Hoffmann Scores Tocsin

In a series of comments which will probably bring down a storm of wrath from local disarmament groups, Stanley Hoffmann last night issued a sharply-worded challenge to the "marchers for peace which they cannot define."

"No group," he declared, "should have the comforts of non-responsibility simply because it is small and in the opposition."

Hoffmann, associate professor of Government, spoke on the "Harvard Radio forum," which will be played over HRB Sunday at 7 p.m. He faced a panel of questioners including Peter Goldmark president of Tocain, Kenneth S. '45, associate professor of English, even Graubard, lecturer in History and general Education, and this reporter.

After a bitter critique of the radical night, Hoffmann addressed his remarks correctly at SANE and Tocsin. "Precisely because what you are advocating is unpopular the burden of proof is on you. If you simply repeat rituals you are going be dismissed out of hand as irresponsible."

Lists Three Errors

Hoffmann pointed to three errors in pronouncements of disarmament groups: an overestimation of the likelihood of war, a mistaken belief in the defensive character and limited objectives of Soviet policy, and an inordinate press on survival as a goal of American region policy.

Discussing unilateral initiative in arms control, he warned against "assuming at just because survival is an common both sides will translate this common imperative into common measures. He does not strike me as part of Soviet strategy to reassure us."

Graubard underlined Hoffmann's comments, and remarked that Tocsin reminded him of "an old record." He lamented that peace groups had not framed specific and practicable answers to the radical right.

Soviets Won't Respond

In reply, Hoffmann declared that "When one stresses a common interest in survival as a basis for negotiations and agreements," one must beware of assuming that "just because we would take unilateral measures in the direction of peace, the Soviet Union would take parallel unilateral measures. It might just as well do the opposite, and take advantage of the gap thus opened."

But he saw more hope in tacit, parallel restraints. These, he claimed, "do not assume a sudden, radical alternation in human nature. After all, if you feel that man remains pig-headed enough to start a war if he is not disarmed, how can you believe he has suddenly become rational enough to willingly give up his arms?" An informal agreement, less restrictive of sovereignty and less threatening to security than an inspected arms ban, might have more effect, Hoffmann concluded.

After a bitter critique of the radical night, Hoffmann addressed his remarks correctly at SANE and Tocsin. "Precisely because what you are advocating is unpopular the burden of proof is on you. If you simply repeat rituals you are going be dismissed out of hand as irresponsible."

Lists Three Errors

Hoffmann pointed to three errors in pronouncements of disarmament groups: an overestimation of the likelihood of war, a mistaken belief in the defensive character and limited objectives of Soviet policy, and an inordinate press on survival as a goal of American region policy.

Discussing unilateral initiative in arms control, he warned against "assuming at just because survival is an common both sides will translate this common imperative into common measures. He does not strike me as part of Soviet strategy to reassure us."

Graubard underlined Hoffmann's comments, and remarked that Tocsin reminded him of "an old record." He lamented that peace groups had not framed specific and practicable answers to the radical right.

Soviets Won't Respond

In reply, Hoffmann declared that "When one stresses a common interest in survival as a basis for negotiations and agreements," one must beware of assuming that "just because we would take unilateral measures in the direction of peace, the Soviet Union would take parallel unilateral measures. It might just as well do the opposite, and take advantage of the gap thus opened."

But he saw more hope in tacit, parallel restraints. These, he claimed, "do not assume a sudden, radical alternation in human nature. After all, if you feel that man remains pig-headed enough to start a war if he is not disarmed, how can you believe he has suddenly become rational enough to willingly give up his arms?" An informal agreement, less restrictive of sovereignty and less threatening to security than an inspected arms ban, might have more effect, Hoffmann concluded.

Discussing unilateral initiative in arms control, he warned against "assuming at just because survival is an common both sides will translate this common imperative into common measures. He does not strike me as part of Soviet strategy to reassure us."

Graubard underlined Hoffmann's comments, and remarked that Tocsin reminded him of "an old record." He lamented that peace groups had not framed specific and practicable answers to the radical right.

Soviets Won't Respond

In reply, Hoffmann declared that "When one stresses a common interest in survival as a basis for negotiations and agreements," one must beware of assuming that "just because we would take unilateral measures in the direction of peace, the Soviet Union would take parallel unilateral measures. It might just as well do the opposite, and take advantage of the gap thus opened."

But he saw more hope in tacit, parallel restraints. These, he claimed, "do not assume a sudden, radical alternation in human nature. After all, if you feel that man remains pig-headed enough to start a war if he is not disarmed, how can you believe he has suddenly become rational enough to willingly give up his arms?" An informal agreement, less restrictive of sovereignty and less threatening to security than an inspected arms ban, might have more effect, Hoffmann concluded.