Quemoy and Matsu

Although the positions of Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kennedy over Quemoy and Matsu have narrowed in the last few days, the issue provides an example of the dangers inherent in a presidential campaign. In their efforts to differentiate their stands, the two candidates have taken positions which can in charity only be called more extreme than is warranted.

Mr. Nixon's position, or at least one of his positions, was as untenable as that of the Nationalists on the islands. To state that these two groups of islands, situated as Fort Sumter was in the middle of the harbors of two major mainland ports, and 120 miles from Formosa, are in "the area of freedom" and must be defended on principle, is to ignore the problem of how or why they are to be defended. To state that they will be defended if they are attacked as part of a campaign against Formosa ignores the fact that it is impossible to determine whether a battle is part of a general attack against the Nationalists, and also assumes unwarrantedly that occupation of these islands bears some relation to the defense of an island over 120 miles away.

Poor Mr. Kennedy, however, has been unable to formulate any effective reply to the argument that we should not cede one inch of free territory. The mere fact that the two groups of islands are not included within the mandatory treaty area is not a reason for surrendering them. Furthermore, Kennedy has exhibited a strange reluctance to cite the perfectly analogous case of the Administration's withdrawal from the Tachen islands when they were under bombardment in the beginning of 1955.

The correct principle involved is not, as Mr. Nixon has suggested, the defense of every inch of "freedom," but, as action in 1955 demonstrated, one of drawing a line which can reasonably be maintained and defended, as Quemoy and Matsu can not.