the use the now virtually dormant powers of the FCC to improve the quality of programs. Specifically, he promised to make the triennial renewal of station licenses more than a formality, and, through public hearings, demand that the stations prove that they are living up to their pledge to operate "in the public interest."

Partly as a result of this long called for, and widely praised by the newspapers and the public, speech, it now appears certain that President Kennedy's program for the reorganization of the FCC will be killed by a Congressional veto. Lobbyists of the broadcasting industry have joined forces with Congressmen piqued by the President's methods of reorganization to defeat the plan.

Neither of the objections offered by opponents of the reorganization program carries much weight. Their principal argument, that the plan would give too much power to the chairman of the commission has been propounded most vigorously (not unexpectedly) by the other members of the commission. Mr. Minow has pointed out in vain that the chairman could not exceed the powers granted to him by the seven-member commission.

The second argument, that the FCC would become a tool of the Executive branch, instead of being responsible to Congress, is advanced most strongly by the powerful Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee. Under the new program, the chairman would have power over all assignment of personnel, including commission members. According to these representatives, he could make certain that only those members whose views he shared, determined policy; and since the chairman serves at the pleasure of the President, the Chief Executive would determine policy. This argument neglects the constitutional legislative checks which have safeguarded Congress' prerogatives with respect to other regulatory commissions.

The contention that the chairman of the commission would become a censor of broadcasting, an idea advanced by the broadcasting lobby, does not apply, because the President's plan does not make a dictator of the chairman. The reorganization program, proposed by James H. Landis, aims to relieve members of the commission from the delay and inefficiency caused by its present obligation to handle petty matters. The delegation of routine decisions to small panels of commissioners or to staff members will not remove the commission's power to restrain the chairman on important matters.

Speaker Sam Rayburn anticipates no difficulty in getting Congress' approval of the reorganization plans for other agencies, which were drafted by Mr. Landis along lines similar to that of the FCC program. The primary reason for the fight over the plans for the FCC was summed up by an anonymous Congressman: "If it were someone else who were chairman, they would not be so concerned."

Red tape and preoccupation with trivial matters have prevented the FCC from using its powers to assure that the country's television stations do, indeed, "serve in the public interest." Power-politicking Congressmen and broadcasters eager to continue the profitable status quo should not be permitted to obstruct the necessary reform because of a personal feud.